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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest and most powerful state in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Geographically, it lies at the cross roads of West Asian 
security. On the one hand, it is a key Gulf player because of its important 
presence in the Gulf, its association with the smaller Gulf monarchies and 
the location of its oilfields near the Gulf. .On the other hand, off Saudi 
Arabia's West Coast, the Red Sea is another strategic water-way for Saudi 
Arabia and other powers'^ -with'the'^ " reopening of the Suez Canal, to 
international navigation, the Red Sea should gain added significance for 
civilian as well as military navigation. To the north, the country borders the 
Fertile Crescent, which gives rise to complicated entanglement in northern 
Arab politics. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is divided into four 
administrative regions: the Eastern Province, the Central Province, the 
Western Province and the Southwestern Province. The Eastern, Central and 
Western provinces are the most important areas: the first for its oil, the 
second as the capital of the house of Saud and the center of the Whhabite 
sect of Islam. 
The third for the Muslim holy places Economically, Saudi Arabia is the 
world's largest oil producer and holds over one-fourth of the world's proven 
oil reserves. It has a decisive voice in the movement and price structure of 
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oil worldwide. Its crude oil production during December 2006 was an 
estimated 9.21 million barrels per day (mbd). This constituted nearly 30 
percent of the OPEC total of 25.85 mbd. Throughout the 1990s Saudi 
production averaged well over 8 mbd, or roughly 13 percent of total world 
production. At the end of 2007 Saudi Arabian's reserves equaled 259.96 
billion barrels of crude oil: 25 percent of the world's total. The kingdom is 
likely to maintain this proportion of reserves well into the next decades. 
Historically, the story of oil in Saudi Arabia started in the early 1930s when 
Aramco first began its explorations in the desert of eastern Arabia. Aramco 
is a unique consortium of four major American oil companies: Socal, 
Texaco, Excon and Mobile. Throughout, Aramco has been a prime mover in 
the building of modem Saudi Arabia, the company and the kingdom has 
been two interlocking gears in the machinery of modernization. 
The modem political history of Saudi Arabia dates only from the mid 
eighteenth century with rise of the House of Saud in Najd, the region of 
central Arabia. The kingdom was formally created on September 23, 1932, 
after King Abdul Aziz al Saud reconsolidated his family's patrimony that 
had been lost to a rival family in the late nineteenth century. 
The most profound agent of change for the economy of Saudi Arabia was 
the discovery of huge reserves of oil by a United States company in 1938. 
Initially, the newly established oil industry had only an indirect impact on 
2 
Abstract 
this primitive economy. The establishment of the Arabian American oil 
company (Aramco, Predecessor of Saudi Aramco) and the oil towns around 
the oil fields triggered major changes in the economy of the kingdom, 
especially in the Eastern provinces. Development of the oil fields required 
ancillary construction of modem ports, roads, housing, power plants, and 
water systems. In addition to the concentration of oil employees and the 
range of services of oil companies and employees needs opened new 
economic opportunities on a scale previously unseen to local merchants, 
contractors, and others. Aramco provided technical, financial, and logistical 
support to local entrepreneurs. The discovery of oil ended the kingdom's 
isolation and introduced new ways to organize the production and 
distribution of goods and services. 
More recently industrial policy has focused upon the potential for 
privatization in the kingdom of a number of state-operated or state-
controlled enterprises these include Saudi Arabia Basic Industries 
Cooperation (Sabic), Saudi Telecoms and Saudi the national airlines. 
In view of the country's almost total lack of modem infrastmcture in the 
early 1950s, constmction activity has been second only to oil in importance 
to the domestic economy. The petroleum industry has created the need and 
supplied most of the funds for a building boom in govemment and business 
facilities, villas and palaces for the royal family and official, and homes for 
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employs of the oil companies and other concerns. This activity has 
proceeded unabated for several years and Industry is the glamour sector of 
economic development. People look to industrial development to provide 
much needed employment, generate higher individual and national incomes, 
relieve balance of payment, constraints through import substitution, open up 
markets for primary products such as those from the mining and fishing 
sector, give the country greater economic independence, generate new tax 
revenues and furnish an important source of national pride. 
With the establishment of Sabic in 1976, the government undertook a major 
effort to create domestic petrochemical industry that was designed to 
augment oil export earning and to use abundantly available domestic 
resources, particular associated gas supplies. 
Sabic affirms the quality of its products and advanced services. These 
companies have setup its industrial complex for development and research, 
which was officially opened on December 1994. 
During recent few years, petrochemical industries in the kingdom have 
occupied an advanced rank on both regional and international levels in view 
of the financial capabilities and huge natural resources available to the 
kingdom. Petrochemical industry utilized oil and natural gas basic raw 
material for its products. The petrochemicals industry is composed of two 
main sector, the first is basic chemical such ethylene and propylene, which 
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are derived from oil or gas. The second is convertible basic chemicals, 
which are used directly in a number of industries such as plastic, rubber and 
fertilizers. 
According to the data of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic), the 
kingdom's share of petrochemical products stood as 78 percent of the total 
chemical products of the GCC countries during 2008, 53 percent of the 
West Asia total chemical production and 3.8 percent of the world total 
production. The kingdom's share of fertilizers was 43 percent of the GCC 
countries total production of fertilizers, 30 percents of the West Asia total 
production and 2.4 percent of the world total production. 
Saudi Arabia is still heavily dependent on petroleum exports, which is 
greater than some Saudi imports. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) reports that 'mineral products' (oil and gas) accounted for 88% of 
all Saudi exports in 1997 a figures that are typical for the late 1970s. These 
figures, however, understate that true role of oil and gas in the economy 
because they do not include another 2-5% in plastics exports and 4-9% in 
chemical products. As a result petroleum actually accounts for something 
approaching 95% of all exports. Estimates by the Ministry of Planning 
indicate that crude oil accounted for 74.2% of all exports in 2000, and 
petroleum products for 17.1% bringing the total to 91.3%). 
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All of these factors limit the kingdom's actual "oil wealth". Saudi Arabia is 
only "wealthy" in oil and gas terms to the extent its export revenues 
preserve a high ratio of oil and gas incomes per capita. While no precise 
statistics are available, this ratio seems to have dropped by more than 65% 
between the peak of oil boom in the early 1980s and the worst point in the 
"oil crash" of the value of both the GDP and petroleum production. There 
are data problems in the oil petroleum export earnings that, combined with 
the previous uncertainties in population data, make it impossible to provide 
an accurate picture of oil income per capita; however, it is all too clear that 
the population is rising significantly faster than oil revenues. 
The challenge of economic reforms; looks at the key economic dilemmas 
facing the Saudi Arabia state today, set within the context of the country's 
overall political economy. While the economic development of the country 
has proceeded quickly there remain key critical areas where some problems 
remain; the provision of adequate and economically productive employment 
of the population (both male and female), the achievement of a reasonable 
level of equity in the distribution of rewards from the economy, the creation 
of economic structure appropriate for the long term (non-oil) viability of the 
economy, and the creation of a social and physical infrastructure adequate 
for popular needs. Saudi Arabia's is a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 2005 makes urgent the resolution of these problems. The 
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need to reform the economy and provide productive employment has an 
urgency which requires a radical approach. The reforms undertaken to date 
suffer from three problems. The first is that they have been implemented 
slowly and partially. Economic reform will become more difficult the longer 
it is left. Rising unemployment and deteriorating social conditions, fed by 
one of the highest rates of population growth in the world (almost 4 percent 
during the 1980s) will intensify political unrest and social disruption in 
ftiture. Second the context of the reforms is inadequate. The wider reforms 
which are needed are in many ways the most difficult, requiring a more far-
reaching social and political transformation than has so far been envisaged. 
Central to the needed reform is the issue of labour and employment. Saudi 
labour must be as productive and cost effective as migrant labour. While the 
problem of unemployment may gain temporary redress through the 
imposition of Saudi labour on unwilling employers and this will not create a 
productive economy for the long term. Saudi labour needs to be able to 
compete with expatriate/migrant manpower, such that employees see that 
economic gain of employing Saudis. The balance needs to be re-adjusted on 
both sides making Saudi labour more productive and less expensive to 
employers, and improving the working conditions of migrant labour (and/or 
imposing taxes on employers of migrant labour) thereby making it more 
expensive. 
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Third, a massive redirection of government finances is needed so as to 
provide the resources for the Saudi state to re-structure the economy and 
social structure. In addition to freeing up the regulations and bottlenecks 
which are currently discouraging investment, so as to ensure more 
employment for Saudis, greater equity, better social conditions and a viable 
economy for the long term. The state needs to divest itself of the ownership 
of most of the productive processes, so as both to save/raise money and to 
allow competitive forces to run companies and corporation more effectively. 
The resources (both financial and administrative) freed by these measures 
must be used to improve the country's physical and social infrastructure on 
the basis of improved educational and health services, and better welfare 
provision (such that the impact of making Saudis redundant from existing 
insecure positions can be softened)and the productive potenfial of the 
population can be released. 
A radical agenda of the kind proposed requires, a new social contract 
between the state and the population. A significant level of trust is needed, 
built on government transparency and a stronger commitment to socio-
economic equity and greater popular accountability. A clear dividing line 
must be drawn between the state and the private sector, such that private 
sector gain is not dependent on government favor. 
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Saudi Arabia socio-economic development must deal with massive ongoing 
social changes, growing demographic problems, and the need to 
fundamentally restructure and diversify the Saudi economy. It must find 
new solution to encourage foreign and domestic direct investment. It must 
create a far stronger private sector and one far less dependent on oil and gas 
exports, service industries and imports. It must develop and implement a 
long term energy structure to manage massive changes in the production and 
use of oil and gas and the scale and character of downstream operation. 
Saudi must replace its dependence on foreign labour with jobs for Saudis 
and Saudi labour and investment must become more productive and 
globally competitive. The kingdom's socio-economic development must 
absorb a near "explosion of young Saudis and expand its educational system 
infrastructure and job market accordingly. At the same time, it must adopt 
its traditional culture, religious customs, education and political structure to 
maintain its Saudi character and become a modem nation. 
The problem of such transitions pose should not be exaggerated. Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated its resilience and adaptability in the past, and it 
seems to be committed to doing so in the future. 
Saudi oil income interact with the certainty of massive population growth 
based on relatively conservative assumption about future Saudi population 
growth, which still shows that the kingdom is projected to have some of the 
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fastest population growth in the Arab world, and indeed the entire world. 
Even though the World Bank projections call for a significant future 
decrease in the Saudi population growth rate, they still project that Saudi 
Arabia will grow from a nation of 21.7 million people in 2000 to 46 million 
in 2030. 
In spite of its past accomplishment, Saudi Arabia faces other challenges that 
will be difficult to meet. Saudi Arabia must deal with the social and 
economic impacts of its explosive population growth at a time when much 
of its oil wealth has diminished in relative terms. 
Saudi Arabia must shape an energy strategy that will maintain its position as 
the world's preeminent oil exporter while developing its gas resources and 
diversifying its economy. 
Many of the kingdom's earnings from its petroleum products and 
downstream operations have been offset by the high investment cost for 
facilities and by the concealed cost of subsidized diversion of crude oil and 
gas to feedstock, Saudi Arabia also faces serious social challenges as a 
result of its rapid social and economic evolution. These challenges range 
from the need to modernize religious practices and the legal system to the 
"culture shock" resulting fi-om placing a highly traditional society in 
continuing contact with a secular west. The most serious of the challenges, 
however, is to create a meaningful future from Saudi youth. During the 
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coming decades, Saudi Arabia not only must invest to create a large diverse 
private sector, but it must make massive new investments to maintain its 
status as a petroleum power. It must make equally massive investment in the 
national infrastructure. These investments almost certainly will cost in 
excess a one-third of a trillion dollars and this may be greater sum than the 
kingdoms can self finance even if it shifts from dependence on state 
investment to dependence on private financing. 
Saudi Arabia may be able to meet this mix of internal challenges, but the 
task will not be easy, restricting Saudi society and the economy present the 
most serious challenges of all, and change most come at a fime when 
Islamic extension is a serious concern and Saudi Arabia's oil income is not 
sufficient to meet it social and economic needs. Saudi Arabia real needs are 
to match education and social reform with economic reform. The demand 
for greater transparency and pressure for political social and economic 
reform in democratic fashion put the ruling class of Saudi Arabia in 
dilemma .The prevailing sentiments in Saudi Arabia indicate a clear 
majority support for democracy and overwhelming rejection of autocratic 
rule. The reformist movement in Saudi Arabia may be discerned as the 
beginning of democrafic awareness of the people—indeed an important 
development. The reformist movement is not an organized political activity 
at the moment. It should not be consider a weak movement in Saudi socio-
11 
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political evolution. However, it could play constructive role in buoyant 
disposition of Saudi socio political evolution. It will not be wronged to say 
that the ruling class in Saudi Arabia is feeling congestion in the smooth 
functioning of the affairs. 
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PREFACE 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has witnessed a remarkable socio-
economic transformation after the increase of oil prices in 1970s. The 
massive accumulation of oil wealth encouraged the leaders of Saudi 
Arabia to launch the development programmes which led the gradual 
evolution of Saudi Arabia into a modem state. Consequently, a modem 
infrastructure with social services and facilities has developed which 
significantly influenced the Saudi's socio-political system. The 
modemization programmes launched so far have significantly influenced 
the social spectrum of the country and perception of the society. These 
advancement programmes have caused major changes in Saudi Arabia's 
economy and society resulting rapid urbanization, diffusion of education 
among the population, altered class structure and heightened political 
awareness due to growth of communication. As a result a new social 
structure, consisting of bureaucrats, technician and an urban work force, 
has emerged who began to assert for liberal political reform. The new 
class structure has also presented challenge to the country's traditional 
political dynamics based on tribal traditions and family powers, religious 
influence and oil wealth. 
Population, health, education, employment, social integration govemance 
and empowerment are all socio-economic issue of crucial importance to 
sustainable development of Saudi Arabia. This is because each 
contributes to the ability of countries of effectively governs human 
settlements, manages natural resources, generate economic growth and 
respond to socio-economic inequities. Generally, two parallel tracks have 
been pursued by governments of the Saudi Arabia to address these issues 
(1) direct actions to assist the most in need; and (2) public reforms to 
improve the provision of health, education, infrastructure, information 
technology, and employment. 
Saudi Arabia has witnessed marked improvements in health, fertility rate, 
education and literacy, as well as a strengthening in the status, and an 
expanded role for civil society. However, this progress has been achieved 
in the face of increasing population pressures, fluctuating economic 
conditions, prevailing unemployment, continued poverty and unreduced 
regional conflicts. 
Economic growth and public spending financed primarily by oil revenues 
- have allowed Saudi Arabia to a better respond to the regions socio-
economic needs over the past decade. However, growth has come at a 
price. Public expenditure has become increasingly unsustainable as debt 
repayments encroach on social spending and environmental investments. 
Changing consumption pattern have led to increased stress on the 
environmental investment. In response, civil society is growing stronger 
and is addressing local concerns. However, participatory and more 
effective governance is still needed. Nevertheless, while important gains 
have been achieved, disparities in social progress and income equality 
remain pronounced. While the majority of people in Saudi Arabia now 
have better access to basic public services, important gaps in health, 
education and welfare persist. Progress on the social front has also slowed 
as compared to previous decades and lags behind progress made by other 
developing regions. 
Further, the rapid pace of urbanization and mass education has 
considerably weakened the cohesion of the system in Saudi Arabia. The 
reconciliation and synthesis of traditional moral values with new norms 
and technology has, infact, created strains on existing society and from of 
government. The question of the adaptability of these issues at present is 
greater sources of instability in Saudi Arabia. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters: 
The first chapter describes the synopsis, hypothesis, objectives, problem 
statement, and evolution of the Government of socio-economic 
development of Saudi Arabia. The second chapter discusses about the 
land, and climatic conditions. It also explains history, customs and culture 
of Saudi Arabia. 
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The third chapter focuses on development of oil and non-oil mineral 
resources of Saudi Arabia and their role in socio-economic development 
of Saudi Arabia. 
The fourth chapter of the present study emphasizes the Agriculture and 
water resource development of Saudi Arabia. 
The fifth chapter mentions industrial development and the increasing 
participation of private sector in the socio-economic development of 
Saudi Arabia. The sixth chapter highlights the Human Resources 
Development of Saudi Arabia. This chapter also elaborates the efforts of 
Saudi government to replace the expatriates with the native population. 
The seventh chapter elucidates the impact of socio-economic 
development of Saudi Arabia, the emergence of reformists and responses 
of the government of Saudi Arabia. The last chapter is suggestion and 
conclusion of entire study. 
The present study is largely an attempt to evaluate the socio-economic 
development of Saudi Arabia. It will analyse the emergence of reformist 
that appeared gradually with the process of socio-economic 
transformation and their immeasurable impact on the long term political 
stability of Saudi Arabia. It will also examine the emerging reformists 
influence and responses of the regime and mild liberalization of political 
life in Saudi Arabia 
rv 
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BACKGROUND 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest and most powerful state in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Geographically, it lies at the cross roads of West 
Asian security. On the one hand, it is a key Gulf player because of its 
important presence in the Gulf, its association with the smaller Gulf 
monarchies and the location of its oilfields near the Gulf On the other 
hand, off Saudi Arabia's West Coast, the Red Sea is another strategic 
water-way for Saudi Arabia and other powers with the reopening of the 
Suez Canal, to international navigation, the Red Sea should gain added 
significance for civilian as well as military navigation. To the north, the 
country borders the Fertile Crescent, which gives rise to complicated 
entanglement in northern Arab Politics. This, combined with its quest for 
legitimacy in Arab affairs and its physical proximity to Israel, make the 
kingdom an important, if reticent, actor in Arab-Israeli matters. 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is divided into four administrative regions: 
the Eastern Province, the Central Province, the Western Province and the 
Southwestern Province. The Eastern, Central and Western provinces are 
the most important areas: the first for its oil, the second as the capital of 
the house of Saud and the center of the Whhabite sect of Islam. 
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The third for the Muslim holy places Economically, Saudi Arabia is the 
world's largest oil producer and holds over one-fourth of the world's 
proven oil reserves. It has a decisive voice in the movement and price 
structure of oil worldwide. Its crude oil production during December 
2006 was an estimated 9.21 million barrels per day (mbd). This 
constituted nearly 30 percent of the OPEC total of 25.85 mbd. 
Throughout the 1990s Saudi production averaged well over 8 mbd, or 
roughly 13 percent of total world production. At the end of 2007 Saudi 
Arabian's reserves equaled 259.96 billion barrels of crude oil: 25 percent 
of the world's total. The kingdom is likely to maintain this proportion of 
reserves well into the next decades. 
Historically, the story of oil in Saudi Arabia started in the early 1930s 
when Aramco first began its explorations in the desert of eastern Arabia. 
Aramco is a unique consortium of four major American oil companies: 
Socal, Texaco, Excon and Mobile. Throughout, Aramco has been a prime 
mover in the building of modem Saudi Arabia, the company and the 
kingdom has been two interlocking gears in the machinery of 
modernization. 
In the early years of production Aramco paid the Saudi government a 
small share of the earning: the payment had gradually risen to 50 percent 
of total company revenues by 1950. With the formation of OPEC in the 
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early 1960s, Saudi Arabia, like other oil-producing countries, began to 
demand a larger share of the earnings, including an increase in the posted 
price. In the early 1970s Saudi Arabia initiated moves to participate in the 
ownership of Aramco. In the spring of 1975, the government and Aramco 
began discussion on the complete Saudi ownership of the company. 
The 1973 October war sparked a new development in the world of oil. 
Prior to 1973, Saudi Arabia had kept oil and politics apart. The three 
Arab-Israeli wars of 1947-48, 1956 and 1967 did not adversely influence 
the volume of production in Saudi Arabia. Oil production continued to 
increase. The Arab members of OPEC, for the first time, used oil as a 
political weapon, an oil embargo was declared against the US and 
Holland. Saudi Arabia, the principal force behind the embargo, advocated 
a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab states based on 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The embargo was also 
accompanied by a sharp rise in the price of oil. Saudi Arabia began to 
mass unprecedented revenues within Saudi Arabia itself, these oil 
revenues have funded major economic projects in agriculture and 
industry. Saudi Arabia started using its oil revenues to diversify its 
economy, to build a broad industrial base, and to educate and train its 
nationals. The kingdom has embarked on colossal programmers of 
economic development, particularly through a series of ambition, five-
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year plans. The diversified programmers' emphasized infrastructure 
improvements, heavy defense expenditures and the immense 
industriahzation projects at the new cities of Jubail and Yanbu. Increasing 
domestic production, especially in agriculture, and greater emphasis on 
the role of private sector were the focus of successive five-year plans, 
with an added effort to reduce dependence on oil revenues and to develop 
human resources, implement privatization policy and improve 
productivity within the government. 
During the three decades from 1953 to 1983, the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia broke out of its traditional isolation, seeking to import the 
conveniences of modernity while preserving its social customs and 
institutions. Modem roads and hospitals were built, sophisticated 
telecommunications systems were installed, and a diversified private 
sector emerged in a land where nomadic Bedouin and village dwellers 
still lived according to norms and traditions handed down from the days 
of the Prophet of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) over the years, the 
Saudi people encountered foreigners and the trappings of technology at 
an accelerating pace, affecting their lives, and lifestyles as never before. 
The destabilizing elements which threaten to upset the traditional balance 
include the sudden infusion of wealth, disparities in its distribution, the 
expansion of secular education, growing contracts with the outside world. 
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and changing social and economic roles. However the basic pillars of 
Saudi Society - the family and Islam and the myriad cultural norms still 
intact and interact with these forces. 
However, economic transformation necessarily also results in social 
change. The impact of economic and social change in Saudi Arabia 
inevitably has caused political repercussions, including reexamination of 
the role of the ruling families and pressure for political participation. In 
common with its Gulf allies Saudi Arabia faces growing pressure for 
political participation at least from the expanding educated sector of its 
population. A growing desire is emerging for a say in state and 
government objectives for fore in which to debate national issues, for the 
creation of some form of government accountability and for restriction on 
the role and excesses of members of ruling families. 
Naturally, these economic and social changes have endangered pressures 
for political change. The principal response of the Saudi government to 
date has been the creation of the Majlis al Shura, or Consultative Council, 
in 1993. The Majlis as al Shura was headed by former Minister of Justice 
chairman and sixty persons were appointed as members of the Majlis. 
The second Majlis, underpressure, was established during 1997-2001 and 
it saw its membership increased to 90 members, and the third Majlis, 
established during 2001-2005, saw another increase to 130 members. 
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Increasingly the emphasis seemed to be on younger modernist with 
higher degrees. The Majlis is not a legislative body, and its purview in 
limited to the social-service function of government. Nonetheless, it is 
said to discuss vigorously a variety of issues in committee. 
Needless to say, internal changes have direct implications for Saudi 
defiance and security policy. This may take several forms. Complaints 
about military expenditures are increasingly heard in private conversation 
across a wide spectrum of the population. This long decline in oil 
revenues has produced the equivalent of guns or butter argument, 
pointing out that the purchase of arms and other material reduces the 
money available for social services or development programmers' and 
defiance expenditures occur simply as a means to enrich members of the 
ruling and their cronies. In addition, with the shrinking of the economic 
pie the issue of corruption has risen to the surface. Arms deals are 
regarded as the biggest source of corruption. Others turn the argument 
slightly and ask why it is necessary to pay for arms when Saudi Arabia 
also has to pay for Western states to defend it. Popular concern in Saudi 
Arabia centers on domestic issues than international ones, even those of 
national security. 
Most people recognize that the dizzy heights of prosperity achieved in the 
1970s and early 1980s will never be reached again. The size of the 
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economic pie has shrunk considerably due to the paying off the Kuwait 
War. The per capita income of Saudi Arabia at the height of economic 
boom was on a par with that of the United States, but it dropped sharply 
to some $ 7000 per year at the start of the 21"' century, relegating the 
country to third world status with correspondingly poor distribution of 
wealth and widening income disparity. The high population growth rates 
have created apprehension about availability of jobs in Saudi Arabia. The 
immediate problem is the need for heavy government expenditure on 
such items as healthcare and education for the majority of the population 
are relatively Young Growing population also means heavier use of 
scarce resources and services, such as water and electricity. Increasing 
disparities between social and economic groups has caused resentment in 
Saudi Arabia. More importantly, however, it has widened divides 
between them as the rich and privileged prosper while many citizens 
remain trapped in low-paying jobs and limited financial means. 
Expatriates form some 25 percent of Saudi Arabia's population. 
Dependence on expatriates becomes mixed with resentment in the minds 
of the growing legion of young unemployed Saudi. The Islamic 
dimension of Saudi Arabia in most important than any. It sees itself as 
having special responsibilities in the world-wide Islamic community. 
Religious influence is another powerful characteristic of the Saudi socio-
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political system. The Saudi royal family has assumed the role of the 
defender of the faith. The Islamic element in the legitimacy of the Al-
Saud leads the kingdom to proclaim itself as the quintessential Islamic 
state. For this reason, the country exhibits an extraordinary religious and 
social conservation, as a result of which the government finds it 
extremely difficult to make many domestic changes. 
The second Islamic responsibility comes from Saudi control of the two 
holiest cities in Islam. Mecca, with the great Mosque housing, the Ka'bah 
and Medina the Burial place, of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) the 
international responsibilities devolving on the Saudi state include both the 
administration of the Haj and a role as spokesman and advocate for 
Islamic causes throughout the world. In practical terms, Saudi Arabia 
sponsor an Islamic foreign policy that alongside its secular foreign policy. 
Over the course of the twentieth century the Saudi regime has established 
a formidable array of religious and quasi-religious organs intended to 
promote Islam within and outside the country. Ever since the siege of the 
Great Mosque of Mecca in 1979 by disaffected young, anti-establishment 
Islamist or neo-Ikhwan, there has been a tension between the officially 
appointed and approved religious establishment and (often younger) anti-
government religious critics. 
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More significant political dissatisfaction tends to derive from opposite 
poles. There is a stubborn, arch-conservative, religious based opposition 
that decree changes to the traditional way, opposes the creeping 
westernization of the country and attack the hypocrisy of the royal family 
and allied elites. At the other end of the spectrum modernist, educated 
elements seek not just economic but also political liberalization, including 
a rule by law, some degree of formal political participation and debate, 
and restrictions on the privileged status of the royal family, 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Saudi Arabia is considered a developing country, and for this reason the 
achievement of both economic and social development remains a national 
strategic objective. The country's investment has depended largely on the 
availability of government revenues generated from oil exports. The 
declining oil revenues and budgetary constraint have limited the ability of 
the public sector to provide sufficient funding for competing obligations. 
Saudi Arabia is in the process of positioning itself to become one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world. It has launches recently a 
comprehensive economic reform and stabilization progress aimed at 
alleviating poverty and improving the standard of living. However, 
meager natural resources and physical condition are the major constraints 
for a dynamic and high growth economy. Further population growth 
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placed a great stress on the public private sector and on the country 
limited resources; Development of oil is one of the most important 
sources. It dedicated most of its effort to develop its services sector to 
become the main sources of socio-economic development. 
Therefore, oil industry has emerged as major sources in the growing 
services sector that provides new opportunities in the labor market. This 
is done through securing a sustainable socio-economic development, not 
just an unmanageable temporary boom. 
Arguably, the objective of economic diversification could be attained 
more successfully with a greater contribution from the private sector. 
Hence the current changing task for the country is to allocate its resources 
efficiency between its different priorities, the clarification of the 
boundaries separating the private and public sector would enhance 
efficiency in the economy through increased specialization. (Wilson, 
2004,139). 
During the last 50 years, Saudi Arabia has experienced rapid economic 
development and corresponding societal and political change. Saudi 
government has undertaken a number of political, social and economic 
initiatives to educate and encourage social and economic development 
participation, promote economic growth, increase foreign investment and 
expand educational and employment opportunities for its citizens. These 
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have allowed the kingdom to play a larger role in the global economy and 
community. Effort to promote greater privatization and diversification of 
Saudi Arabia economy continue to take place alongside economic and 
social development 
By 1970, Saudi Arabia introduced the first of a series of ongoing five 
year development plans to build a modem economy and society capable 
of producing consumer and industrial goods that previously had been 
imported. The country's infrastructure was expanded, allowing industry 
and comers to flourish. At the same time, the national oil continued 
exploring for new deposits to maximize earning from the oil sector, 
which were needed to fund further growth. The result was a steady 
economic transformation of the country, which encouraged Saudi Arabia 
to join the world trade organization in 2005. Today Saudi Arabia is one of 
the fastest developing economies in the world. 
Commensurate with this rapid modernization were development in the 
country's political and administrative system, which had evolved from a 
slandered monarchy to include the formalization of the Islamic system of 
popular consolation. By the 1990s the custodian of the two holy mosques 
king Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz moved to revitalize the existing set up to meet 
the requirement of a modem nation. Taking into consideration in the 
kingdom's role in the Islamic world, as well as its traditional and social 
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fabric, the change were made in total adherence to Islam The efforts led 
to move towards greater participation of the citizenry in the growing of 
their country, and the Saudi Arabia government approved procedures for 
the election of half the members of the municipal councils, which took 
place in early 2005. 
Over the last 40 years of economic development, Saudi Arabia has 
witnessed a major transformation in its economy. This has been possible 
through the financial advantage offered by oil revenues and by consistent 
and determined economic policies -geared to under industrialization -
followed by the Saudi government. The Saudi Arabia economy has seen 
its physical and social infrastructure revolutionized and the non-oil sector 
including agriculture, yielding an increasing and significance proportion 
of total output. 
The social impact of this process of development has been enormous, 
despite the traditionally conservative nature of Saudi Arabia society and 
the government conscious efforts to foster economic change while 
simultaneously seeking to avoid social change. Not surprisingly, rising 
standards of living and better health care have resulted in a population 
explosion. The massive increase in population has resulted great 
difficulty in finding employment. Hence, this study tackles the impact of 
socio-economic development on society. In addition the study also 
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focuses on the Saudi government efforts to diversify its economy, to build 
a broad industrial base and to educate and train its nationals 
HYPOTHESIS 
Oil dominates the economic life of Saudi Arabia .oil revenues have fueled 
Saudi Arabia's economic development programmers' and have impelled 
the current transition from a traditional tribal and feudal economy into a 
modem industrial nation. Although tribal political traditionalism has 
worked fairly successfully in Saudi Arabia so far, internal political reform 
in inevitable. The new urban, college -educated economic middle class of 
Saudis in rapidly expanding, and the increasing centralization of 
government with generate a national-albeit initially elitist- demand for 
political change. A reasonable assertion seems to be that the nature of the 
reform and the degree of internal political stability to a large statement 
will be determined by the ruling family's willingness and ability to 
identify and respond to the demand for political change. Whatever the 
outcome, repercussions will be felt throughout Arabia. 
However, the study of socio-economic development and its impact on 
Saudi polity has not been under taken to a great extant. Hence we asked 
the following questions for this research work. 
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1. The socio-economic development has transformed many traditional 
social relationships and has created new expectation and demands. 
2. The economic changes and progress in development has been 
accentuated by shifts in social class and demography. The 
consequences is the rise of a substantial middle class a new stratum 
of population that is educated, semi secular, bourgeois, and 
nontraditional. 
3. This new class seems destined to play a central role in the ftiture of 
Saudi Arabia. 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology is a descriptive analysis with a combination of 
empirical data. The emphasis of the study is on the geographical 
resources of Saudi Arabia and their role in socio- economic development 
.The data and other material obtained has been thoroughly checked and 
cross checked to eliminate discrepancies wherever existed before 
embarking on building up the thesis with regard to adopting analytical 
approach ,simple mathematical techniques have been used. Computer has 
also been used to analyze the data and material. 
Socio-economic development of Saudi Arabia has been upgraded to the 
concept of sustainable development as a new development paradigm for 
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humankind. Sustained development forms a theoretical and empirical 
basis of this study. In this regard, sustainability is not defined as "a fixed 
state but rather an ongoing dynamic system that can continue to evolve 
without self- destructing (Hardi et al.l993, 3).Therefore, for the system to 
be sustainable, different force that act on this particular system must be in 
balance. At its core, the concept of sustainable development requires 
adapting human activities to the carrying capacities of the socio-
economic factors. 
At the level of social and economic spheres of development, a number of 
internationally established indicators can be used as a basis for further 
comparisons. For example, especially recommendable for Saudi Arabia 
studies are (Vintar Mally, 2006a). 
Economic indicators; Focusing on oil reserves, oil export, economic 
growth rate per capita and economic structure, growth of non oil sectors, 
growth of Agriculture sectors and water resources. 
Social indicators; Focusing on population growth rate, total fertility rate, 
education of population, life expectancy at birth, child mortality rate and 
Number of employment. In the case of Saudi Arabia political structure 
change and socio- economic reforms are also a social indicator. 
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DATA BASE 
• The research materials and data have been collected from various 
sources, government and nongovernmental, private institution etc 
as given below; 
• Booklets, official records, Documents of Ministry of planning of 
Saudi Arabia. 
• Year wise statically records published by Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency annual report (SAMA) various issues. 
• Various magazines, newspapers, national and international journals 
data collected from, the various others sources. 
• Information available on the internet has been utilized. 
• Publication of the international agencies, such as UN publication, 
Library of congress and publications of Saudi Arabia Ministry have 
been taken into use 
In addition, various research works and publication reports have been 
consulted in completion of the present research work. Some relevant 
Journals, magazines, articles and newspapers have also been referred 
extensively to enrich the data. 
Publications of the ministry of Planning and Government body 
responsible for the socio-economic industry of Saudi Arabia have been 
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taken into consideration. Its main purpose is to manage the socio-
economic development of Saudi Arabia. It is also responsible for clearing 
socio-economic development related to investment with collaboration of 
other sectors. In this study, we have taken the marginal approach at the 
micro level on the management activities of socio-economic development 
of Saudi Arabia. 
LIMITATION OF STUDY 
The study of socio-economic development of a country depends on 
information of all sector of economy. Socio-economic development 
covers many aspects such as country resources, Industrial development 
HRD, services sectors. Information's on these above aspects are difficult 
to obtain. 
Economic and social development of any county explains the full 
development of the country. So the data of economic and social 
development has become politically sensitive. Most of the data related to 
economic and social development management and allocation are 
inadequate or unreliable or both. Several factors accounts for the general 
paucity of statistical information. Saudi Arabia's development is much 
dependent on oil resources; oil is not like other commodities in that 
because it affected both on the social and economic development. 
Secondly the human resources development of Saudi Arabia, are difficult 
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to arrange precisely, and usually impossible to operationalise. Moreover 
information on basic features of oil export, of reserves, standard of 
education, unemployment are very hard. It is therefore, recognized that 
data limitation preclude the evolution of a more comprehensive study of 
social and economic development. 
PROBLEMS STATEMENT 
Saudi Arabia's need for economic reform and diversification does not 
mean that its petroleum sector will lose its importance in Saudi Arabia's 
future. No matter how successful economic, demographic, and social 
reform become, Saudi Arabia's strategic position, economy, and ability to 
meet the expectations of its people will still depend on the revenues 
provided by its petroleum sector. Saudi energy exports will remain the 
most important source of the kingdom's income. Saudi Arabia will stay a 
petroleum sector-driven economy even if it is successful in both 
diversifying and expanding its private sector. In fact, much of its 
diversification, and much of the growth in its private sector, will consist 
of ventures that add value and labor intensity to the Saudi economy 
through the production of petroleum related products. 
The petroleum sector normally accounts for around 40% of the Saudi 
GDP by Saudi estimates. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
estimates that the total value of crude oil was 38.47 million Riyals in 
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1970 out of a GDP. It was 28.86 million riyals in 1985, 36.85 million 
riyals in 1990, 35.68 million riyals in 1995, 41.40 million riyals million 
riyals in 2000 and 37.66 million riyals in 2003. These percentages vary 
according to world demand for petroleum and the resulting Saudi 
earnings, but they do not reveal any trend toward reduced dependence 
(SAMA, 2002, 361-364). These differing estimates illustrate the largesse 
of trying to make precise estimates of Saudi dependence on petroleum 
earnings, even if one ignores the notorious volatility of the world oil 
market. The central fact remains, however, that they have shown that 
even the most successful economic reforms will take well over a decade 
to make a major reduction in the kingdom's current level of dependence 
on crude oil exports, and many forms of diversification and Saudization 
will depend on adding value to the petroleum sector by exporting more 
petroleum-related products. Saudi Arabia's energy strategy is clearly as 
critical to its future as its strategy for dealing with population growth and 
economic reform. 
The turning point in the economy came with the beginning of oil exports 
in 1948. Oil had been discovered in 1938, but the initiation of oil 
production and export was held back by the Second World War. Oil 
exports greatly increased the revenues available to the government 
(Niblock 1982: 95-6). While gross annual Saudi petroleum export 
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revenues varied from lows of 1,174.17 million barrels to highs of 
2,486.77 million barrels during 1970-2004, Saudi Arabia has consistently 
earned more oil export revenues than any other single member of OPEC. 
The Saudi share of total OPEC revenues ranged from below 20% in 1972, 
to over 40% in the early 1980s and around 30% in 2001. 
According to SAMA report Saudi Arabia net petroleum exports were 
worth 2,282.38 million barrel in 2000 and 2,203.10 million barrel in 
2001, and they reached 1,928.89 million barrel in 2002. Saudi Aramco, 
however, reports that EIA estimates of petroleum (SAMA, 2003) export 
earning do not include total income from the entire petroleum sector -
including downstream operations, related manufacturing, and domestic 
earnings. 
It is generally assumed that Saudi Arabia economy is totally 
underdeveloped and that aside from its oil industry, no economic 
development of any significance exists. The most cursory examination of 
economic activity in Saudi Arabia since the early 1960s proves this to be 
an unfounded assumption .As an example, more Saudi are employed in 
industry ,agriculture transportation and construction than they are in the 
oil industry .Budgetary allocation to developmental projects in the past 
decade have continually increased in proportion to the national budget. 
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The gross national product has grown annually; a real income has also 
increased. 
Yet it must be stressed that in spite of these strides in socio-economic 
development and inspite of the accumulation of oil revenues, the Saudi 
economy is still far from advanced. The present study focuses on gradual 
evolution of Saudi Arabia into a modem state and the progress in the 
social and economic spheres. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The Saudi economy is currently in a state of transition as a consequence 
of the completion of most infrastructural development and the need to 
move from a focus on public sector to private sector activity. The process 
of socio-economic development has led changes in the Saudi Arabia 
social structure which have resulted from the sudden wealth and rapid 
modernization .This study seeks to achieve the following objectives. 
1. To analyse the nature of reform 
2. Find out the impact of economic and social change 
3. Review the oil reserves and oil production and its role in the socio-
economic development. 
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4. To analyse the economic, political and demographic dynamics of 
Saudi society and the problem involved in the transforming that 
society from traditional tribalism to modem government. 
5. To assess the impact of economic and social change in Saudi 
Arabia and the resultant political repercussions. 
6. Find out the increasing saudization of the workforce in public and 
private sector. 
7. Evaluates economic diversification and the need to break free from 
the dependence on oil. 
8. To assess the, performance development and progress of the non 
oil sector. 
9. Inquiry into the prospect of more privatization of current public 
sector responsibilities and the greater use of private sector 
finance. 
10. Find out the rational use of limited water resources through a 
restructuring of the agricultural sector. 
11. Analyses the prospects of an increases in the proposition of non -
oil to oil exports. 
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12. Trace the evidence of change occurring in the structure of 
exports, through clearly, merchandise exports will continue to be 
dominated by crude oil exports for some considerable time. 
13. Provide recommendations for future studies or appropriate 
actions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The numbers of entries in the following Review, to a certain extent, seem 
to indicate that a rich body, of literature exists on Saudi Arabia 
While the factual outlines of the development of the Saudi Arabia are 
fairly well known, little work has been done to fill in the contours. All too 
often, new writing consists of a rehash of stories already told, fi"equently 
relying on the same secondary sources, or of superficial country surveys 
prompted by the region's high profile over the last decade or two. 
Meanwhile, the literature on anthropology and social issues is 
embarrassingly slight. Perhaps because of the country's traditional 
isolation, historical writing on the period between the early centuries oh 
Islam and the modem era is scarce. 
As a selective literature Review, certain classes of materials either have 
been excluded or only a small sample included. Arabia language sources 
are not comprehensive. General rules of inclusion have been to limit the 
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selection to seminal books or those published recently or on topics of 
recent history. The preponderance of the English language among works 
in European languages reflects the kingdom's close ties to Britain and the 
United States. Items in other European languages, Particularly French and 
German, have been included but not as systematically. For reasons of 
space, most publications which cover the gulf as whole, are the six gulf 
cooperation council states, and are only partly on Saudi Arabia, have 
been excluded. 
The information for this literature Review has been collected from a wide 
variety of sources, including interviews and personal observations in 
addition to published sources; particular use has been made of a number 
of more specialized reference works. Information on tribes and 
geographical places has been culled from a large variety of specialized 
compendia, including Hamad al-Jasir's Mu jam qabs.'ilal-mamlakah a/-
'arabiyah al-sa 'udlyah, Mahmud Taha Abu al-Ala's Jngr 
Qfiyatshibhjaziratal- 'arab, 'Umar Rida Kuhhalah's Mw jam qaba'ilal-
'arab, J. G. Lorimer's Gazetteer of the P ersian Gulf, 'Oman, and Central 
Arabia, the United Kingdom Admiralty's Handbook of Arabia and 
Western Arabia and the Red Sea, and Sheila Scoville's Gazetteer of 
Arabia. The principal sources used for arch-aeology andpre-Islamic 
history are the Saudi Arabian Department of Antiquitiesand Museums' 
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Muqaddimah 'an: athiiral-mamlakah al- 'arabiyah al-sa 'udlyah, and 
Abdullah Masry's "The History and Development of Settlement in Saudi 
Arabia," as well as Philip K. Hitti's History of the Arabs . 
Much information on Islamic terms and history has been drawn from the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (1st and 2nd editions) and Cyril Glasse's The 
Concise Encylopaedia of Islam. Background on individuals is contained 
in biographical dictionaries such as the Who's Who of Saudi Arabia, the 
Who's Who of the Arab World, Burke's Royal Families of the World, 
Khayr al-Din aUZirkaWsAl-Flsim: qannis tarajim, Brian Lees's 
Handbook of the Al Sand Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia, and J. R. L. 
Carter's Merchant Families of Saudi Arabia. Considerable information is 
to be found as well in Holden and Johns (below), Lacey (below), and 
Gary Samuel Samore's "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953-
1982)." 
A good, if difficult to find, bibliographic sources is the Saudi Arabian 
institute of public Administration's compilation of information sources 
on Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabia volume in the ABC-Clio series of 
country bibliographies, by Frank A. Clements, can also be recommended. 
A valuable, if dated, bibliographic review is provided by George Rentz in 
his "Literature on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." 
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A useful general introduction to the country is by Helen Chapin Metz and 
associates, Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, while sweeping popular 
histories are David Holden and Richard Johns, The House ofSaud, and 
Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House ofSaud. The book 
edited by Ismail I. Nawwab, Peter C. Speers, and Paul F. Hoye, Aramco 
and Its World: Arabia and the Middle East, does, an admirable job of 
placing the kingdom in the broader Arab context. M Clemity and 
Tradition: the Saudi Equation by the ex Minister of Information, Fouad 
al-Farsy, provides a wealth of basic, factual information. Noteworthy 
volumes of collected essays include Willard A. Beling, ed., King Faisal 
and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, Paul Bonnenfant, ed., La 
Peninsuk Arabique d'aujourd'hui, and Tim Niblock, ed.. State, Society 
and Economy in Saudi Arabia. 
Publications on the history of the three Saudi states steadily grow in 
volume and quality. Alexei Vassiliev's The History of Saudi Arabia 
provides a broad overview of the country's history and is more readable 
than H. St. John B. Philby's Saudi Arabia. J. G. Lorimer's Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf 'Oman, and Central Arabia, although only partially 
covering the kingdom, remains an unsurpassed compendium on historical 
outline, people, and places. Madawi al-Rasheed outlines the period of the 
Al Sa'ud in her, four History of Saudi Arabia. 
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In Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman 
Control, 1840-1908, William Ochsenwald gives a portrait of western 
Saudi Arabia while Frederick Anscombe's provides insight into an aspect 
of Saudi history that here to fore received short shrift. In The Cohesion of 
Saudi Arabia, Christine Moss Helms dissects the state-building process of 
King 'Abd al-Aziz, while Joseph Kostiner covers similar ground in his 
The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936. Other noteworthy historical 
works include John Habib's Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam, Madawi al-
Rasheed's Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal.Dynasty, and 
Bayly Winder's Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. 
The availability of archival material outside Saudi Arabia has made 
studies of the country's earlier foreign policy possible, among them Irvine 
Anderson's 
Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia, Jacob Goldberg's The 
Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, Clive Leatherdale's Britain and Saudi 
Arabia, 1925-1939, and Gary Troeller's The Birth of Saudi Arabia: 
Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud. The most important external 
sources of material on Saudi Arabia remain the Rwfelic Record Office in 
London and the National Archives in Washington, DC. 
Most book-length studies of the economy appeared in the decade after 
the oil price revolution, when Saudi Arabia finally had the money to put 
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its process of development in high gear, and have been overtaken by 
events, although Robert Looney's Economic Development in Saudi 
Arabia is more recent. The Ministry of Planning's Achievements of the 
Development Plans, 1390-1420 (1970-2000) provides extensive 
statistical information on the economy as well as development. Although 
not specifically on Saudi Arabia, Daniel Yergin's The Prize provides a 
highly readable history of the international oil industry and Ian Skeet's 
OPEC: 25 Years of Prices and Politics ably outlines that organization 
and Saudi Arabia's role in it. 
The political scene has been discussed by Mordechai Abir in Saudi 
Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crises, Alexander Bligh in 
From Prince to King, Tandy Mamoun in Saudi Arabia and the Politics of 
Dissent, Summer Scott Huyette in Political Adaptation in Sa'udi Arabia: 
a Study of the Council of Ministers, and Joseph Kechichian in Succession 
in Saudi Arabia. 
Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia's security matters and American concerns 
have produced a voluminous literature. The topic has been covered by 
Anthony Cordesman in a number of works,-Thomas McNaugher Arms 
and Oil, William Quandt in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, and the present 
author's Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security. Regional relations 
have been the subject of Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp in Iran-
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Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order and Gregory Gause in 
Saudi-Yemeni Relations. 
Only a few anthropological or sociological studies have been published. 
A number of these have focused on women, such as Soraya Altorki's 
Women in Saudi Arabia and Eleanor Doumato's Getting God's Ear. 
Ethnographic studies include Donald Cole's Nomads of the Nomads, 
Motoko Katakma's Bedouin Village, and Frcderico Vidal's The Oasis of 
Al-Hasa. A unique view, of the town of 'Unayzah's, development is 
provided by Altorki and Cole in Arabian Oasis City. Mai Yamani 
provides insight into the views of the kingdom's burgeoning youth in 
Changed Identities: The Challenges of the New Generation in Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia's nearly disappeared traditional architecture is 
discussed by Geoffrey King in his The Traditional Architecture of Saudi 
Arabia and William Facey surveys the capital in word and picture in 
his Riyadh: The Old City from Its Origins Until the 1950s. 
A number of websites relevant to the study of Saudi Arabia complete the 
bibliography. These include both official Saudi Arabian government 
sites and a number of other sites that deal with the country. A 
representative selection of sites, devoted to the Middle East is also 
included. All the sites listed were current as of early 2003. 
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Needless to say, the works mentioned in this brief survey represent only 
the tip of the iceberg and many more worthwhile references could be 
included. 
EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Structure of the Government 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy since its establishment. The king is 
not constrained by a written constitution, a legislative assembly, or 
elections (Sheikh, 1976, 22). Since 1962, Saudi kings periodically 
promised to establish a Majlis al Shura, or consultative council, to advise 
them or governmental matters, but none of them undertook practical steps 
to establish such a body. In March 1992, King Fahd once again 
announced that a Majlis al Shura would be appointed and specified its 
responsibilities. Fahd proposed a Majlis of sixty-one members, all 
appointed by the king. The Majlis would have limited authority to 
question ministers and propose legislation. The Majlis would not have 
actual legislative powers but rather would serve as an advisory body that 
could make recommendations to the king (Huyeette, 1985, 65). 
As of the end of 1992, King Fahd had named only a single individual to 
the Majlis al Shura that he had proposed ten months earlier. In appointing 
the speaker, the king made no promises as to when Saudi citizens could 
31 
Chapter -1 
expect the covering of the full MajUs. The international committee for 
Human Rights in Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula issued a public 
statement advising Saudis that the government has promised consistently 
for thirty years to establish a consultative council but never had fulfilled 
these promises (Bowen, 2005, 647). Saudis considered the Quran, the 
holy book of Islam, their country's constitution (Helen, 1947, 34). 
The Quran is the primary source of the Sharia. Because the Sharia does 
not specifically address the conduct of most governmental matters, Saudi 
ruler, beginning with Abd al-Aziz, have promulgated numerous 
regulations pertaining to the functions of government (Sheikh, 1976, 12). 
In early 1992, King Fahd became the first Saudi monarch to compile these 
regulations into a single document called the main code (Nizam). 
Promulgated as a royal decree, this document codified bureaucratic 
procedures and prohibited government agencies from arbitrarily arresting 
citizens or violating their privacy. Although the main code was not a 
formal constitution, it fialfilled some of the same purpose of such a 
document. However, the main code lacked any explicit clause 
guaranteeing the basic rights of citizens to freedom of belief, expression, 
assembly, or political participation (Bowen, 2005, 647). 
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The Council of the Ministries 
The council of Ministers, created in 1953 by King Abd al Aziz shortly 
before his death, is the principal executive organ of the government 
(Lacey, 1981, 373). The council of Ministers had authority to issue 
ministerial decrees, but it had no power separate from the King, who 
approved all its decisions. The office of prime minister has been 
abolished by royal decree in 1964, but the king, in his capacity as 
president of the council of Ministers, served as the defacto prime 
minister. The crown prince was designated the first deputy prime 
minister, and the next prince in the line of succession was the second 
deputy prime minister (Ibrahim, 1976, 81). In 1992 the council of 
Ministers consisted of the king, the crown prince, three royal advisors 
who held official positions as ministers of state without portfolio five 
other ministers of state, and the heads of the twenty ministers, including 
minister of Defense and Aviation Amir Sultan, who also served as second 
deputy prime minister. The ministers included agriculture and water, 
commerce; communications; defense and aviation; education; finance and 
national economy; foreign affairs; health; higher education; industry and 
electricity; information; interior; justice; labour and social affairs; 
municipal and rural affairs, petroleum and mineral resources; pilgrimage 
affairs and religious trusts planning; post, telephone and telegraph; and 
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public works and housing. In addition to these ministers, the Saudi Arabia 
National/Guards, which was headed by crown prince Abd Allah, was 
similar in status to a ministry. The governors of Medina, Mecca, Riyadh, 
and the Eastern province, as well as the governor of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the head of the General Petroleum and 
Mineral Organization (Petromin) also held ministerial rank (Menoret, 
2003, 88). 
Government Organizations 
The Ministry of Interior, which was responsible for domestic security, 
was second in overall political influence to the Ministry of Defense and 
Aviation. Since 1975 Amir Nayif ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (bom 1933), 
who was a fiill brother of King Fahd, has been minister of interior. In 
1992 Nayif ranked as the fourth most powerful person in the country after 
Fahd, Abd Allah, and Sultan Nayif supervised the expansion of the 
ministry into an organization that exercised considerable influence over 
the daily lives of Saudi citizens (Menoret,2003,86). As crown prince 
under King Khalid and as King in his own right since 1982, Fahd brought 
into the Government many talented men from families other than the 
ruling Al Saud (Huyeette, 1985, 68). In 1992 about 75 percent of the 
council of Ministers was of commoner backgrounds. Nevertheless, the 
key ministries of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and public works 
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continued to be headed by Saudi Princes. In addition, several of the 
king's younger brother and nephews were deputy ministers in these same 
ministries, in effect acquiring on-the-job training to help ensure Al Saud 
control for another generation (Menoret, 2003, 88). 
The King 
As one of the world's last absolute monarchs, the Saudi Arabian king 
exercised very broad powers. He was rested with the king. All legislation 
is enacted either by royal decree or by ministerial decree, which has to be 
sanctioned by the king. In his capacity as prime minister, the king 
appoints all cabinet ministers, other senior government officials, and the 
governors of the provinces (Quandt, 1981, 77). In his capacity as 
commander in chief of the armed forces, the king appointed all military 
officers above the rank of lieutenant colonel (Menehem, 1972, 82). He 
also appointed all Saudi Arabia's ambassadors and other foreign envoys. 
All foreign diplomats in the country are accredited to the king. In 
addition, the king acted as the final court of appeal and has the power of 
pardon (Nimblock, 1980, 39). 
The legitimacy of the king's rule is based on the twin pillars of religion 
and the dynastic history of the Al-Saud. The family's most important 
early ancestor Muhammad ibn Saud (1710-65), had been a relatively 
minor local ruler in Najd before establishing a political and family 
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alliance with the puritanical Muslim preacher and reformer Muhammad 
ibn Abd al Whahhab (1703-87) in 1744. Muhammad ibn Saud and his 
descendants the Al-Saud - ardently supported the preacher and his 
descendants - the Al ash Shaykh - and were determined to introduce a 
purified Islam, which opponents called Wahhabism, throughout Arabia. 
Religious fervor facilitated the conquest of Najd and at the height of their 
power in the early nineteenth century; the Al-Saud had extended their 
control over most of the Arabian Peninsula. Subsequent conflict with the 
Ottoman Empire and dynastic rivalries both diminished and enhanced the 
political fortunes of the Al Saud throughout the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi alliance with the Al ash Shaykh endured 
(Huyeette, 1985,66). 
The founder of the modem state of Saudi Arabia, Abd al Aziz ibn Abd or 
Rahman Al Saud (1876-1953), was a grandson of the last effective 
nineteenth century Saudi ruler, Faisal ibn Turki (1810-66). Abd al Aziz 
restored the family from virtual political extinction by reintroducing the 
crusading zeal of wahhabi Islam by 1924, when the Ikhwan, a select force 
of Bedouin religious fighters created by Abd al Aziz, conquered the 
Hijaz, almost all the territory of the present day Saudi State was under 
Abd al Aziz's authority (Bowen, 2008, 632). In 1932 he proclaimed this 
territory the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and himself its king. Abd al Aziz 
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ruled until his death in 1953 (George, 1969, 15). Although he had named 
his eldest son, Saud ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (1902-64), crown prince, he 
had not instituted a mechanism for orderly succession. Because Abd al 
Aziz was survived by more than thirty sons, the lack of a process for 
passing on the mantle of kingship constituted a source of potential 
political instability for the country. Problems emerged soon after king 
Saud began his reign (Farsy, 1978, 81). Like his father, Saud had more 
than thirty sons, and he was ambitious to place them in position of power 
and influence. The new king's numerous brothers, who believed their 
nephews were too young and inexperienced to head ministries and major 
government departments, deeply resented their exclusion from power. 
The political and personal tensions among the Al Saud, combined with 
the extravagance and poor judgment of Saud, climaxed in a 1964 family 
coup. A number of brothers joined together to depose Saud and install 
asking the next eldest brother, Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al-Saud (1904-75). 
The transfer of power was endorsed by Saudi Arabia's Ulama, or 
religious authorities (Mohammed, 1980, 96). 
King Faisal strengthened the power of the monarchy during his eleven 
year reign. Although he had acted as prime minister during most of 
Saud's rule, he issued a royal decree stipulating that the king would serve 
both as head of state and as head of government. Faisal also increased 
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central control over the provinces by making local officials responsible to 
the king, creating a Ministry of Justice to regulate the autonomous 
religious courts, and establishing a national's development plan to 
coordinate construction projects and social services throughout the 
country. Faisal's concern for orderly government and durable institutions 
extended to the monarchy (Willard, 1980, 43). In 1965 he persuaded his 
brothers to observe the principle of birth order among themselves to 
regulate the succession, although the next eldest brother, Muhamhmad 
(bom 1910), voluntarily stepped down in favor of him (1912-82) (Bowen, 
2008, 647). 
Faisal rule ended abruptly in 1975 when he was assassinated by one of 
his nephews. A meeting of Senior Al Saud princes; the sons and 
surviving brother of Abd Al Aziz, acclaimed crown Prince Khalid the 
new king. Because some of Khalid's brothers, who would have been next 
in line of succession according to age, renounced their right to the throne, 
the king and the princes designated a younger brother, Fahd (bom 1921), 
crown prince. Fahd ascended to the throne in 1982 after Khalid suffered a 
fatal heart attack. In consultation with his brothers, Fahd named Abd 
Allah (bom 1923) crown prince and Sultan (bom 1927) third in line of 
succession. The relatively smooth transitions following the deaths of 
Faisal and Khalid this seemed to have resolved the issue of succession 
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among the sons of Abd- Al- Aziz (Bowen, 2008, 642). In 1992, however, 
Fahd altered the procedure for designating future kings, in the same royal 
decree that announced the impending appointment of a Majlis, Fahd 
declared that the king would henceforth name and could remove the 
crown prince. Furthermore, the crown prince would not automatically 
succeed on the death of the king, but serve as provisional ruler until he, or 
a descendant of Abd Al Aziz deemed more suitable, was enthroned. 
Fahd's decree on succession established two precedents a royal 
prerogative to choose and to withdraw approval for the crown prince; and 
an acknowledgement that the more than sixty grandsons of Abd -Al -
Aziz were legitimate claimants to the throne (Long, 2005, 37). 
In the late 1990s, and early 2000s ill health prevented him from carrying 
out his day-to-day responsibilities and the daily operation of the 
government passed to crown. Prince Abdullah, the monarch's half 
brother, who held the position of deputy Prime Minister. Although Fahd 
continued to reign until his death in 2005, by most account he did not 
rule, only occasionally intervening in government affairs with Saudi or 
foreign dignitaries (Zuhur, 2005,36). 
In late May 2005, King Fahd's health deteriorated rapidly, and he died on 
August 1. Crown prince Abdullah, who had essentially governed the state 
since Fahd's 1995 stroke, immediately took the throne as king and prime 
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minister on August 1 at the age of 81. In keeping with basic law and 
Saudi tradition, he named another half brother, Prince Sultan, as his 
deputy prime minister, and designated successor (Bowen, 2008, 645). As 
the six Saudi monarch, king Abdullah Inherited a host of challenges, 
including managing volatile oil revenues, the relationship with the United 
States, the complexities of royal politics, and the ongoing threat of 
terrorism, as well as surviving in one of the most dangerous and violent 
regions in the world (Bowen, 2008, 648). His years as acting prime 
minister and crown prince had prepared him for the position, however 
and many Saudis compared him to King Faisal in terms of his talents, 
desire for modest reforms, and image as the real power behind the throne. 
King Fahd, however, has been - for a more effective ruler than Saud, at 
least before his stroke sidelined him in 1995 (Zuhur, 2005, 48). 
The Judiciary 
Legal opinions of Judicial questions, and approved all sentences of death, 
amputation, and stoning. Since 1983 the minister of Justice has also 
served as chief of the supreme judicial council, a position that further 
enhanced his status as chief justice (Raphaeli, 2005, 14). 
Sharia courts included courts of first instance and appeals courts. Minor 
civil and criminal cases were adjudicated in the summary courts of first 
instance. One kind of summary court dealt exclusively with Bedouin 
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affairs. A single Qadi presided over all summary court hearings. The 
general courts of first instance handled all cases beyond the Jurisdiction 
of the summary courts. One judge usually presided over cases in the 
general courts, but three Qadis sat in judgment for serious crimes such as 
murder, major theft, or sexual misconduct (Gaetano, 1939, 77). 
Decisions of the summary and general courts could be appealed to the 
Sharia appeals court. The appeals courts had three departments, penal 
suits personal status suits and all other types of suits. The appeals had two 
seats, one in Riyadh and one in Mecca. The chief justice and a panel of 
several Qadis presided over all cases. The king was at the pinnacle of the 
judicial system, functioning as a final court of appeal and as a source of 
pardon. Decrees pertaining to labor were enforced by special committees 
within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Coulson, 1964, 27). 
Local Government 
Saudi Arabia consisted of fourteen provinces, or emirates, each governed 
by an Amir (governor) appointed by the King. In 1992 these emirates 
included Al Banah, Al Hudud ash Shamaliyah, Al-Taif, Al Madinah, Al 
Qasim, Al Qurayyat, Al Riyadh, Ash Sharqiyah, Asir Hail, Jizam 
Makkah, Najran, and Tabuk. The larger more populous emirates were 
subdivided into districts and sub districts (Nadwi, Danish, 1998,24). 
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In theory, the governors were responsible to the minister of interior. In 
practice, however, the governors usually reported directly to the king. In 
1992 all emirate governors and most of their deputies were members of 
the Al Saud, King Fahd's brothers. Sons, and nephews ruled the most 
politically important emirates; other kins ruled the smaller emirates. The 
governors maintained administrative offices in the principal cities of their 
respective emirates, although none of these cities were designated a 
capital. The governor's principal responsibility was to oversee the work 
of both central government and municipal officials within the emirates 
(Bligh, 1985, 684). The governors also served as commanders of the local 
police and Saudi Arabian National Guard units and supervised the 
recruitment of local men for these security forces. In addition, each 
governor followed the example of the king and held a public Majlis, often 
on a daily basis, at which he heard petitions from local residents. 
Typically, the petitions pertained to local disputes, which the governor 
either arbitrated or referred to an appropriate court. Some governors 
considered the Majlis an important link between the people and 
government and employed several special assistants who investigated 
local disputes and grievances (Ansari, 2003, 18). 
The governors are assisted by one or sometimes two deputies and, in 
some emirates, by one or more, deputy assistant governors. In emirates 
42 
Chapter - I 
thai were divided into district, the district officials act as subordinate to 
the emirate governors. The mayors of each city, town and village within 
an emirate are formally responsible to the Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs, although in practice they also are subordinate to the 
governors (BHgh, 1985,28). 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION 
Saudi Arabia has 14 emirates hmhrhl 
"•*% singular im^rahl All are administered 
^ from RivAdh. 
Administrative Divisions 
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Source: http://www.lib.utexa$.edu/maps/atlas-iniddIe-east/saudi-arabia-division.ing 
The Ulama 
The Ulama, or Islamic reiigkus leaders, served a unique role by 
providing religious legitimacy for Saudi rule. Except for Iran, where the 
Ulama participated directly in government, Saudi Arabia was the only 
Muslim countrv in which the Ulama constituted such an influential 
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political force. The kingdom's Ulama included religious scholars, Qadis 
(judges), lawyers, seminary teachers and the prayer leaders (imams) of 
the mosques. As a group, the Ulama and their families included an 
estimated 7,000 to 10,000 persons. However, only the thirty to forty most 
senior scholars among them exercised substantive political influence. 
These prominent clergy constituted the members of the council of senior 
Ulama, an official body created by Faisal in 1971 to serve as a forum for 
regular consultation the monarch and the religious establishment. Fahd 
continued the precedent set by Faisal and Khalid of meeting weekly with 
council of senior Ulama members who resided in Riyadh (Nadwi, Danish, 
1998, 33). 
The council of senior Ulama had a symbiotic relationship with the Saudi 
government. In return for official recognition of their special religious 
authority, the leading Ulama provided tacit approval and, when requested, 
public sanction for potentially controversial policies. Because Saudi kings 
esteemed their Islamic credentials as custodians of the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina, they considered Ulama support critical. For example, 
in 1979 members of the council of senior Ulama signed the religious edict 
(Fatwa) that sanctioned the use of force to subdue armed dissidents who 
had occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islamic holiest shrine. In 1990 
the decision to invite thousand of United States military personnel to set 
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Up bases in the northeastern part of the country alarmed some devout 
Muslims who believed that the presence of so many non-Muslim on 
Saudi soil violated the sanctity of the holy land. Fahd defused such 
concerns by obtaining Ulama approval for the United States military 
presence (Munro, 2000,27). 
Historically, the royal family maintained close ties with the Ulama, 
especially with members of the Al ash Shaykh. The Al ash Shaykh 
included the several hundred direct mail descendants of the eighteenth 
century religious reformer Abd al-Wahhab. The Al Saud dynastic 
founder, Muhammad Ibn Saud, had married a daughter of Abd al 
Wahhab, and subsequent inter-marriage between the two families 
reinforced their political alliance. The mother of King Faisal, for 
example, was the daughter of an Al ash Shaykh Qadi who was a direct 
descendant of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Rentz, 1969, 11). The 
pre-eminence of the Al ash Shaykh thus derived not only from its 
reputation for religious erudition but also from its position as part of the 
country's ruling elite. In 1992 most of the Al ash Shaykh men were not 
members of the clergy but held position in government, education, the 
security services, the armed forces, and private business. Nevertheless, 
the Ash Shaykh Ulama dominated the kingdom's influential clerical 
institutions such as the council of senior Ulama, the higher council of 
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Qadis, and the Administration of Scientific study. Legal opinions, Islamic 
propagation and guidance in addition, the most senior religious office, the 
grand mufti (chief judge) were traditionally filled by a member of Al ash 
Shaykh(Iqbal, 1977, 126). 
Not all of the kingdom's Ulama belonged to the Al ash Shaykh. Ulama 
from less prominent families tended to criticize, usually privately, the 
senior clergy, especially after 1975. The increase in numbers of students 
in seminaries led to a larger number of clergy willing to challenge the 
senior Ulama's role and to criticize their support of government policies 
(Long, 2005, 62). 
The Royal Diwan 
The primary executive office of the King is the Royal Diwan. The king's 
principal advisers for domestic politics, religious affairs, and international 
relations have officers in the Royal Diwan. The king's private office also 
is the Royal Diwan. The king conducts most roufine government affairs 
from this office, including the drafting of regulations and royal decrees. 
In addition the heads of several government departments have their 
offices in the Diwan. These include the chief of protocol, the office of 
Bedouin Affair; the Department of Religious Research, Missionary 
Acfivifies, and Guidance, and as well the Mutawwin or Committees for 
the propagation of virtue and prevention of vice (popularly known as the 
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committees for Public Morality). The Department of Religious Research 
Missionary Activities, and Guidance in headed by the most senior of the 
country's Ulama (Nehme, 1994, 639). 
The king also held his regular Majlis, or court, in the Royal Diwan. The 
purpose of the Majlis was to provide Saudi citizens an opportunity to 
make personal appeals to the king for redress of grievances or assistance 
in private matters. Plaintiffs typically sought the king's intervention with 
the state's bureaucracy (William, 1981, 276). 
The Civil Service and Independent Agencies 
The nine-member civil service board, responsible to the council of 
Ministers, exercised formal authority over the employees of all ministries, 
government organizations, and autonomous agencies. It presided over the 
civil service bureau, which implemented the decisions and directives of 
the civil services board that pertained to grade classification pay rates, 
recruitment and personnel needs, and personnel evaluation. Beginning in 
the early 1970, the number of civil services employees in Saudi Arabia 
increased dramatically as the government expanded its social services 
(Nimblock, 1981,40). 
During the 1970s the number of autonomous agencies also expanded. 
Although most of these agencies were under the administrative auspices 
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of a particular ministry, each agency had its own budget and operated 
with considerable independence (Macgregor, 1978, 19). Several agencies, 
including the General Audit Bureau, the Grievances Board, the 
Investigation and Control Board and the organization for public services 
and Discipline, were not attached to any particular ministry. The latter 
three agencies were responsible, respectively, for hearing complaints of 
misconduct by civil services employees investigating complaints against 
government officials, and dispensing disciplinary action against civil 
servants judged guilty of function in office (Stephen, 2002, 74-86). 
Civil servants were classified either as government officials and lower-
paid employees. All civil servants were ranked according to grade, and 
advancement depended on merit and seniority. Training was provided 
within each ministry and at the Institute of Public Administration, an 
autonomous government agency with its main training centre in Riyadh, 
and at branches in Jeddah and Dammam (Vassiliev, 1998, 47-52). 
The Legal System 
The Saudi Arabian legal system in 1992 was based on the Sharia, or 
Islamic law. The Sharia was applied throughout the kingdom in strict 
accordance with the interpretation of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. 
Because pious Muslims believed that the Sharia was sacred law, they 
accepted as judges or Qadis, only men who had spent a number of years 
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Studying the accepted sources of the Sharia, The Quran and the 
authenticated radiations (Hadees), of the Prophet Muhammad's rulings 
and practice (Nadwi, 2001, 45). Historically, the decisions of Qadis are 
subject to review by the ruler, whose primary role is to ensure that the 
Islamic community lived in uniformity with the Sharia. In effect, the 
judiciary is not an independent institution but an extension of the political 
authority. This traditional relationship between Qadis and the king still 
prevailed in Saudi Arabia (Dered, 1972, 58). 
The Ministry of Justice, established by King Faisal in 1970, was 
responsible for administering the country's more than 300 Sharia courts. 
The minister of Justice, appointed by the King from among the country's 
most senior Ulama, was the de facto chief justice (Williard, 1980, 64). He 
was assisted by the supreme judicial council, a body of eleven members 
chosen from the leading Ulama. The Supreme Judicial Council 
supervised the work of the courts, reviewed all legal decisions referred to 
it by the minister of justice, expressed legal decisions referred to it by the 
minister of justice (Gerald, 1966, 26). 
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HISTORY 
The modem political history of Saudi Arabia dates only from the mid 
eighteenth century with rise of the House of Saud in Najd, the region of 
central Arabia. The kingdom was formally created on September 23, 
1932, after King Abdul Aziz al Saud reconsolidated his family's 
patrimony that had been lost to a rival family in the late nineteenth 
century. The history of the Arabian Peninsula provides the context for 
understanding the political culture and the ways in which Saudi leaders 
and the institutions have emerged in the twentieth century (Madawi, 
2002, 26). 
Two principal regions, the Najd (central Arabia) -the heartland of the AL 
Saud-and the Hejaz, the western province which bordered the Red sea, 
the site of the twin holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the flourishing 
port city, Jeddah, have contributed most to the century's institutional and 
social development. The role of Arabia in history before the rise of Islam 
is relatively very limited. Two strains of traditions are inseparably 
together to the political history of Saudi Arabia— family and religion. 
The extended family is as old as Arabia itself and the religion Islam was 
first introduced in Arabia in the seventh century AD. The two were joined 
together in the persons of Amir Mohammad Ibn Saud and Sheikh 
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Mohammad Ibn Abd al Wahab (Hitti, 1960, 76). The former, bom about 
1703-1704, was the ruler of Darriyah, a small principality in Najd and the 
latter was a Najdi teacher and preacher and the founder of the Islamic 
reform movement, first labeled Wahabism by its opponents. He was bom 
in 1703 in the town of Ayaina in Najd of a highly respected and religious 
family. He was concerned with the heresies and abuses which had grown 
up around Islam. He started preaching the faith in the original simplicity. 
For that he was prosecuted and was forced to leave his town. Perceiving 
the value of sheikh Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Prince Mohammad 
concluded an agreement with him that together they would bring the 
Arabs of the peninsula back to the tme faith of the Islamic religion 
(Ansari, 2004, 24).This alliance occurred in AD 1744.They were 
successful, within barely sixty years Mohammad ibn Saud and after him 
his son Abdul Aziz, extended the sovereignty of the house of Saud all 
over Najd. In 1806, Saudi army defeated the Ottomans and seized Mecca 
and Medina, arousing for the first time the attention of outside world. In 
1811 the Ottoman Sultan felt threatened by the achievement of Al Saud 
asked its viceroy in Egypt, Mohammad Ali to proceed to the Arabian 
Peninsula and put an end to the emerging Nation. He launched military 
campaigns under the command of his two sons in succession to invade, 
Najd, which lasted from 1812 through 1818.1n 1818 the second son 
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Imbrahim Pasha finally took Darriyah, and the first Saudi state collapsed. 
The ruler Abdullaha, ibn Saud was taken in exile to Cairo and later to 
Constantinople where he was beheaded (Asad, 2004, 82), 
For a time, it appeared Saudi Arabia power was declined for a decade, but 
in 1824, Turki ibn Abdullaha Al Saud recruited a new tribal army and 
drove the Egyptian garrisons out of Najd, restoring the supremacy of the 
family and nearly succeeding in reconstituting the lost "empire" of his 
grandfather. He did not return to Darriyah but established his capital at 
Riyadh. The second Saudi state flourished or established in Najd under 
Turki, but he was defeated by internecine fighting. In 1834 Turki was 
assassinated by his cousin and by 1840 his son successor Faisal ibn Turki 
regained power and finally restored order (Asad, 2004, 82). 
Faisal was able to region all Saud territories except Hejaz and proved and 
proved an exceptional leader who held the Saudi state firmly, in hand 
Faisal's death in 1865 heralded another Saudi decline. A struggle for 
power between two of his sons led to the second weakling of the Saudi 
Arabia. At the same time, a tribal leader of the Jabal Shammar, 
Mohammad ibn Rashid based in Hail created a strong political body 
which rapidly reasserted themselves in the Najd and by 1871, after 
concluding a pact with Turkey, captured al Hasa. In 1891 he completed 
his control over Najd by capturing Riyadh. Ibn Rashid's seizure of 
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Riyadh, the citadel of the House of Saud forced the third son of Faisal, 
Abdul Rahman to leave the city and settle for months with the Murra 
tribes at the Great Waste, in the out skirts of Rub al Khali, accompanied 
by his son Abdul Aziz ,the future king future Arabia. Eventually he went 
to Kuwait to seek asylum there, ending the second Saudi state. The Najd 
then came under the control of Mohammad ibn Rashid the ruler of Hail 
and Amir of the Shammar tribe (Iqbal, 1977, 78). 
The rise of the third Saudi state and its concession into today's major oil 
power was largely to the vision and leadership of one person. King Abd 
al Aziz ibn Abd al -Rahman Al Saud. Popularly known as ibn Saud 
Abdul Aziz was deeply concerned with thought of his home territory, 
Najd, the land of this ancestor. He resolved to restore the power and 
greatness of his family. Having mastered the art of Bedouin warfare from 
the Banni Murra tribesmen, famous for their ferocity and daring, Abd al 
Aziz felt ready to undertake his daring plan to recapture the Najd from 
the Al Rashid. He led small group of followers to the Najd capital of 
Riyadh in the winter 1901-1902 and after a brief scuffle; he regained 
control of the city. (Iqbal, 1977, 78). 
Abd al Aziz, proclaimed himself ruler of the emirates of Najd, but it took 
more than 20 years for him to defeat the Rashids. By the time he captured 
the Rashidi capital al Hail in 1922, he had already recaptured Eastern 
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Arabia from Ottomans. Consequently, his drive for consolidation was 
quite successful to the extent that by the end of 1904 he had manage to 
break the stranglehold of the Rashid and pushed them to the area at Jabal 
Shammer in northern Najd. Thus on the death of Al Rashid in 1906, ibn 
Saud won complete control over Najd. Having accomplished thus 
objective, he turned the attention to Al Hasa and the area of the Arabian 
Gulf which was still under Turkish rule. He launched a successful assault, 
and by 1913 his sovereignty was extended to both Najd and Al Hasa 
(Iqbal, 1977,79). 
He then addressed the perennial problem of the Bedouins and their 
practice of raiding and moving from place to place, problem of Bedouins 
was the major impeding factor in establishing a stable and large scale 
political organization in the conquered territories. Without resolving 
Bedouins problems their support and loyalties were difficult to count or 
obtain. He took initiative and launched a brilliant two stage plan. First he 
used Wahaabi preaches for teaching the essence of Islam to various tribes 
and convincing then to engage in agriculture labor. Secondly he 
succeeded in adjusting the Bedouins established according to Wahhabi 
teaching in agriculture settlement in Najd region (Huyette, 1985, 86). 
He continued this plan and succeeded in creating formidable political 
military forces known as Ikhwan (brethren), which helped ibn Saud to 
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further consolidate his rule in Najd and Al -Hasa .Gradually and slowly 
Ikhwan became such a powerful force that ibn Saud assumed personal 
commend of them .In a tactical move he concluded treaty with Britain, 
recognizing him as the sole ruler of Najd and Al-Hasa 
(Rentz,1969,48).This agreement provided strength to Abdul Aziz and by 
1918 his authority was extended to reach the outskirt of Hail, the capital 
of the Rashid. His forces (Ikhwan) clashed with the forces of Sharif 
Hussain of Mecca in 1919 but he withheld his troops from attacking 
Hejaz became of his world to Britain (Hitti, 1970, 64). The rule of Hejaz 
Sharif Hussain bin Ali- Al -Hashim was an ally of Britain .He adopted a 
policy of sitting and waiting .In the meantime in 1920 he moved further 
south and annexed Asir .In 1922 he captured the Rashid Capital Hail. 
This was his final campaign against the Rashid. Meanwhile relations 
between the Sharif of Mecca and Britain began to deteriorate. When in 
march 1924, Sharif Hussain Proclaimed himself the king of Arabia and 
caliphof Islam, ibn Saudi patience ceased. He mobilized his Islamic tribal 
army, the Ikhwan and invaded the Hejaz and captured the city of Taif 
(Rentz, 1969,48). 
With little delay and only minor resistance, Mecca, Medina and the whole 
area of Hejaz came under the sovereignty of ibn Suad. The final 
consolidafion of the Arabia Kingdom was accomplished by the end of 
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1925.1n the following year, ibn Saud responding to a popular demand 
from the people of Mecca, became the king of Hejaz, and the sultan of 
Najd, and its Dependencies. Finally in 1932 Abd al-Aziz renamed the 
country the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and became the first king. By the 
time of the death in 1953, Saudi Arabia was well along the way to 
becoming the modem oil kingdom it is today (Long, 2005, 52). 
LAND 
The land known today as the kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers the four 
fifth of the Arabian Peninsula. The country is bounded on the west by the 
Red sea, on the north by Jordan and Iraq, on the east by the Gulf and the 
smaller states of Kuwait. The tiny island state of Bahrain lies off eastern 
shore of Arabian Gulf and ftirther south the small peninsula of Qatar. The 
United Arab Emirates on the Arabian Gulf and the Sultanate of Oman on 
the Gulf of Oman control the approaches to the strategic Strait of 
Hormuz, while the Yemen occupy the south western seaboard. The 
country -1600km from east to west and 1920 km from north to south-
forms a rough triangle, tilting from west to east .Al-Hejaz, the western of 
the three principal regions, the birthplace of Islam, contains Islam's 
holiest cities Mecca and al -Medina. Aside from the country's religion 
and economic significance, the political importance of Saudi Arabia 
geographical posifion is quickly apparent; it is strategically located 
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between Africa and mainland Asia, lies close to the Suez Canal and has 
frontiers on both the Red Sea and the Arabia Gulf (Trevor, 1998, 401). 
The physical environment dominates life in Saudi Arabia, but with the 
advance and exploitation of technology since the discovery of oil in 1933, 
even the desert- for century's dominance of the nomadic Bedouins and 
his camel-is beginning to flower as modem scientific methods locate 
more water. Environmental factors govern the distribution, practically 
rainfall, and Underground water resources and deserts (Trevor, 1998, 
401). 
Geographically, Saudi Arabia is divided into four major regions. The first 
is Najd, a high country is the heart of the kingdom and generally 
considered the core of the peninsula, the Hejaz, the region along which 
lies between Najd and the Red Sea coast. The region of Asir, in the 
southern Red Sea -Yemen border area, constitutes the third region. 
Finally, there is Al-Hasa, the sandy and stormy eastern part of Saudi 
Arabia, the richest of all the region in oil or petroleum (Middle East and 
North Africa, 2006, 963). 
Najd 
Najd is the largest region and comprises the central Arab desert as well as 
many mountains, wadis and deserts in the central part of the country .Its 
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land is not all barren, as was believed in the past, since from Huran in the 
north to the Euphrates there stretches a flat area called the Hamad, which 
has good pastures and many springs. Najd is the center of the country and 
is generally know, the historic center of modem Saudi Arabia. It contains 
country's capital Riyadh. The Najd region also considered the heart of the 
Arabian Peninsula is and vast eroded plateau, Most of Najd region is arid, 
with some oases in the north around Buraydah and Unaizah (Farsy ,1978, 
28). 
The Hejaz 
This consists of a number of inter related natural region; the coastal area 
stretching along the Red Sea (the Tihamah) and fringed by coral reefs. A 
high mountainous area which slopes gradually from Mecca down to the 
port of Jeddah, where the altitude is below 300 meters. An in land plateau 
area surrounded by mountains. In the north this plateau is very high and is 
covered with lava, but it slopes gradually down towards, the south where 
below Mecca and Taif its altitude is only 300 meters (Farsy, 1978,28). 
The main ridge; the high parts of the ridge such as Kharma, Uwayrid and 
Khibar (1800-2000 meters high) are covered with lava. Near Mecca the 
ridge rises to a height of 1,500 meters (Held, 1998,274). 
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The eastern slopes these extend towards the center of the peninsula. In the 
coastal and plateau region are found a number of well populated towns, 
like Al-Muwayliah, Wajh, Amlaj, Yanbu, Rabigh and Jeddah in the 
coastal region, and ula, Medina and Mecca on the plateau (Held, 1998, 
274).. 
Many fertile oases are to be found in the Hejaz situated mostly on a line 
between the main ridge and the eastern slopes: among these are al- Haite, 
al-Huwait (Fadle), Khibar, Hanakia,Taif, Wadi Fatima and Safra. The 
Hejaz occupying a strategic position on the Red Sea Cost, took an active 
part in both sea trade route extending from India to Europe via Yemen 
and the lucrative camel caravan route north west to Damascus, Baghdad 
and Istambul (Held, 1998,276). 
Hasa 
The Al- Hasa region, also called the Eastern providence in the country 
wealthiest east part, containing its massive petroleum resources. The head 
quarter of the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) is located in the 
region in Dhahram, a few miles from the administrative capital and port 
of Dammam. Ras Tanura, the world's largest petroleum port is to the 
north of Dhahran. Up the coast is the site of the kingdom new industrial 
complex al-Jubail. The fertile Oasis -cities of Qatif and Hufuf are also 
located here. Most of the Hasa is a desert plain rising well above sea 
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levels in the west, where the geographical features are similar to those of 
Tiharna. There are a number of separate range of hills which form natural 
barriers between the region, eastwards, the plain gradually slopes down to 
the sea (Farsy, 1978, 28). 
Arrange of hills extends towards the south along the Wadi el-Miah and 
the Jabal-el- Taif, while the rocky al-Summan heights run parallel with 
the Arabian gulf coast between Hasa and the sandy Dahahna desert which 
separates this region from Najd (Farsy, 1978, 28). 
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Wadi Faruq, a part of Wadi el-Miah in the south -west is the most 
important wadi in this region. The coastal region in largely un cultivated 
part. It contain many wells, in which water level almost reaches sea-
level, and extensive pasture lands even the desert areas are modestly 
populated. Hasa and Qatif Oases in the south are the richest areas in the 
region, and they contain numerous wells springs and small lake rivers 
basin(Geetz, 1985, 867). 
Only fertile part extending 70 km east of Hufuf in under cultivation and is 
well populated. In the north there are, however, some isolated areas of 
cultivated watered by spring. The Hasa region is rich in water resources 
and has many hot springs scattered over a wide area. Roads have built 
near these springs (Geetz, 1985, 867). 
Rice and other grain -crops are cultivated, but the principal crop dates, of 
which there are several kinds. Other fruits grown extensively are citrus 
fruits Peaches, Apricots, Pomegranates, Grapes and Figs. Fine Arab horse 
good breeds of donkeys and cows, as well as camel and sheep are reared 
here in large numbers (Middle East and North Africa, 2006,964). 
Hasa is the east was formerly known as Bharain and Hajar. This name 
was applied to the area from Basra to Oman. Nowadays the name Hasa is 
given to the area stretching along the western coast of the Arabian Gulf 
from Kuwait Southern borders as far as Saudi Arabia, forties with Qatar 
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and Oman and Khubura desert, where it is bounded in the west the al-
Summan desert (Middle East and North Africa, 2006, 964). 
Topographically the kingdom is the gently tilted plateau which slopes 
eastward from a coastal mountain range along its western edge bordering 
the Red Sea. In the south is the famous Rub al-Khali (the Empty Quarter) 
a massive, trackless ekpanse of shifting sand dunes - the largest desert in 
the world. Rub al -Khali desert is shared by Saudi Arabia Oman and 
Yemen. It contains dunes of pink quartz sand, which rise 244 meter from 
the desert floor (Fisher, 1971, 446). 
Asir 
The Asir region is the relatively fertile area of costal mountain in the 
extreme southwest. Mountain peaks rise to 10,000 feet, with ample 
rainfall for cultivation (Britanica, 1985, 868). The Asir region with the 
Najran region forms the best agriculture area of Saudi Arabia. The clue to 
the region's fertility is that they are influenced by the monsoonal 
phenomenon of the Indian Ocean. Most of Asir his above 1,500 meters, 
reaching 3,000 meters at some points. Thus these uplands have a summer 
rainfall of 150 to 300 mm, which is addition to the elevation brings about 
dew and fog precipitation (Held, 1998,275), all helpfull to agriculture and 
giving a livelihood to many more people. Fast running streams flow for 
several months of the year ,with deep valley or wadis filled with a jungle 
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- like bush vegetable in the upper reaches (Trevor, 1998, 402) .There are 
extensive terracing on the higher slopes for the cultivation of such un 
likely crops as yams ,vines ,wheat ,millet, bananas, coffee and dates. 
Where the land drops towards the a Red Sea, the pattern of aridity 
returns, with fringe land where nomadic herding of goats can be 
practiced, but the coastland itself the Tihama can support but feeble scrub 
vegetation unfit for man or beast and in desolate. Asir is the most 
beautiful part of Saudi Arabia, some of its lovely natural scenery being 
similar to that parts of Italy, Cyprus and the southern part of the Yemen 
(Fisher, 1971,446). 
Early European cartographic divided the Arabian peninsula into two 
parts; Arabia felix ,which comprised the southern highland of the Yemen 
and the adjoining Asir and Hejez mountains in southwest Saudi Arabia 
and Arabia deserta, the largely desert area that made up the rest of the 
peninsula. Stretching along the kingdom entire southern frontier is the 
Rub al-Khali. Its huge pink sand dunes can get as high as 250 meters and 
stretching parallel up to 40 km in length. Covering over 550,000 sq km, 
the Rub al -Khali is the world's largest quartz sand desert and was 
largely unexplored (Fisher, 1971,446). 
In the north is a smaller quartz desert (Corcoran, 1981, 24), the Great 
Nafud, which is about 55,000 sq km in size .Its dunes are also smaller and 
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are shaped like giant horseshoes, for reasons no one has yet been able to 
explain. Stretching from the Great Nufud to the Rub al- Khali in the east 
is a narrow, strip of sand desert, the Dahana. In all three areas the sand is 
a distinct dark pink color (Bankston, 2000,460). 
The country can be divided into two geological sections, the western 
province (Hejaz) and the western part of the central providence (Najd), 
which consist of crystalline rocks and the eastern province, which is 
mainly made up of sedimentary rocks, including mineral rocks, These 
sedimentary rocks including mineral rocks. These sedimentary rocks 
include in particular, limestone. Sandstone too is found underground in 
Ula in the northern part of Saudi Arabia. Sabkhat (salt flats) of the eastern 
province are typical as are the hadhabat (gravel plain), and still more 
common are the area of Dikakah, which are hummocky growth in sand of 
bushes and grasses (Britanica, 1985, 867) 
PEOPLE 
The population of Saudi Arabia is mainly composed (90 Per cent) of 
native Arabs: A substantial minority consists of Yemenis and other 
Arabs, Africans and Asians who have come to Saudi Arabia since the 
1950s because of the economic opportunities the country offers (Held, 
2000, 284). Nomads know as Bedouin, make up a declining proportion 
(27 per cent) of the population, and the number of settled cultivators has 
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also decreased. By the early 1990s, 77percent of the population was 
urban. The figure is now 87 per cent. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005, 
18) 
In 2006 Saudi Arabia had a population of 27 million of which 5.5 million 
were non national (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005, 18).The kingdom 
has one of the more homogeneous population's in the Arab world, 
excluding the expatriate. Virtually all its citizens are Arabs and Muslims. 
There is a no "class system" in Saudi Arabia. With the exception of the 
upper cluster ,class consciousness is still not non -existent ,Indeed, unlike 
other West Asian countries, Saudi society -with the possible exception 
of the Hejaz ,where the Asharaf dominated the economy and the power 
structure-remained relatively classless throughout its history 
(Vassiliev, 1998,47). The absence of large, structured urban centers 
perhaps denied the social stratification. Saudi Arabia society included the 
settled population in the oases and the nomadic and semi nomadic Badu, 
whose status stemmed from bloodlines more than occupation or wealth. 
The Badu, whom bill and Leiden term lower class, considered themselves 
nobler than settled people, disdaining them as weak and sedentary 
(Patai, 1969,84). 
Secular Arab nationalism never gained much popular support in Saudi 
Arabia, however western nationalist ideology did not hold much appeal 
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for deeply conservative Saudi society, and bitterness at western 
colonialism was never as strong among Saudis, having never experienced 
it themselves. In the worlds of King Faisal; we do not need to import 
foreign tradition. We have a history and a glorious past. We led the Arabs 
and the world ....with what did we lead them? The word of the one God 
and the Sharia of his Prophet", Saudis as well as all other people of the 
peninsula consider themselves the first and therefore the only pure Arab 
by blood, not just by ideology or language (Halliday, 1974,56). 
In Saudi society bloodlines are considered extremely important. 
According to belief, all Arabian tribes are descended from two ancestors; 
Adnan whose live descended from Ismail, (PBUH) son of Ibrahim by 
Hajar and Qahtan (Jakhtan), the grandson of Shem and grandson of Nooh 
(PBUH) mentioned in Genesis 10:25 and following pages (Chaudhry, 
1997, 86). Most of the north Arabian tribes are Adnanies, and most of the 
South Arabia tribes are Qahtanis. Each tribe subdivided into clans which 
are further subdivided into extended families .Moreover, the Arabic 
language indigenous, to the Arabian Peninsula is a major element in 
Saudi Arabia cultural identity. Arabic is a Semitic language originated in 
northern Arabia. The role of Arabia in Saudi culture is considerable .It is 
the language of Holy Quran (Vassilie, 1998,28). 
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Arabic is much more than a medium of communication; however it is 
also the primary medium for reHgious, cultural and artistic expression. 
The inseparable association of Arabic with Islam has transformed it from 
the local Semitic language of northern Arabic into a major world 
language (Kevin, 1981, 37). Arabic has not only spread worldwide, but to 
association with God's word has preserved the classical form as a major 
religious language as well. No matter what their native language, Muslim 
all over the world memorizes passage of the Quran in Arabic 
(Saleem, 1982,62). Moreover as Islam spread outward from the Arabian 
Peninsula, it superseded both other Semitic language and non Semitic 
language as the predominant native tongue, throughout West Asia and 
North Africa (Farsy, 1978, 26). 
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67 
Chapter - II 
All Saudis are Muslim as well as Arabs. Although the great majority of 
Saudis are Sunnis there is a significant Shia Muslim community centered 
in al -Hasa oasis and al -Qatif oasis in the eastern provinces that numbers 
about 1.5 million and there is also a small Shia community in Najran and 
the Yemen border (Patai, 1969, 72).The Saudi people form a closed, 
extremely conservative society due in large part to harsh climate 
condition and particularly in Najd to physical isolation. Although much 
of population in tribally based, nomadic culture played a secondary role 
in forming contemporary Saudi culture and customs. For the most part 
traditional Saudi culture evolved among the sedentary inhabitants of 
towns and villages located wherever water could be found. Only in the 
Hejaz did genuine urban culture evolve, centering on the Islamic holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina and the ports city of Jeddah. Until the advent 
of modernization in the twentieth century, social dynamics in Saudi 
Arabia had changed little since pre-Islamic times (Vassiliev, 1998, 12). 
THE CLIMATE 
The climate is an important factor affecting the lives of the people, 
animals and plants. Climate affects the social and economic life as well as 
other activities. The types and sectors of agriculture crops are determined 
by the climate (Held, 2000, 238). 
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In the field of tourism, climate affects people's movements. For instance, 
in winter, people living in cold areas like the north and middle of the 
kingdom move to the western coastal areas. In summer people living in 
warm areas, move to the area where the weather remains mild. Due to the 
diversity of geographic, environments and topography in the kingdom, 
climatic condition differs from one area to another. Thus the weather 
condition in coastal area is different from those in the internal plateaux 
and heights. The climate in the kingdom can be classified into three 
types: the climate of coast, climate of plateaux and the climats of heights. 
These climate vary in condition such that a given division can have 
different areas with the division, depending on its position in relation to 
the Equator (Held, 2000, 238).Temperature precipitation and winds for 
example influence not only natural element but also land form and animal 
life. Whereas weather is the sum of day to day conditions of the 
atmosphere, climate is the long term average of that condition. 
Saudi Arabia has a desert climate characterized by extreme heat during 
the day an abrupt drop in temperature at night and slight erratic rainfall. 
Because of the influence of a subtropical high pressure system and the 
many fluctuations in elevation there is considerable variation in 
temperature and humidity. Two main extremes in climate are felt between 
the coastal land and the interior (www.worldtraveles.com). 
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Temperature varies from one area to another depending on environmental 
and geographical factors. With the exception of the mountain area, the 
temperature is high in the summer and mild in winter. The average daily 
temperature in the kingdom is 24.5 degree Celsius. The lowest mean 
temperature is 15.6 degree Celsius while the highest is 30.2 degree 
Celsius. The averages increase in low and coastal areas and decrease in 
elevated areas (Homeiedan, 2008, 25). 
Temperatures in the kingdom vary from one season to another. In winter 
the average temperature is 16.2 degree Celsius, while in summer it is 30.2 
degree Celsius. The temperatures are extreme, exceeding 45 Celsius (130 
f) in the interior during the summer months. In the coastal areas, 
temperature are lower, but the climate is far more uncomfortable and the 
humidity prevents the temperature from dropping at night. The climate is 
basically hot and very dry. By contrast, the dry interior can witness a 
temperature drop of over 28 Celsius (50f) within a few hours after sun set 
and in winter can drop below freezing point. 
The rapidly growing capital Riyadh, survives only on water mined from 
non-replenishable aquifers of fossil water. The city dose receives about 4 
inches (102mm) of rain, most of it falling between January and May. In 
summer hot winds can send temperature scoring up to 45° Celsius 
(113°F). In winter can be surprisingly chilly, however particularly at 
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night. Tlie best months of Riyadh, when days are pleasantly tolerable and 
night are cool, are between Octobers and May (www.worldtravels.com). 
Along the kingdom's coastal regions, such as at Jeddah and Dammam 
there is a humid climate which prevails for almost six month of each year. 
Despite its generally arid climate and extremes in temperature sporeding 
rains do fall in Saudi Arabia. On Jabal Sawada (Black mountain) in Asir 
Mountain, monsoon winds can bring as much as 40 centimeters of annual 
rainfall and occasional snow in the winter. 
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There are some temperate mountain locales as in Taif and Abha. In the 
mountain of Asir to the west sufficient rainfall occur for some dry 
farming .In the north, it rains 100-200 mm annually while in the south 
several years may pass without rainfall, and only oases and wells 
provides water. The largest oasis in the world, Al-Hasa is located in the 
eastern province and in the site of extensive agriculture reclamation 
projects .The kingdom does not include any lakes or permanent stream of 
water and some areas may have to go without rainfall for long periods 
(Farsy, 1978,28). 
Average precipitation, ranges from three inches yearly up to twenty 
inches in the mountains of the country's south -west area. Runoff waters 
from large inland wadis are the usually dry riverbeds that can stretch for 
hundreds of kilometers and along which are found wells and oases. There 
are also ancient nonrenewable aquifers that have traditionally water oases 
such as AL-Hasa in the east, over 170 sq km across; Al-Hasa is the 
world's largest Oases. Water from large inland wadis the usually dry 
rivers bed that can stretch for hundreds of kilometers and along which are 
found wells and Oases (Middle East and North Africa, 2006,942). 
The kingdom is located in the tropical and semitropical area between the 
latitudes of 24 degree to 39 degree north, 46 degree to 46 degree east 
longitude. In summer the sun is vertical on the tropic of cancer, which 
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almost passes through the middle of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These 
geographic and climatic factors affect the amount and duration of the 
solar radiation (Middle East and North Africa, 2006, 942). 
The kingdom is exposed to a variety of local and regional winds. The 
wind that come from the north and the north east are cold and dry in 
winter, and hot and dry in summer .Winds from the north west are cold 
and dry, while the winds from the southern east and southern west are 
warm and humid (Britanica, 1985, 867). The kingdom is also exposed to 
local winds that are hot, dry and dusty. The annual amount of rain in the 
kingdom is less than 150mm, with the exception of the western and 
southern heights ,where the rate exceeds 500mm,Table no (2.1) shows the 
average precipitation of some of the cites of the Saudi Arabia(Middle 
East and North Africa,2006,942). 
The annual rate of humidity in the kingdom is 15%.this rate gets higher in 
the eastern and western coastal areas, as well as in elevated areas. In 
general the humidity increases in winter and decreases in summer 
(Britanica, 1985, 867). 
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S.NO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
TABLE 2.1 
Average precipitation (mm) 
CITY 
Abha 
Namss 
Baljarashi 
Bisha 
Sulayed 
Taif 
Zulfi 
Yabreem 
Hardh 
Riyadh 
Hail 
Tabuk 
Gurayat 
AVERAGE 
385 
481 
488 
111 
36 
124 
113 
46 
48 
80 
122 
20 
45 
Homeidan 2008, 334 
CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SAUDI ARABIA 
Many western equate Arabian society with nomadic Bedouin tribes. 
Despite the barrage of foreign ideas, technique and technology Saudi 
Arabia is still a highly traditional Islamic society. Education mass 
medium and the influence of modernization have certainly changed 
expectation in Saudi Arabia but have not created the kind of identity 
crisis prevalent other developing countries. Saudi known who they are; 
this strong sense of identity is based upon strong family ties and historical 
factors (Kathy, 2002, 110). 
The Introduction of Islam to the family structured society of northern 
Arabia in the early seventh century is arguably the most important single 
event in evolution of Saudi culture. It bought a highly cohesive set of 
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moral and social values that permeate the culture to this day more than 
just a religion. Islam is all encompassing and cosmic in scope. It teaches 
that all things animate and inanimate are God's creation, and all under 
God's dominion. (Kathy, 2002,110). 
Islam was bom in Saudi Arabia and thus is visited by millions of 
Muslims every year. The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is seen as the last 
of God's emissaries (following in the footstep of Jesus (PBUH), Moses 
(PBUH), Abraham (PBUH) etc.) to bring revelation to mankind. The 
prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was bom in Mecca around 570 AD, a 
member of the clan of Bani Hashim of the Quraysh tribe. He was 
distinguished with bringing a message for the whole of mankind, rather 
than just a certain peoples. As Moses brought the Toran, and Jesus the 
Bible, Muhammad (PBUH) brought the last book the Quran. The Quran 
and the action of the prophet (the Sunnah) are used as the bases for all 
guidance in the religion. Among certain obligation for Muslim are to pray 
five times a day at down, noon, after, sunset and evening:- These are the 
five pillars of Islam religion Al-Shahdah (Dietl, 2006, 38). 
Friday is the Muslim holyday, everything is closed. Many companies also 
close on Thursday making the week end Thursday and Friday. During the 
holy month of Ramadan all Muslims must fast from dawn to dusk. 
Fasting includes no eating, drinking, cigarette smoking or gum chewing. 
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Friends gather to celebrate the breaking of fast. The festivities often 
continue well into the night. Many businesses operate on a reduced 
schedule. Shops may be opened and closed at unusual times (Herbert, 
1975, 120). 
Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country in which Islamic law is strictly 
enforced. Alcoholic drinks, pork products or religious books and artifacts 
unrelated to Islam are not permitted in the country (Saudi Arabia 
Information Resources, 1999, 3). Dress should be conservative at all 
times, and women should take particular care not to oftened. Visitors' are 
advised to follow native customs with good behavior and dress codes 
before entering the country. Homosexuality and adultery are illegal and 
can carry the death penalty. Photography of local people, government 
buildings, military installations and places of importance are not allowed. 
And women are not permitted to drive. Religious customs should be 
respected particularly during the month of Ramadan when eating, 
drinking and smoking during daylight hours should be discreet as it is 
forbidden by the Muslim culture. The right hand should be used for 
everything, including eating and the giving and receiving of things as the 
left is considered unclean (Nicaolos, 1995,26). 
Men shake hands; good friends may great each other with a handshake 
and a kiss on each cheek. Women generally hug and kiss close friends. 
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Men and women would not great each otner in public and from outside 
the family. When Saudis great each other they conserve general things. 
Saudi socializes primarily in restaurant and international hotels at 
important occasions. Only known and well acquainted persons are 
welcomed at home. Entertainment will generally be amongst the same 
sex only. If both sexes are included, they will be in separate rooms. 
Generally Arabian coffee and dates are served before dinner, punctuality 
is an appreciated but not crucial (Nicaolos, 1995, 26). 
The first of the tenets of Islam is the testimony and the pronouncing of 
the words that "there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet". 
This Shahadah, or testimony, when recited by a person of sincerity, sound 
capacity and without any mental reservations, constitute the first major 
requirement for being a Muslim (Nicaolos, 1995, 26). 
Al-Salah (Prayer) 
Prayers are of such great significance that some leading scholars of the 
religion describe them as the backbone of Islam. Each Muslim is required 
to pray five times daily, in a prescribed manner. The first prayer is at 
dawn the next is at high noon, then in the afternoon, after sun set and 
finally at nights (Corcoran, 1981, 7). 
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Al-Siyan (Fasting) 
The imposition of fasting wiiich means complete abstention from food 
and drink from sunrise until sunset during the month of Ramadan is the 
third basic tenet of the Islamic religion. Fasting in Ramadan, besides 
being a religious duty is no doubt of great benefit as it trains one to be 
patientent, wise, well-disciplined and to share the feelings of others. 
Ramadan is the ninth month of Arabic Calendar, which therefore, consist 
of twelve lunar months (Corcoran, 1981, 7). 
Al-Zaka (Alms giving) 
In various parts of the Quran great stress in laid to on the Zaka that is 
alms giving to those who deserve it. Each able Muslim should give a 
certain percentage of his annual income, either in money or kind, to the 
poor and the indigent. In Saudi Arabia, the religious obligation of Al-
Zaka has been officially recognized by the Ministry of Zaka under the 
auspices of the ministry of finance. Al-Zaka on the individual's annual 
income amount to almost two and half percent (Corcoran, 1981, 8). 
Al-Hajj 
The fifth and last pillar of Islam is the Hajj. It is explicitly stated in the 
holy Quran that every physically and financially able Muslim should 
make the hajj to Mecca once in his or her lifefime. The Hajj is considered 
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the final culmination of each Muslim's religious dufies and aspirations 
(Ibrahim, 1974, 15) 
The Family 
At the time of the birth of Islam, the traditional Saudi extended family 
was patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, endogamous, and occasionally 
polygamous (Lipsky, 1959, 52). 
Patriarchal refers to family authority being concentrated among the 
elders, male and female, patrilineal refers to tracing descent through the 
male line, patrilocal refers to family members living to close proximity 
endogamous refers to choosing spouses from within the same tribe, 
extended family, or social groups and polygamous refers to having 
multiple wives. Islam permits a man to have up to four wives, but only so 
long as the wives are treated equally, in practical terms this usually 
required them to be provided with separate residences (Lipsky, 1959, 52). 
Clothes 
People's level of progress can be measured by the extent to which they 
preserve their traditions. Saudi Arabia has a great history extending back 
thousand of years, a history abundant with expressing a special test in the 
practicing a lifestyle that suits the environment, and the springs from 
customs and traditions (Dietl, 2006,22). 
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Clothes may be most important of these elements, let us consider here the 
traditional customs with its distinctive rich colors simple lines, decency 
and the artistic beauty that reaches a high degree of skill and precisions in 
spite of primitive tools and scarcity of resources (Dietl, 2006, 22). 
Men wear a Thob, a simple ankle length robe of wool or cotton, usually 
in white or earth tones, on their heads they wear of a Ghotra, a large 
diagonally folded cotton square worm over Kufiyyah and held in place 
with an Oqal, a double coiled cord circlet sometimes men wears, a low 
flooring length outer cloak called a Bisht over their Thob the Bisht is 
made of wool or camel hair in black, beige brown, or cream colors (Dietl, 
2006, 22). 
Women's traditional dress varies by regions, but it always covers the 
body from colored fabric appliques some women wear a Shayla, a black 
gauzy scarf wrapped around the head and held in placed by a variety of 
hats, head circlets or jewelry. In public, women sometimes wear a black 
outer cloak called an "Abaya" over their dress. In the south southwest 
district known as the Asir, women wear brightly colored, long wasted 
dresses and no veils (Dietl, 2006,22). 
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Language 
The official language of Saudi Arabia, spoken by virtually all Saudis is 
Arabic language; Arabic is spoken by 100 million people worldwide and 
has many distinctive dialects, written Arabic on the other hand is the 
same for Arabic writers the world over. It is written and read from right 
to left (Lipsky, 1959,52). 
"Hello" in Arabic is Marhaba or Ahaln to which over replies, Marhabtayn 
or Anlayn, other common greetings are As-Salam Alaykum (peace be 
with you) with the reply of Walaykum as-Salam (and to you peace). 
Ma'Assalama means "Good bye". The numbers one to ten in Arabic are 
Wahad, Itnayn, Thalatha, Arabia's Khamsa, Sita, Sab'a Thamnya, Tis'a 
and 'Ashara. 
Food 
Traditionally, dates were the staple food for the Saudis. A typical Saudi 
dish is lamb (or chicken) and bread and seasonal rice. Tea / coffee are 
served at all gatherings, butter, milks, camel's milk and laban a yogurt 
drink are favorite beverages, desserts generally consist of fruits . A 
unique Saudi food is Arikha, a bread from the southern region (the Asir) 
which is broken off and formed into a spoon shape to be dipped into a 
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dish of honey locusts, although terribly destructive when swarming, are 
considered a delicacy in Saudi diet (Dietl,2006,22). 
Meals that commemorate religious events, such as the birth of the prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) are served on a white tablecloth on the floor. Forks 
and knives are not used at these meals either the right hand or a spoon is 
used on religious occasion. Everybody's meals are served at tables and 
forks and knives as commonplace (Dietl, 2006, 22). 
Marriage Customs 
From olden times, marriage has been in man's interest. It has been 
nurtured by religion and tribals, Rules and regulations have been made, 
because it represented the paramedical foundation of social unity. By 
marriage man can achieve a stable life and create a family and 
consequently, a united society (Dietl, 2006, 22). 
A large number of traditions and customs have been inherited from 
human societies, where each formed its own customs and traditions to 
create an Arabian peninsular society. They also have their special 
marriage traditions. One of the social customs is the marriage procedure, 
a contract between two parties under the patronage of a lawyer with two 
witnesses (Dietl, 2006, 22). 
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OIL HISTORY 
Saudi Arabia is a biggest and most powerful country in the Arabian 
Peninsula. It enjoys the largest proven petroleum reserves to be in any 
single country in the world and these account for around one-quarter of 
total world reserves (Gelb, 1998, 67). The huge oil reserves led to the 
development of oil industry in Saudi Arabia. The evolution of 
relationship between the oil companies and the host country surely most 
important, the earliest attempt to exploit mineral resources in Saudi 
Arabia was made 1923 by Frank Homles, the New Zealander who 
represented a London financial syndicate- a British group (Anan, 1999,4). 
This group was granted a concession for exploration of petroleum in 
Eastern province, which now known to contain the world's largest 
petroleum reserves. But since the syndicate failed to generate the 
sufficient interests to raise the necessary capital to undertake the project 
the concession was allowed to lapse four years later ( Moliver, 1980,19). 
Ten years later, an American businessman Chrles R.Crane, visited king 
Abd al-Aziz and promised to send him a mining engineer to investigate 
the country's mineral deposits (Danielsen, 1982, 142). The man he later 
sent was Karl Twitchell an American who had already worked for Crane 
in Yemen. Meanwhile, the standard oil company of California (Socal) 
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had drilled and discovered oil in nearby Bahrain, and geologist had a 
strong, suspicion that oil lay under the surface of the mainland. Eager to 
pursue the possibility, Socol contacted Harry St. John Philby, Abd al-
Aziz's close friend and unofficial adviser, to arrange the appropriate 
introductions. Phiby agreed, and in February 1933, a Socal lawyer Lloyd 
Hamicton, together with Karl Twitchell, traveled to Jeddah to negotiate a 
concession agreement, complicated by competition from The Iraq 
petroleum company (IPC). Eventually Socal prevailed and Abd al- Aziz 
authorized his finance Minister, Abdullah Sulayman, to sign the 
concession agreement on 29 May 1933.Thus began a new era in Saudi 
history, destined to change the face of Arabia by creating new sources of 
income independent of the uncontrollable pilgrims in traffic and uncertain 
subsidies (Moliver, 1980, 18). 
By April 1935 the men, who now officially worked for a new, Socal 
subsidiary, California Arabian Standard oil company (Casoc) were ready 
to drill for oil, but progress was unsteady (Quandti, 1980, 34). It was 
three years before they discovered oil in sufficient quantities to generate 
enthusiasm, and in October 1938 Bill lenanan, Cosoc's official 
government representative, traveled to Riyadh to announce the fact to 
Abd al- Aziz. The discovery rekindled interest in the ulfimate success of 
the venture and stimulated frirther expansion in the company's operation. 
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In 1936, Standard Oil Company of California, putting Article 32 of the 
1933 agreement into effect sold one-half of its concession's interest to 
The Texas oil company. The two companies emerged as the California-
Texas oil California (CALTEX) later (Corcoran, 1981, 3). 
On 1 may 1939 the king opened the value allowing the first barrel of oil 
to flow into the first tanker at the port of Ras Tannura and at the end of 
that month Casco singed a supplemental agreement expanding the limits 
of the concession, for a period of sixty years auguring well for fiirther 
exploration and production. This second instrumental, enlarged the 
company's concession area by almost 80,000sq miles. It also included 
rights in the Saudi government's half interest in the two neutral zones 
showed with Iraq and Kuwait (Roncaglia, 1985, 49). 
During 1940 war at sea and supply shortage severely checked the further 
development of oil production and the company was force to restrict 
productions until the end of the war (Al-Rasheed,2002,26 ). In 1944 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company was renamed the Arabian 
American oil company (Aramco). Once more, in 1948, Aramco enforce 
Article 6/b/c of the supplemental Agreement of 1939 by selling a thirty 
per cent interest to Standard Oil of New Jersey and a ten percent interest 
of Socony Vacuum, redistributing the ownership of Aramco as follows; 
Texas Oil Company thirty percent Standard Oil of California, thirty 
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percent standard Oil; New Jersey; thirty percent and Socony Vacuum the 
last ten percent (currently named Texas, California Standard Exxon, and 
Mobil oil) (Damer, 2003, 56). In 1949 the Getty Oil Company was able to 
acquire a sixty year petroleum concession in the Neutral Zone where the 
Saudi Arabia, government shared right equally with Kuwait (Rabison, 
1980, 12). This concession included exploration and production rights in 
territorial waters for a distance of six miles. In 1957, the government of 
Saudi Arabia conclude, an agreement by which it granted the Japan 
Petroleum Trading Company, ltd. a forty four year concession covering 
the governments undivided share in all that offshore area outside the 
territorial waters limit of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral zones. 
Drilling standard in 1959; petroleum was discovered in January 1960 
(Held, 1989, 264). In January, 1965 the Saudi government concluded 
another concession agreement with the French-Owned Societie 
Auxiliaire de la Regie Autonome does Petroles (Auxirap) to explore for 
petroleum in the Red Sea. It was agreed that the French Company would 
bear all exploration costs until petroleum was discovered. Then a joint 
operating company would be founded in which Petromin (the Saudi 
National oil company) would acquire four percent equity, but would 
enjoy fifty percent of the voting power (Cordesman, 1997, 501). 
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Meanwhile, Saudi government demanded a greater share in the profits 
and in October 1948 revised the concession agreement to provide an 
additional five cent per barrel in royalty on each barrels in royalty of each 
barrel produced from a redefined offshore portion of the concession. This 
was followed in December 1950 by the so-called 50-50 agreement, 
perhaps the most important adjustment in the concession relationship 
until the movement changes of the 1970's.Under this agreement, Aramco 
agreed to pay income Tax and 50 percent of its gross income less 
operating expenses, which greatly increased the government's share of 
the oil revenues. From then on, the Saudi government's income was 
linked to Aramco's profits rather than the number of barrels produced and 
sold as before. As oil revenues increased, the face of old Arabia began to 
change forever (Helms, 1981, 84). 
Moreover, it was agreed upon by 1952 that the Saudi government should 
be represented in the company's policy deliberation and that the 
company's headquarter should be located in Saudi Arabia. Consequently 
Aramco's headquarters were moved to Dhahran, and in 1959 two Saudi 
government representatives were elected to Aromco's 15 man board of 
directors (David, 1989,72). 
The Petromin is the nation's first national petroleum company, which is 
empowered to formulate and execute projects for the development of 
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petroleum, petrochemical and mineral industries of the nations. At the 
beginning of 1973 Petromin acquired a 25 percent stake in Aramco's 
concession and operation. Petromin's stake in Aramco was raised to 60 
percent at the beginning of 1974. The Saudization of Aramco concession 
and operation was completed in 1980 well retroactive effect as Petromin 
acquired the remaining share in Aramco. However Aramco still plays a 
role in Saudi oil production. It provides Petromin with technical 
assistance on a per barrel fee basis and has access of Petromins sales and 
refining needs (Greogry, 1994, 96). 
The seventies saw a major reorganization of the oil industry in Saudi 
Arabia. On December 20 1972 an agreement was concluded between 
Saudi Arabia and Aramco regarding the participation formula. According 
to which the Saudization of Aramco would be made by January 1, 1980 
(Greogry, 1994,96). 
In November 1953, Abd al- Aziz passed away leaving, his sons to solve 
the problems which the production of oil inevitably brought in its wake. 
In the year following his death, petroleum played an ever-increasing role 
in the country's development, as well as in its international relations 
(Brossard, 1974, 62). 
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In 1962 the general Petroleum and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN) 
was established to develop Saudi Arabia oil and mineral resources. In 
1980 the government assumed full ownership of Aramco, remaining it 
Saudi Aramco. The first Saudi president was appointed in 1984 (Looney, 
1982,44). 
In the early 1990s, Saudi Aramco undertook exploration of parts of the 
country where a search for oil had never before been undertaken. In 
central Saudi Arabia, the company discovered major deposits of natural 
gas and oil, including sweet, low-sulfur grades of crude (Bligh, 1982, 
666). 
The oil boom changed Saudi Arabia's strategic position as well. Saudi 
Arabia became one of the largest and most powerful states in the Gulf, 
and a key supplier of world oil imports. In 2000, the kingdom had 260 
billion barrel of proven oil reserves, more than one-fourth of the world's 
total. It was the world's largest oil producer. This surplus capacity made 
Saudi Arabia the world's largest "swing producer" and its ability to 
increase production to meet a crisis means that it plays a critical role in 
ensuing moderate and stable oil prices (Cordesman, 2003, 504,). 
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OIL FIELDS 
The Saudi Arabian economy is deeply involved in the production and 
exploration of crudes oil. Oil resources and its ability to control the 
international oil market has been established on several Occasion. Saudi 
Arabia oil has played a major role in the world market (Corcoran, 1981, 
3). 
Saudi Arabia enjoys the largest proven oil reserves s of any country in 
the world. Oil, of course, is the basic reason for Saudi Arabia 
unprecedented international involvement. It contains the largest proven 
reserves of petroleum in the world, and capable of producing oil at very 
little cost of Saudi Arabia (Menoret, 2003, 71). 
Geophysical survey in Saudi Arabia was started in September 1933 and 
the first well was drilled in 1935. Development of the oil was hindered by 
the Second World War but from the mid's 1940's on words a series of 
further finding were made. Crude oil production in Saudi Arabia is 
carried out by the Arabian American oil company (Aramco) (Menoret, 
2003,71). 
Since the late 1990s oil production in Saudi Arabia has taken place in 
eighteen oil fields in Saudi Arabia proper, and in five oil fields in the 
Netural Zone. Over half of Saudi Arabia current proven reserves are 
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contained in eight fields, and 90 percent of all Saudi production comes 
from the four largest oil fields Ghawar, Safaniyah, Abaqiq and Berri. 
Ghawar is the world largest on shore oil fields. Ghawar field alone has 
some 70 to 85 billion barrels. Several others on shore oil fields are 
Hadriya, Majan, Fadhili, Harmliyah, Manifa etc (Held, 2000,276). 
The Safahniyah is largest offshore field in the world. It has 19 billion 
barrels oil reserves. The Abaqiq super giant field has 17 billion barrels 
and Berri has 11 billion barrels. Since 1994 the Hawtah Trend also called 
the Najd fields, which includes the Hawtah and smaller satellites 
Nauyyim, Hazmiyah, south of Riyadh has been the significant oil fields 
of Saudi Arabia (Knauershase, 1975, 64). 
The important offshore fields, Zuluf (8 billion barrel), Abusafah (6 billion 
barrel), Manifa (11 billion barrels), Shayhah (6 billion barrel), and 
Khursaniyah (3-5 billion barrel) (MEES, 13 December, 2004). 
Saudi Kuwait Divided Zone, also known as Neutral Zone contains about 
5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Within divided zone Japan's 
Arabian Oil Company (AOC) traditionally had operated two offshore 
fields (Kha^i and Hout) with 300,000 million barrel but in February, 
2000 it lost the concession (Presely, 1999,20). 
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The offshore Divided Zone has represented Japan's most significant 
upstream oil interest with 80 percent of revenues going to Arabian Oil 
Company (AOC), and 10 percent each to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
(Presely, 1999,20). 
Chevron Texaco, meanwhile, operates three onshore fields Wafra, south 
Fawaris, on and Umm Gudair in the Divided Zone. Saudi Arabia had 
stated that it wanted Arabian Oil Company (AOC) and Japan to increase 
their development in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman, 247,2003). 
Besides the Kuwait Saudi divided zone Saudi also produces oil jointly 
with Bahrain, from Abu Saafa offshore oil fields. As a way of supporting, 
their neighbor's economy, since 1996 the Saudi administrators had 
donated all of the income from its 150,000 bl/d of production of Bahrain. 
However in late 2004, with output from Abu Saafa doubling to 300, 000 
bl/d the Saudis apparently reduced this share to 50 percent. In addition, 
Bahrain traditionally has received around 50,000 bl/d of Saudi oil from 
other fields, apparently at a significant discount (MEES, 23 August, 
2004). 
Although Saudi Arabia has around 80 oil and gas fields (and over, 1000 
wells), more half of its reserves are contained in only eight fields (MEES, 
23 August, 2004). 
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OIL PRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia is the world's most important oil producer, given its 
relatively high production levels, accounting for nearly 13 percent of 
world output and 35 percent of total OPEC output. Saudi Arabia has 
become the "swing producer", balancing international oil demand and 
supply (Presely, 1999, 14). Therefore, within limits, Saudi oil production 
polices can have a profound impact on international prices. Since the 
early 1970s, the kingdom has occasionally used this dominance to 
influence oil prices, usually to fiirther its objectives of sustaining long 
term oil consumption and ensuring economic stability in the 
industrialized world (Wells, 1974, 7). 
Practically all oil production in Saudi Arabia is controlled by the state-run 
Saudi Arabia oil company, Saudi Aramco (Corcoran, 1981, 4). While 
foreign companies are contracted to build infrastructure and install 
equipment, the Saudi government maintains ownership of the facilities. 
Saudi Aramco is a vertically integrated company with tanker and refinery 
operations. It has both cut its production levels to maintain its assigned 
OPEC level and raised production to prevent possible price and supply 
crises or reduce their impact (Farsy, 1978, 11). 
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The Saudi government's ability to use Aramco as a "swing producer" has 
given Saudi Arabia still further strategic importance (Quandt, 1982, 47). 
Saudi Arabia production of different types of crude gives Saudi Arabia 
special flexibility. Unlike Kuwait - which can produce only one type of 
crude -or the UAE and Iraq - which can produce two each -Saudi Arabia 
produce five types ranging from heavy to light, during 1999-2001, for 
example, Saudi Arabia gave repeated assurances that it would increase 
production to meet any shortfall from Iraq at a time when Iraq was 
attempting to use cutting off its oil exports as a threat that could help it 
break out of UN sanctions (Nimblock, 2006, 32). 
The table No (3.1) shows, the Saudi oil production levels have fluctuated 
sharply over the years, depending largely on the political condition in the 
Gulf and the changing world oil market, Saudi production was 3.2 million 
barrels a day(MMBD)in 1970, when the oil boom began. It rose to peak 
of 9.2 in 1979, 8.3 in 1980 (MMBD), driven partly the fall of the shah of 
Iran and the start of Iran -Iraq war. Production then dropped back to a 
low of only 4.5 MMBD in 1985, largely because OPEC oil prices reached 
the point where demand was cut sharply or because new sources outside 
of OPEC began to enter the market. Saudi Arabia decision in 1986 to 
focus on market share rather than high prices, raised production back to 
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4.7 MMBD in 1988 levels rose slowly, reaching 5.15 MMBD in 1990 
before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (SAMA, 1995, 64). 
Since the last 1990, oil production in Saudi Arabia has taken place in 
eighteen fields, and 90% of the Saudi production comes from the largest, 
oil fields ~ Ghawar, Safaniyah, Abqaiq and Berri. Saudi Arabia produces 
a range of crude oil grades from heavy and super light, about 65%to 70% 
of Saudi Arabia's total oil production capacity is considered light gravity, 
with the rest either medium or heavy (SAMA, 1995, 64). 
The outbreak of the Gulf war in August 1990 drove Iraq-- Kuwait oil out 
of the market and Saudi production rose to a peak of 8.12 MMBD in 
1991, to compensate for the shortage. Saudi oil production stayed at 
levels over 8.12 to 8.1 through the early and mid 1990s, ranging from 
annual average of 8.1 to 8.3 MMBD (SAMA, 1992, 37). 
Saudi Arabia is unique among GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states in 
that it has very wide range of physically and financially feasible 
production levels (Jerichow, 1997, 66). In 2000 Saudi oil production 
totaled about 8.09 million barrels per day. In 2005, oil production of 
Saudi Arabia reached around 9.35 million barrels per day (SAMA, 2006, 
87). 
95 
Chapter - III 
The Table No (3.1) explains vast fluctuations in level of oil production; in 
Saudi Arabia between 2002 to 2005.The variation in crude oil production 
of Saudi Arabia was due to domestic and international reasons. The 
events of 11 September and the second Iraq crises were main causes of 
variation in Saudi Arabia oil production (SAMA, 2006, 87). 
The Saudi Arabia also constantly adjusts its production of crude types in 
response to fluctuation and demands. In 2001 and 2002 the demand of oil 
th in international market declined due to territorial events of 11 September 
2001 and because of the presence of the wave of Islamic revivalism. The 
table no 3.2 shows oil exports of Saudi Arabia 1970 to 2004 (Lippman, 
2004, 29). 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Table-3.1: OIL PRODUCTION OF SAUDI ARABIA 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
MILLION BALLERLS 
Total Production 
1,173.9 
1,740.68 
2,201.96 
2,772.61 
3,095.09 
2,582.53 
3,139.28 
3,357.96 
3,029.90 
3,479.15 
3,623.80 
3,579.89 
2,366.41 
1,656.88 
1,492.90 
1,158.80 
1,746.20 
1,505.40 
1,890.10 
Percentage 
Change 
5.40 
18.13 
25.53 
26.50 
25.92 
6.97 
-9.77 
14.16 
4.16 
-1.21 
-33.90 
-29.98 
-9.90 
-22.88 
50.69 
-13.79 
25.55 
-2.20 
26.62 
Daily Production Average 
3.2 
3.8 
4.7 
6.0 
7.6 
7.6 
8.5 
7.0 
8.5 
9.2 
8.3 
9.5 
9.5 
9.8 
6.4 
4.5 
4.0 
3.1 
4.7 
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20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1,848.50 
2,340.50 
2,963.00 
3,049.40 
2,937.40 
2,937.90 
2,928.54 
2,965.45 
2924.28 
2,022.27 
2,761.10 
2,962.60 
2,879.46 
2,5888.98 
3,069.74 
3,256.30 
3,413.94 
3,360.90 
-2.20 
26.62 
26.60 
2.92 
-3.67 
0.02 
-0.32 
1.26 
-1.39 
3.35 
-8.64 
7.30 
-2.81 
-10.09 
18.57 
6.08 
4.84 
-1.55 
4.12 
5.15 
8.12 
8.33 
8.05 
8.05 
8.02 
8.10 
8.01 
8.28 
7.56 
8.89 
7.89 
7.09 
8.41 
8.90 
9.35 
9.20 
Sources: Ministry of Petroleum and Mining Various Issues of Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency, Forty Three Annual Report Research and Statistics Department Riyadh, 
2007. 
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Table-3.2; OIL EXPORT OF SAUDI ARABIA 
MILLION BARRELS 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
YEAR 
1970 
1976 
1980 
1981 
1986 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
TOTAL EXPORT 
1,174.17 
2,930.64 
3,218.47 
2,068.40 
1,190.02 
2,382.11 
2,408.98 
2,296.92 
2,275.75 
2,296.13 
2,236.01 
2,257.33 
2,332.48 
2,087.68 
2,282.38 
2,203.10 
1,928.89 
2,380.85 
2,486.77 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mining. 
Sources:-Various issues- of Saudi Arabia monetary agency SAM A Annual Report. 
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OIL RESERVES 
Saudi Arabia's petroleum sector is as important to the world as it is to 
Saudi Arabia. The kingdom shaped its energy strategy from a unique 
position. Its massive oil reserves make up over 25% of the entire world's 
production reserves (Presely, 1999, 13). Estimates of the size and 
importance of Saudi Arabia oil reserves do differ slightly according to 
sources (MEED, 2000, 18). The U.S government estimates that Saudi 
Arabia proper (excluding the Saudi- Kuwait "Netural Zone") contained at 
least 262 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of 2002 (EIF, Saudi 
Arabia, 2000, 17). It estimate that Saudi reserves totaled 264.2 billion 
barrels, when oil from the Saudi half of the Neutral-Zones -about 5 
billion barrel of proven oil reserves. A comparable Saudi estimate was 
261.7 billion barrels (SAMA, 2004, 40). 
Virtually all sources agree, however, that estimates of Saudi Arabia 
proven reserves have increased every year since 1962, and that Saudi 
Arabia has massive additional reserves (MIF, 1996, 346), that is not yet 
"proven. Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) estimates, the reserves 
were 56.9 billion barrels in 1962, 96.2 bilHon barrel in 1973, 113.5 billion 
barrels in 1980 and, 257.8 billion barrels in 1990, (SAMA, 1991, 34) 
Saudi Aramco estimates that Saudi Arabia's recoverable crude oil and 
condensate reserves rose to 259.1 in 1997, 259.2 in 1998,259.2 in 1999, 
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259.3 in 2000, 259.4 in 2002, 259.7 in 2004 and 259.9 in 2007 (SAMA, 
2009, 386). 
The U.S Department of energy estimates that Saudi Arabia has a little 
over one- quarter of the world's total proven petroleum reserves (25.4%). 
This compares with 11% for Iraq, 9.6% for the UAE, 9.2% for Kuwait 
and 8.6% for Iran, 13% for the rest of OPEC, and 22.6% for the rest of 
the world (Arab News, 2001, 6). 
Saudi Arabia reserves compared to those of other nations and regions are 
on an average substantial. Not only does Saudi Arabia have over eighty 
years of reserves at current average annual production rates (approaching 
9 million barrels a day), but its reserves are nearly ten times those of the 
united sates and more than four times those of all of North America (Arab 
News,2001,6). 
They are well over five times the reserves of Russia, and sixteen times the 
roughly 17 billion barrels of proven reserves in all of the Caspian Sea and 
Central Asia. They are larger than all of the roughly 230 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and 
Western of Eastern Europe Combined (EIF, 2001,10). 
The total gulf region has some 677 billion barrels -65% of the world total 
of 1,046 billion barrels. Saudi Arabia stability and strategic ties to the 
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west underpin the security of roughly two thirds of all of the world's 
proven oil reserves. Any effort to contain Iran and Iraq, with roughly 20% 
of all the world's oil reserves, depends heavily on western access and 
military ties to Saudi Arabia. The same is true of any effort to provide 
security for the other GCC states-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 
UAE- with another 20% of the world oil reserves (EIF, 2001, 10). 
To put Saudi Arabia reserves in further perspective the world has spent 
more than a quarter of a century since the Arab oil embargo of 1974 
trying to find alternative sources of oil and energy. In the process, it has 
conducted an intense search throughout the world. The net result, 
however, has been to expose the fact that many area projected to have 
major reserves did not. At the same time, new discoveries in Saudi Arabia 
have steadily increased both estimated of proven Saudi reserves and the 
Saudi share of the world's total reserves (Presely, 1999,21). 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Table-3.3: CRUDE OIL RESERVES 
Year 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980-84 
1985-89 
1990-94 
1995-99 
2000-04 
Saudi ARAMCO 
134.822 
156.58 
164.82 
202.155 
258.634 
259.132 
259.14 
Others 
(ASB,OPEC) 
0.3564 
0.3604 
0.3446 
0.3446 
0.4028 
0.2366 
0.3648 
Billion barrels 
(average) 
Total (SAUDI 
ARAMCO,ASB,OP 
EC) 
138.38 
160.184 
168.266 
20.51594 
26.1042 
28.1752 
26.3058 
(~)Note Available 
Sources:- Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
Forty-Fifty Annular Report, 2009, Research and Statistics Department Riyadh. 
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Crude Oil Reserves 
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OIL REVENUES 
The economic development which Saudi Arabia witnessed over the 
period of 1962-70 was built on the increasing resources which could be 
spent on development (Lai, 1997, 64). These increased resources, 
however, were not simply a fortunate windfall from which Faisal 
government was able to benefit. It was largely the outcome of the 
government on efforts. There were two aspects to this. The first was that 
Faisal's rigorous control over wastefiil state expenditure released 
resources which could now be devoted to development (Masood, 1989, 
17). 
The second aspect was the growth in revenues from oil sales. Unlike the 
gain's which Saudi Arabia made from this source during the mid and late 
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1990s, this did not come from a rise in the prices of oil, (Presely, 1999, 
17) indeed for most of the 1960s the posted prices oil (the prices agreed 
with Aramco for calculating the share of oil sale revenues allocated of the 
Saudi government) remained constant (Meier, 1995, 52), 
The increased revenues, rather stemmed in part from increased 
production and in part from a series of renegotiation with Aramco of the 
terms on which revenues was shared. The gains in both cases can be 
attributed to the gradual change in the balance of the relationship between 
government and oil companies (Meier, 1995, 52). 
During 1972 and early 1973 demand of Saudi oil production increased 
rapidly actual production decisions were still primarily being made by the 
American oil companies that constituted the Arabian American oil 
company (Aramco) upward pressure on prices and expanding Saudi oil 
output (Movier, 1980,27). In the early 1973 conceded with the Arab 
Israeli war which broke out on October 8^*^  1973, subsequently at on 
OPEC meeting in Kuwait on October 16*, Saudi Arabia along with the 
other member announced as 5 percent production cut and also increased 
posted prices (Looney, 1982, 38). 
In 1976 the Saudi Arabia oil revenues 135,957 million riyals, which 
declined to 84,600 million riyals in 1988. In 1994 the oil revenues of 
Saudi Arabia rose to 146,500 million riyals and 179,085 riyals in 1995. 
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By the mid 1990s Saudi Arabia had paid for the Gulf war but still faced 
serious budget problems. Additional increase in oil prices gave the 
government total revenues of 205, 5000 million riyals in 1996 and 58,327 
million riyals in 1999 (SAMA, 2000, 44). 
The Saudi oil revenues in 2001, extend as 228,159 million riyals, which 
rose by 22.2 percent to 293,600 million riyals in 2003.During 2004 Saudi 
oil revenues decreased by 31.8 percent to 200,000 million riyals from 
293600 million riyals in 2003.This fluctuation in oil revenues may be 
attributed to second Iraq crises and declining of the world economy 
(SAMA, 2000, 44). 
Table-3.4: TRENDS OF ACTUAL OIL REVENUES 
MILLION RIYALS 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Year 
1976 
1982 
1988 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total Revenues 
135,957 
246,182 
846,00 
146,500 
179,085 
205,500 
141,608 
147,454 
158.327 
258,065 
228„159 
213,000 
293,000 
200,000 
OIL REVENUES 
Amount 
121,191 
186,006 
48,400 
105,728 
135,982 
159,985 
79,908 
104447 
202,228 
214,424 
183,915 
166,100 
231,000 
157,000 
% Share 
Contribution of 
Oil Sector in TR 
89.1 
75.6 
57.2 
72.2 
75.9 
77.9 
56.5 
70.8 
68.3 
83.1 
80.5 
78.0 
78.8 
77.2 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency Forty-Fifty Annular Report, 2009, Research 
and Statistics Department Riyadh. 
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(0 
Trends of Actual Oil Revenues 
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Years 
Table-3.5: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY OIL SECTORS 
MILLION RIVALS 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
YEAR 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
GDP 
22,279 
163,156 
544,069 
372,408 
430,334 
484,353 
501,359 
485,630 
494,766 
526,004 
581,873 
608,802 
536,636 
593,956 
697,007 
679,163 
699,680 
795,787 
OIL SECTORS 
8,572 
33,217 
146,758 
104,51 
158,693 
179,572 
199,856 
170,012 
169,438 
187,718 
226,476 
228,250 
152,829 
198,988 
289,165 
255,510 
263,51 
263.51 
% Share of 
OIL IN GDP 
38.47 
20.35 
39.31 
28.86 
36.86 
37.03 
39.86 
35.00 
34.24 
35.68 
37.49 
28.47 
25.10 
33.50 
41.40 
37.62 
37.66 
37.66 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency Forty-Fifty Annular Report, 2009, Research 
and Statistics Department Riyadh. 
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NATURAL GAS 
Saudi Arabia is one of the world's richest countries in hydrocarbon 
resources. The emergence of natural gas as an important hydrocarbon 
supply resources has brought a new dimension to the future of Saudi 
Arabia. For many years gas has been seen largely as a disposable by 
product of oil (MEES, 2?>"^ August, 2004). 
In the 1940s 50's and 60's natural gas found with oil had few commercial 
outlets consequently, this natural resource of such great abundance was 
once had been flared to the atmosphere because at the time it had little 
use fullness and economic value. Aside from the occasional gas fixed 
turbine or as a pressure builder for injection. Gas had only nominal value. 
There was no major industrial, customer to speak of, hence no ready 
market. And even if these had been customers, pipelines and other 
106 
Chapter - III 
facilities were lacking for efficient distribution of gas. Therefore the 
existing industries burned liquid fuels. Such as fuels oil or kerosene 
(MEES, IS*''November, 1999). 
Saudi Arabia recognizing the extent of its natural reserves was among the 
first nations to act. In what at the time seemed an ambitious undertaking, 
and was later proven to be prudent ones, Saudi Arabia launched a 
mammoth project in 1975 to study, design and build an extensive network 
capable of collecting, processing and utilizing associated gas from its 
many wells in Eastern Province (Presely, 1999, 22) 
Saudi Arabia has been producing gas in modest quantities since 1970. 
Mostly, as a byproduct of oil production, the aim was to harness the gas 
previously flared off most of the 1970 initial production being used in the 
oil industry itself. From the later part of that decade some gas was used as 
an energy source for domestic industries, and this has gradually increased 
with over ten million barrels of liquefied petroleum gas and almost 206 
million barrels of natural gas being consumed locally in 2000 
(Cordesman, 2003, 504) 
By 1980, Saudi Aramco, the national oil company completed the Master 
Gas System (MGS). As part of the project a large number of gas oil 
separation plant (GOSPS), were established at oil fields. Hundreds of 
miles of pipelines were built to bring the gas to three new processing 
107 
Chapter - III 
plants. The Berri plant, completed in 1997, is located near the Jubail 
industrial city on the Arabian Gulf (Presely, 1999, 23). The other two 
plants the other plants Shedgum and Othmaniah, are located in the fields 
of the Eastern Province. Gas treated at these three plants to remove toxic 
and corrosive compounds, including hydrogen sulfide and carbon 
dioxide. Further processing produce a sweet, dry residue gas, known as 
sales gas, which is composed primarily of methane (MEES, 23 August, 
2004). 
The so called 'Gas initiatives', launched in 2001 is seen as the key to 
fiiture industrialization to Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has the fourth 
largest proven reserves of gas in the world estimated at 6.6 trillion cubic 
meters. Not surprisingly western companies are eager to get involved in 
the development and exploitation of these huge resources. Saudi Arabia 
is apprehensive about ceding control of basic resources, even though it 
takes the finance and arguably the capability to develop them itself. 
Consequently in 2001 a series of major deals were signed with 
international oil companies for the development of three gas project in 
Saudi Arabia (Arab News April 24, 2002). 
The largest involved a consortium led by Exxon Mobil and including 
Royal Dutch shell, Brifish petroleum and the US Company Philips. This 
was to develop the south Ghawar gas fields as part of a fifteen billion-
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dollar project, with the gas used as feedstock for industries in Jubail. It 
was envisaged that work on this scheme would proceed first especially 
given the success of gas development in neighboring Qatar (MEES, 23 
August, 2004). The second deal was for the development of gas fields on 
the Red Sea coast, with Exxon Mobil also heading the project in 
collaboration with two American oil companies Occidental and 
Marathon. Gas from this area could serve industries in Yanbu (MEES, 15 
October 2001). The third gas project was to be based in Saudi Arabia 
Empty Quarter bordering the UAE and Oman. It was led by shell, which 
had a 40 percent stake, with total final Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
of France and Cohoco of the United States each having a 80 percent 
stake. Total investment in the three projects was, expected to exceed 
twenty five billion dollars over a thirty year period, with the oil 
companies working in partnership with Saudi Aramco (Wilson, 2004, 
52). 
There were strong suspicious that Ali Naimi oil Minister was stalling 
progress of these projects in order to protect the monopoly position of 
Saudi Aramco. The organization is naturally reluctant to see other oil 
company enter the Kingdom, even for gas development. This could set a 
precedent for future involvement in oil development in competition with 
Saudi Aramco, Moreover, Saudi Aramco has itself already developed a 
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Master gas system (MGS) without the in involvement of foreign 
companies except on a contractual basis for a limited number of tasks of a 
technical nature (Cordesman, 2003, 503). Its Hawiyah gas plant started 
processing in September, 2001 and became fully operational in 
December, 2001 the fourth major plant to open. Saudi Aramco's gas 
production already amounted to 3.5 billion cubic feet per day by 2002 
and was planned to rise to 7.0 billion cubic feet per day by the end of 
2003 (MEES, 23 August, 2004). Its directors argued that they could 
manage the gas expansion themselves with gas expansion themselves 
with a much more limited involvement from foreign companies not 
necessitating a stake in ownership (Presely, 1999,14). 
Three major factor were responsible for the impasse first, western oil 
companies were expecting return on their investments of up to 18 percent 
per annum to reflect the risks involved, but on the most generous estimate 
the initial terms offered by the Saudi Arabian side were unlikely to results 
in the return exceeding 10 percent at best. Second, the areas offered by 
the government for gas exploration and exploration were deeded by 
Exxon Mobil and its western patterns to be too limited in size to produce 
the supplies needed for the electricity, desalinization and petrochemical 
plants (Presely, 1999,14). The companies estimated that the fields offered 
were incapable of producing more the six trillion cubic feet, lesser than 
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half the output they had originally envisaged. Finally, there was 
considerable opposition from Saudi Aramco to western oil companies 
becoming once again directly involved in resources exploration in the 
Kingdom, as although these projects involved gas rather than oil it was 
feared that their penetration could be merely the thin end of the wedge 
(Farsy, 1978,55-56). 
NATURAL GAS FIELDS 
The country of Saudi Arabia has focused on the development of its 
energy and mineral resources. Natural gas that was once flared off it now 
collected and utilized. The kingdom has become a producer of refined oil 
products petrochemicals, such as diesel oil and kerosene as well as 
gasoline. In addition with discoveries of deposits of precious and 
semiprecious metals, Saudi Arabia expects to become a major exporter of 
minerals in coming decades. All of these resources, along with programs 
to diversify the country's sources of energy, are being developed to build 
a stronger and more resilient economy (Wilson, 2004, 50). 
According to oil and gas Journal, Saudi Arabia proven natural gas 
reserves are estimated at 235.0 trillion cubic feet (TCF), ranking fourth in 
the world (after Russia, Iran, and Qatar) and up about 5 TCF from 2002. 
Most around 60 percent of Saudi Arabia's currently proven natural gas 
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reserves consist of associated gas mainly from the onshore Ghawar fields 
and the offshore Safaniya and Zuluf fields (MEES, 2 July, 2001) 
The Ghawar: 
The Ghawar oil fields alone accounts for one third of the country's 
proven natural gas reserves. However, it is important to note that only 15 
percent of Saudi Arabia has been adequately explored for gas, according 
to Aramco (MEES, 2 July, 2001). 
South Ghawar Area Development: 
This ventures forces on the utilization of existing Saudi Aramco gas 
supplies in south Ghawar together with exploration for gas in an area of 
the Rub'al-Khali, and includes fields production and gathering facilities, 
gas processing and fi^acfionation plants to recover and separate liquids 
from existing and new gas production, gas liquids transmission, and down 
investment in power, petrochemical and water desalination facilities in 
both the east and west coast. The key stone of this venture is the 
"Straddle" gas processing/NGL recovery plant at Hawiyah which is 
proposed to process 2.8 bncf/d of rich gas from the Hawiyad and Haradh 
areas in the southern part of the Ghawar fields. And also from the 
Shaybah and Kidan field in the Rub'al Khali (MEES, t^ July, 2001). 
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The Haradh 
The Haradh development is part of Saudi Aramco major capital 
investment program to develop gas as an increasing important fuel for 
power generation and industrial development. (MEES, 17* January, 
2000). The Saudi Oil Minister, Ali Naimi, has made it clear on a number 
of occasions that the Kingdom's objective in investing in gas is not a 
desire to export to foreign markets (MEES, 15th October, 2001). 
Red Sea Area development 
This venture combines the development of known gas discoveries in the 
northern Red Sea al-Midyan (onshore), Barqam (offshore), Ummluj 
(onshore) and al-Wajh (onshore) with power generation and desalination. 
It also embraces the pipeline of the developed al-Tabuk and Yanbu and 
construction of one power and desalination plants (MEES, 2"^* July, 
2001). 
Shaybah area development 
This venture will be responsible for gas exploration activities in an area 
covering 90,000 sq km in the Rub'al- Khali a feasibility study regarding 
the development of the Kidan sour gas fields, the installation of treatment 
and transportation facilities for associated gas extracted from the Shaybah 
oil field which contains potential gas reserves of 10 billion cubic feet and 
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a production capacity from 600 million cubic feet per day (mncf/d) and 
the construction of a petrochemical plant and power and desalination 
facility, both of which will be located on a Gulf coast. (MEES, 2"'^  July, 
2001). 
Most new associated natural gas reserved discovered in the 1990's has 
been in fields which contain light crude oil especially in the Najd region 
south of Riyadh. Most of Saudi Arabians non associated gas reserves 
(Mazalij, Al- manjoura, Shaden, Nipen, Tinat, Al-Waar, etc -are located 
in the countries extreme northwest, at Midyan and in the Empty Quarter 
(Rub'al-Khali) (MEES, 22"^ * September, 2003) 
Another large natural gas fields, called Dorra is located offshore near the 
Khafi oil field in the Saudi-Kuwait Divided zone and may be developed 
by Japan's Arabian Oil Company (AOC). Dorra development is 
controversial, however, because part of it is also claimed by Iran (which 
calls the fields Arash). The maritime border between Kuwait and Iran 
remains under marketed, but Saudi Arabia reached an agreement with 
Kuwait in July, 2000 to share Dorra equally. Currently Iran is resisting 
any moves by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to develop the field on this area 
(USBC, 2005, 67). 
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NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia, however, can use most of its gas production to meet 
domestic energy demands and reduce its dependence on crude oil-which 
provides higher profitabiUty that gas exports (Presely, 1999, 20). As a 
result, it is focusing on the development of gas to provide a national wide 
energy source, as well as feedstock for product and petrochemicals 
(Nimblock, 1980, 62). The Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports that 
Saudi Arabia has not expressed great interest in liquefied natural gas 
because it is more cost effective to use it as feedstock or fuel. (EIA, 
2002, 8). 
Gas production has done much to meet domestic energy needs and to 
reduce the domestic demand for oil, which is easier and more economical 
to export. Saudi Gas production now account for roughly 2% of all world 
output (USBC, 2005, 63). 
In 1980 the production of natural gas of Saudi Arabia was 54351 million 
cubic meters, which declined by 40.9 percent to 32080 MCM in 1985.The 
Iran- Iraq war was the obvious reason for this decline. In 1990 gas 
production went up by 40.7 percent to 541, 00 MCM from 320, 80 MCM 
in 1985.Table-3.6 reveals the natural gas production during the period 
between 1980-2004 in Saudi Arabia (SAMA, 2006, 45).Virtually all this 
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gas production was consumed in Saudi Arabia, and domestic demand for 
gas is expected to increase at an average rate of 7% a year for at least the 
next decade (USBC, 2005, 63). 
In October, 1997, the Saudi oil Minister announced plans to boost its gas 
processing capability in five years to 10 billion cubic feet a day. 
(Nimblock, 2007, 136). 
In 2000, Saudi gas production totaled about 6% if Saudi primary energy 
production, including crude oil. In June 2000, a key pipeline project was 
completed that extended the master gas system from the eastern province 
(which contains large potential gas and condensate reserves), to the 
capital, Riyadh in the central province, where it will replace crude oil in 
power generation (MEES, 15 October, 2001). This is part of a broder 
expansion of the existing gas transmission on system in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi gas production capacity is expected to increase to 7,500 cubic feet 
a day when the new processing plant at Haradh is completed. Over 6000 
million cubic feet of gas reserves have been discovered over the last five 
year. Saudi gas production has increased to 7,500 cubic feet a day after 
the completion of new processing plant at Haradh (MEES, 22 September, 
2003). 
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Table-3.6: NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION OF SAUDI ARABIA 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
J . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Year 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
1996 
1997 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total Natural 
Gas Production 
of Saudi Arabia 
543,51 
320,80 
541,00 
739,70 
776,50 
475,70 
534,60 
536,95 
573,20 
600,60 
656,80 
MILLION CUBIC METERS 
Total 
Production of 
Country 
111,929 
145,060 
275,562 
355.54 
369,675 
362,690 
380,455 
277,636 
283,426 
291,015 
302,309 
Percentage 
51.4 
77.8 
80.3 
79.1 
78.9 
86.8 
85.9 
80.6 
79.7 
79.3 
78.2 
Various issues: Secretary General's Annual Report, Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) P.O. Box 20501 Safat Kuwait 
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NATURAL GAS RESERVES 
The 'Energy Information Agency' (EIA) report that roughly two third of 
Saudi Arabia's currently proven gas reserves consist of associated gas, 
mainly from the onshore Ghawar field and the offshore Safaniya and 
Zuluf fields (EIA,6March 2002,). The Ghawar oil field alone accounts for 
one third of the country's total gas reserves. Most new associated gas 
reserve in the 1990s, have been in fields that contain light crude oil, 
especially in the Najd region south of Riyadh. Most of Saudi Arabia's 
non-associated gas reserves such as (Mazalij, Al-Manjoora, Shaden, 
Niban, Tinat, Al-waar etc.) are located in the deep Khuff field reservoir 
that underlies the Ghawar oil field. Another gas field, called Dorra, is 
located near the Khafij oil field in the Netural zone and may be developed 
by Japan's AOC. Gas also located in Rub al-Khali and extreme North 
West at Midayan. (Wilson, 2004, 46). 
Many Oil and Gas experts' estimates that the kingdom's natural gas 
reserves stood at 224179 billion cubic feet (BCF) at the start of 2001-an 
increase of 20% since the mid 1990 - due to the discovery of non 
associated gas in Aramco areas of operation (Wilson, 2004,46). 
Much of this increase in Saudi gas reserves has been recent. Aramco 
estimated that Saudi Arabia's recoverable gas reserves rose from 197442 
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BCF in 1996, to 204038 BCF in 1997,210832 BCF, in 1998, 210832 in 
1999 BCF, 224179in 2001, 234470in 2003 and 237010 in 2004.This 
compares with 1,700 Tcf for Russia, 81203 for Iran, 393.9 for Qatar 
212.1 for the UAE, 167.4 for the US, 159.7 for Algeria,and 109.8 for Iraq 
(SAMA, 2007,296). 
The (EIA) Estimates' Saudi Arabia's proven gas reserves at 219.5 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf), ranking them fourth largest in the world- after Russia, 
Iran, and Qatar. Other estimates give Saudi Arabia at least 214 Tcf of 
natural gas reserves, without the reserves in the Neutral zone, and 217 
Tcf, including these reserved (EIA, 6 March, 2002). This would be about 
4% of the world's reserves, which ranks Saudi Arabia a fifth in the world. 
In early 2000 Saudi Arabia reportedly decided not to move ahead with 
development of Midyan, which include provision of gas to the Tabuk 
power station. However, Saudi Arabia has announced plans to add some 
5 TCF of recoverable gas to its reserves each year. In September 2000, 
test at Ghazal No.l located on the southern tip of the giant Ghawar oil 
field and west of the Haradh gas field, indicated a significant gas 
discovery and represented the eight gas or condensate discovery in the 
under Saudi Arabia's stepped up gas exploration program (Wilson, 2004, 
42). 
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Most of the natural gas produced in the country is produced in the century 
in the country is produced in conjunction with crude oil. As a 
consequence its output levels are directly related to that of crude oil. 
Currently large quantities of natural gas are being flared and hence 
wasted, rather than utilized for economic purpose (SAMA, 2003,296). 
Table-3.7: NATURAL GAS RESERVES 
Million cubic feet's 
(average) 
S.NO. Year Saudi 
ARAMCO 
Others 
(ASB,OPEC) 
Total 
(SAUDI 
ARAMCO,ASB, 
OPEC) 
1970-74 54.0686 
1975-79 84.2116 
1980-84 99.06 21.7574 139.0116 
1985-89 129.55698 4.7162 156.986 
1990-94 152.2698 3.996 149.1824 
1995-99 182.096 3.6186 232.9854 
2000-04 203.4956 3.991 232.9854 
Sources:- Saudi Arabia Monetary agency (SAMA), Annual report Forty-Fifty 2009, 
Research and Statistics Department Riyadh. 
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Natural Gas Reserves 
."--^ fe^  
182.10 152.27' _^3M 
j^MI^Mfl^^^^^^^B 
^ ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
D1970-74 
• 1975-79 
n 1980-84 
D1985-89 
• 1990-94 
• 1995-99 
•2000-04 
MINERAL RESOURCES 
At present the contribution of mining and quarrying sector to the 
economy of Saudi Arabia is very limited. The development of the 
kingdom's mineral wealth is now viewed as a major part of the 
diversification process taking place in the economy. It is also a sector in 
which private sector activity is likely to be increasingly encouraged 
(Twitchell, 1953,32). 
The Saudi government has identified a number of constraints upon the 
growth of the mineral sector in particular a shortage of Saudi manpower 
with the expertise required. As a consequence there is a strong 
dependence upon foreign expertise, also it is clear that where mineral 
deposits have been found there is generally very little infrastructure 
available to support exploitation of deposits. (Presley, 1999, 19) 
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The Directorate General of Mineral Resources is responsible for the 
development and regulation of mineral and mining activities. Its objective 
is to survey and record the geology of the country, to provide an 
inventory of mineral resources and to assure the assimilation of mineral 
industry with industrialization in Saudi Arabia. The first objective has 
already been achieved with the assistance of the Bureau de Recherches 
Geologigues et miniers, the Rio Finex and the United States Geological 
fields missions. (SAMA,1969,32).The general Directorate of Mineral 
Resources concentrated its activities in 1980 on the search for gold ore 
and base metal by using diamond drilling method and by undertaking a 
geochemical survey to assess the ores. Finding indicates the existence of 
gold ore in impressing concentration at Al-Amar Belt areas, studies were 
completed during on eight major areas, selected for exploitation of 
precious and base metals (SAMA, 1982, 52). 
Reassessment of previous works at Shakhtaliyah deposits, North East 
Taif, was initiates for the exploitation of gold as studies proved its 
occurrence at rates ranging from 4 to 25 gram per ton. A group of old 
mines was also discovered at Bir Hamdan Belt area. Works is still in 
progress in assessing findings and determine the geochemical range of 
the gold metals (SAMA, 1982, 52). 
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Geological studies confirmed the existence of gold metal associated with 
oxidized rocks close to earth surface at Wadi Wassat and Wadi Qatan 
areas at Asir Geochemical Studies were undertaken by the Directorate 
during 1900 to determine the ore contents. The Directorate also embarked 
during the same year on a project involving search for filling minerals 
and discovered many sites contain in marble rocks. Besides, it conducted 
a number of feasibility studies for a number of discovered minerals such 
as bauxite ore and phosphate at Al-Jalamid area and the Kaolin mineral 
associated with bauxite at Al-Zubayrah. Results confirmed the existence 
of layers of fair thickness that could be used in dying ceramic industries 
and metal melting process (SAMA, 1985, 74).. 
The mineral resources found in the kingdom include gold, silver, copper, 
zinc, lead, iron, titanium, strategic and radiate metals, decoration stone 
and gemstones (SAMA, 1985, 74). 
Gold and silver exist in varied quantities in gold bearing quartz veins in 
the central and western parts of the Arabian shield at Zaim and Umm al 
Quarrayat areas, or in quartz veins, which contain many metals at Mahd 
Adh Dahab area. Gold has also been found recently in volcanic felsic 
sulfide rocks at Al-Alajor and Jadmath area in Asir (SAMA, 1985, 74). 
.Mahd Adh-Dahab mine, which was repeated in 1988, contains a reserve 
estimated at 1.1 million tons, with a content of 27 grams/ton gold and 73 
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gram/ton silver. During the first operation period of the mine 1989, about 
765 thousand ounces of gold and more than one million ounces of silver 
were produced (SAMA, 1990, 80). 
In 1991, the second mine Al-Sukhayabanat (in Qasim region) started its 
production. The mine's reserves is estimated at 8.4million tons. In 1993, 
the tv^ o mines produced 25.5 kilo grams of gold. The Directorate general 
of Mineral Resources has identified 53 sites where gold ores occurs. 
These deposits include gold ores at Al-Amar, Al-Hajar and Hamdan. The 
first gold bullion was produced Al-Hamdan as a test work in 1991 
(SAMA, 1995,83). 
Silver metal occurs in the eastern northern part of the Arabian shield (at 
Dawadmi district) and along the sites of Samra, Umm Al-Qosur Abdul 
Sonoon and Umm Hadid. Samrah site is one of the most significant 
ancient silver mines in the kingdom. It is located 15 kilometer south of 
Dawadmi. It contains an estimated reserve of 301 thousand tons with a 
concentration of 450 grams/ton silver (SAMA, 1995, 82). 
Silver is also available in association with gold, copper and zinc in a large 
number of sites. The most important site is Al-Nuqrah 230 kilometers 
north east of Madinah, Reserves is estimated at about 466,300 tons at 
southern Nurqah and 0.4 million tons at northern Nuqrah . (SAMA, 1995, 
82). 
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Copper, one of the base metals, occurs in association with zinc along the 
western side of the Arabian shield Al-Jabal Sa'ud Jabal Samran, Al-
Aqeeq, Al- Masane, Umm Al-Ramad and Umm -ash Shalahib areas 
(SAMA, 1995,82). 
Copper ore reserves at Al-Jabal Suad North East Jeddah is estimated at 29 
million tons. Technical studies have confirmed the possibility of 
producing concentrate with a grade of 29 percent copper ranging from 
100-120 thousand tons per years. Copper and zinc ores at Al-Masane area 
are estimated at 7 million tons. Technical studies have confirmed the 
possibility of producing 36 thousand tons of copper concentrates and 56 
thousand tons of zinc concentrates annually (SAMA, 1995, 84). 
Zinc ore also occurs at Al-Khanaiguiyah area south west of Riyadh, with 
potential reserves of 4 million tons. Zinc concentrates of about 35 
thousand tons may be produced annually (SAMA, 1995, 84). 
Deposit containing zinc, copper, silver and lead were also found at the 
bottom of the Red Sea in the middle of the area located between Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan (SAMA, 1985, 78). 
Iron ore exist at Wadi Al-Sawaween area, west of Tabuk with a 
potential resei-ve of 84 million tons and a concentration of 42.5 percent, 
iron. There is also significant deposit of iron ore at Jabal Adsa area, south 
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west of Riyadh. The potential reserves are estimated at 300 milHon tons 
with a concentration of 18-20 percent iron. Other deposits of the ore exist 
at Wadi Fatima area east of Jeddah. Potential reserves are estimated at 
48.4 million tons with a concentration of 46.2 percent iron (SAMA, 1985, 
78). 
Strategic minerals and rare elements include niobium Tinralium 
Yttrium. The rare elements which were discovered are available in 
plutonic granite rocks at Ghurayyah area south west of Tabuk. The 
potential reserve in estimated at 440 million tons.These rare elements also 
occur Al-Jabal Al-Atawellah area west of Tabuk which contain potential 
reserve of more than 6 million tons, and at Jabal Swad area with probable 
reserves of 23 million tons (SAMA, 2003,96). 
Radiant minerals, such as uranium and thorium, were discovered in small 
quantities in granite rocks in various locations in the middle of the 
kingdom, at Al-Rawda and the northern west. Platinum minerals, 
including plutonium and palladium, occur in ultra basic rocks at Wadi 
Kamal area in the northern west of the kingdom along the Red Sea. Other 
minerals such as Chrome,tin and Nickle, exist in small uneconomic 
quantities in a number of areas in the kingdom (SAMA, 2003,96). 
Non-metallic minerals include industrial minerals decoration stones, 
gemstones, phosphate, bauxite, potash, lime stones, glass sand, byrlite 
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gypsum, granite coal, etc, are available in Saudi Arabia in substantial 
quantity. Phosphate accumulations exist at Jalamid area, east of Turayf, 
in the north of the kingdom. Potential reserves in estimated at 213 tons 
with a concentration of 21 percent phosphorous oxide. It is expected to 
produce 4-5 million tons a year of phosphate concentrate (SAMA, 2003, 
94). 
Bauxite occurs at Zabirah area, east of Hail, with a potential reserve of 
about 173 million tons, Magnesite exists at Zarghat, south west of Hail 
with a potential reserves of more than 4 million tons. Silica sand, are 
found at Al-Butayn, north east of Riyadh over an area of 75 square 
kilometer. Potential reserve is estimated at 10 million tons, with a 
percentage up to 99 percent Silica, which would meet the requirement of 
two of two glass plants under construction in the area (SAMA, 2005, 
sl23). 
The Directorate of Mineral Resources identified more than 2,000 
potential sites for industrial minerals required for cement gypsum, glass 
and ceramic industries red blocks, limestone, rock wool and various 
construction materials. These minerals have contributed substantially to 
the development of numerous factories and quarries of positive yield to 
the national economy (SAMA, 2005, 123). 
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The works of the Agency of Mineral Resources during 2001 were 
concentrated in the field of mineral explorations in the kingdom and the 
development related to them as well as the production of gold and silver 
(SAMA, 2001,210). 
As regard the development related to mineral, the Agency organized and 
participated in a number of symposia on investment opportunities in 
mineral (SAMA, 2001, 210). 
The most prominent project and studies carried out by the Agency in the 
field of geological maps and mineral exploration, involved the conversion 
of the previous map of the Rayen area (Riyah region) into digital maps 
for modem satellite picture. A digital map for the Arabian shield rocks 
which contain mineral ores was assembled. About 55 mineralized deposit 
at the Rayen were surveyed and a mineralized site was discovered in 
Jabal Moire area (Al-Baha region).The initial reserves of this deposit was 
estimated at 2.5 million tons with a concentration of 1.7 percent copper 
and 33 gm/ton of silver (SAMA, 2001,210). 
There has already been some response by the private sector in exploiting 
these deposits. The mining code requires three stages of exploration 
initially, a reconnaissance permit is required, then an explorafion license 
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and eventually a mining lease. By 1979, 76 permits had been issued for 
quarry leases compared to only 10 such permits in 1974; 32 permits were 
also granted for granite iron ore and limestone. Recently Wadi Sawawin 
has been identified as rich in deposits of iron ore, gold, has been located 
at Mahd al- Dhahab and nickel -iron at Wadi Qatan (SAMA, 1980, 81). 
TabIe-3.8: THE SAUDI ARABIAN I 
(MA'ADEN"S) PRODU( 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
(Thousand 
ounces) 
Gold 
235 
239 
231 
217 
167.0 
147.0 
116.7 
139.2 
147.2 
282.0 
265.8 
239.7 
166.6 
142.8 
146.0 
(Thousand 
ounces) 
Silver 
-
-
-
-
445.1 
336.7 
279.7 
321.1 
384.5 
559.5 
466.0 
434.1 
411.2 
290.3 
265.0 
VIINING COIV 
CTION 
s(Tons) 
Copper 
-
-
-
-
-
-
804 
839 
587 
627 
652 
668 
730 
737 
1465 
IPANY 
(Tons) 
Zinc 
-
-
-
-
3,550 
3,161 
2,520 
1,911 
1,209 
1,797 
-
-
983 
716 
336 
rth 
( ) Not Available 
Sources: Ministry of Petrol and Minerals, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 45'" Annual 
Report, Riyadh, 2009, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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AGRICULTURE 
Saudi Arabia is one of the most arid countries in the world with about 80 
percent of the total area receiving less than 100 mm. precipitation per 
year. The high summer temperature commonly in excess of 40°C means 
that evapo-transpiration rates are high almost everywhere (Beaumount, 
1097, 311). There are no perennial streams in Saudi Arabia Flash floods, 
partly because of the low infiltration rates of the soils, are a relatively 
frequent occurrence in the western high lands, when they happen they 
cause considerable damage to the settlements and crops along the floors 
of the Wadis (Shoruq, 1999,124-125).Although the cultivated Area of 
Arabia was probably unable to feed the entire population at the beginning 
of the twentieth century Arabia farming has been basic importance for 
many centuries. Not only were cultivators in a majority but by scale 
exchange and tribute they also helped to support the pastoral and other 
economies in the peninsula (Kanuershase, 1975, 86). Some land was 
worked by another occupiers and some was in communal ownership, but 
most belonged to share cropping estates (Agriculture Development, 1992, 
13). Size of holding varied considerable throughout the peninsula as 
recent figures for Saudi Arabia indicate largely in response to the relative 
abundance of water the intensity of cultivation which this allows, and the 
density of population which could thus be carried. Fragmentation was 
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probably common place. Because of the division of property between all 
the male heirs but its intensity varied regionally (Beaumount, 1976, 311). 
Less than 2 percent of the total land area is used for crops. Of the 
cultivated land about half consists of rain fed dry faming (mostly in Asir) 
two fifths is in tree crops and remainder in irrigated. Most of the irrigated 
areas in the districts of Riyadh and Al-Qasim for example near Al-Hufuf 
in Al-Shariyyah province utilize underground water (Merri Report, 1985, 
88). 
The kingdom has achieved self sufficiency in the production of wheat 
eggs, and milk among other commodities, though it still imports the bulk 
of its food needs. Wheat in the primary cultivated grain followed by 
Sorghum and Barely Dates Water Melons, Tomatoes, Potatoes, 
Cucumbers, Pumpkin, and Squash are also important crops (Britanica, 
1926, 946). 
The kingdom is making a firm commitment to improving the amount of 
agriculture output. The ultimate goal is to be self sufficient in food 
production (Moliver, 1980, 53) the Saudi in agriculture aiming for a long 
range agricultural economy. There were slow, steady expansion of the 
area under cultivation from 1963 until 1973, and the major emphasis 
during this period was on mechanization of the small traditional form. 
Since 1973 the main emphasis has been expansion of the area under 
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cultivation mostly irrigated especially of the area planted with subsidized 
wheat such a aim is unrealistic not only in terms of water available since 
Saudi crops production relies over whelming on irrigation 
(Held,2000,367) 
Desalination is only part of the water problem there is a clear interaction 
between the misallocation of water and a poorly managed Saudi 
agricultural policy. A great deal of Saudi Arabia's total water supply still 
goes to subsidized agricultural because Saudi concerns over the 
kingdom's growing dependence on Western food led to a policy of self 
sufficiency in the 1970's that it has pursued ever since (Cordesman, 
2003, 334). 
They year 1975 was a particularly important year in the development of 
the agricultural resources of Saudi Arabia as two important documents 
were published which provide guidelines for future expansion (Presely, 
1984,81). 
- In February 1975 the national policy was published which 
established the government's objectives in the development of 
agriculture, animals and fishery resources as well as strategy for 
achieving these objectives (Merri Report, 1985, 88). 
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- In July 1975 the second five year plan covering the period 1975-
1980 was published outlining the goals to be achieved over the 
period. (Merri Report, 1985, 88). 
- At the end third plan period almost half of the kingdom's 
population was living in rural areas and a significant proportion of 
total Saudi employment was in agriculture (Merri Report, 1985, 
88). 
- The third five year plan the goal set for this sector were increase in 
domestic food production reclamation of land and irrigation 
projects and development of large farms agriculture estates 
(presely, 1984,74) 
Government aid also encourages the excessive use of water by providing 
virtually free deep wells and low cost diesel fuel for pumps. These 
subsidies supposedly were reduced in 1995 (Cordesman, 2003, 305) 
The Sixth Development Plan called for still further increase in agriculture 
output during 1996-2000. This agriculture goal continues in Seventh 
Development Plan. The Seventh Development Plan places particularly 
emphasis on the water sector, but does not address key issues like 
allocation and cost of the development. The Saudi Agriculture bank alone 
paid some 6.6 billion Saudi riyals for agricultural loans and subsidies in 
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the 1999, most of which were short term loans to finance operating 
expenses (Homeiedan, 2008, 224). 
The government did cut subsidies in 1998 due to the oil crash but restored 
them in 2000 after a major rise in oil revenues ironically the low price of 
water and other agricultural subsidies led some farms back into wheat 
(Homeiedan, 2008, 224). 
Agriculture including forestry and fishing contributed only 5.1 of GDP in 
2002 and the sector employed 4.7% of the working population in 2002. 
CuMvation is confirmed to oases and to irrigated regions which comprise 
only 2% of the total land area. About 39% of land is used for low grade 
grazing ((Middle East and North Afric, 2006, 980) 
All these features of agricultural policy seek to bring modem technology 
to agricultural production to increase the average size of farm incomes to 
lower costs of production to increase the average size of form holding and 
to persuade agricultural workers to remain on the land rather than transfer 
to alternative employment rather than transfer to alternative employment 
(Middle East North Africa, 2006,980) 
Much fiarther progress needs to be made before the government can claim 
any major achievement in the pursuit of these aims. Crop production has 
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undoubtedly improved over recent years partly a result of policy action 
but it is still demands for the country. (Presely, 1984, 81) 
Table-4.1: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY THE AGRICULTURE 
SECTOR 
AT PRODUCERS VALUES AT CURRENT PRICES 
Million riyals 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Agriculture 
1,025 
1,528 
5,399 
13,789 
25,142 
31,598 
24,973 
35,708 
36,101 
36,454 
+Total GDP 
341,118 
490,496 
163,7278 
953,815 
130,5002 
159,3012 
180,4133 
144,1755 
211,3813 
240,4251 
% Share 
0.30 
.31 
.32 
1.44 
1.92 
1.98 
1.93 
2.47 
1.70 
1.51 
+Total GDP include:_ Industries, Agriculture, Mining, Manufacture ,EIectricity 
Construction, Wholesale ,Transport, Finance, Community Less Inputted procedures, 
Total Export Import, Gross Domestic product. 
Various issue;- Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
MOJOR CULTIVATED AREA 
In the past the bulk of agricultural production was concentrated in a few 
limited areas. The produce was largely retained by their community, 
although some surplus was sold to the cities. Nomads played a crucial 
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role in this regard shipping foods and other goods between the widely 
dispersed agricultural areas (Presely, 1999, 36) 
Saudi Arabia has 1,075 thousand totaled cultivated areas in 2000. 
Lack of water has always been the major constraint on agricultural and 
the determining factors on where cultivation occurred. The kingdom has 
no lakes or rivers. Rainfall is slight and irregular (Homeiedan, 2008, 334) 
over most of the country. Only in the southwest, in the mountains of Asir, 
close to the Yemen border and accounting for 3 percent of the land area, 
rainfall occurs sufficiently to support regular crops. This region plus, the 
southern Tihama coastal sustained farming. Cropping in the rest of the 
country was scattered and dependent on irrigation. Along the western 
coast and in the western highlands ground water from well and spring 
provided adequate water for self supporting farms and some extent, for 
commercial production -moving east, in the central and northern parts of 
the interior, Najd and al Nufd, some groundwater allowed limited 
farming. The Eastern province supported the most extensive plantation 
economy. The major oasis centered on Qatif, which enjoyed high water 
tables, natural springs, and relatively good soils (Presely, 1999,36) 
The sections of the country which contain important agricultural area are 
the Taif area The Asir and Jizan region, the Qasim and Riyadh provinces. 
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and the Eastern province. The other region contains smaller arable area 
limited primarily to oases (Homeiedan, 2008, 335). 
Scattered throughout the kingdom are a number of areas in which 
agricultural production is possible. Except for the Asir on area stretching 
southward along the Red Sea coast from below Taif to the Jizan- Zaharan 
region agricultural is based on irrigation. In the Asir region rainfall is 
sufficient to permit crop and livestock production without irrigation, 
There is ample evidence that agriculture has been a part of economic 
activity in the Arabian Peninsula (Nimblock, 1980, 86). 
The Asir region, located in the south western tip of the country, is 
mountainous and receives more rain than any other part of the kingdom. 
Some farming is possible without irrigation and there are some forest in 
the higher and more remote areas (Beaumount, 1976,224). 
However, rain fed agriculture dominates in Asir where high-lands 
intercept summer monsoon rains and the water is efficiency utilized on 
planning and heavy government subsidizing of wheat and barley crop the 
cultivation. Until recently the Asir was quite isolated so that exchange 
with the rest of the country was limited. This has changed dramatically 
with the completion of a modem road network. It is still too early to 
predict the precise impact that reduces transportation costs will have on 
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the region but almost certainly commercial agricultural will be 
encouraged (Beaumount, 1976, 224). 
The coastal plain near Jizan like rest of Saudi Arabia is hot and humid, 
but fertile and agriculture is possible with irrigation. The major crops of 
the region are sorghum wheat and alfalfa. In addition it accounts for more 
than one third of the country supply of cattle sheep and goats (Held, 
2000, 228). 
The Qasim and Riyadh provinces are very different from the Asir 
Mountain. These two provinces cover much of the central plateau. 
Together, they contain four main farming zones, which are defined by the 
availability of both good soil and water (Beaumount, 1976, 224). These 
are the twin cities of Buraidah and Unaizah in the Qasim provinces, the 
Washm and Sudair districts, which are west and northwest of Riyadh 
respectively, and the Al-Kharj regions. These Farms in these regions 
consist of large open fields and produce wheat, cereal and large quantifies 
of vegetables, such as tomatoes and melons as well as one third of the 
countries dates. Farms in these areas are becoming quite mechanized and 
large agricultural complexes are being developed (Knauershase, 1975, 
56). Most of Eastern provinces is barren but it does contain two of the 
largest oases in the country Hofuf and Qatif which together account for 
over one fifth of the kingdom's dates producfion. The Hofuf Oasis (also 
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known as Al-Hasa a name formerly applied to the entire eastern province) 
has been extensively remodeled with a new irrigation and drainage 
system implemented by the Al-Hasa Irrigation and Drainage Authority 
(HIDA) (Merri Report, 1985, 86). 
Map 4.1: LAND USE 
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Source: http://www.l.lb.utexas.edu/maps/atlas-middle-east/saudi-arabia-land.ing 
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PRODUCTION OF GRAIN, FRUITS AND VEGETABLE 
During the advancement of agricultural development in the Kingdom 
especially with the start of the first five year plan 1970 unfil the end of 
the fifth five year plan 1988 the environment and economic 
circumstances had not been fully ready for such ambitious development. 
However, determinafion to exploit free resources has transformed desert 
to green land especially during the last two decades. The increasing rates 
of agricultural production can be regarded as existing proof of this 
achievement. 
The distinguished evidence of the agricultural development sector was 
apparent from the high production rates of cereal products, especially 
wheat. The production of wheat in 1985, was 22,29 thousand tons, which 
declined to 17,24 thousand tons, in 1990, and 1734 thousand tons 
1995.The production remained around 17,87 thousand till 2000. In 2001 
wheat production increased to 2,082 thousand tons, representing a 20.5 
percent increment. The production of wheat was highest in 2004 touched 
to 2,775 tons. Agricultural production has expanded considerable in 
recent years. The interest free loans subsidies and other incentives 
provided by the government have enabled farmer and agriculture 
companies to adopt modem production technique including mechanized 
farming use effective irrigation methods and improved seeds apply 
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fertilizers in proper quantities and undertaken researcli increase crop 
productivity. The increase in the production of wheat has not only 
become self sufficient as an important crop but is also sending it as grants 
to some countries. 
However, production of sorghum declined to 9 thousand tons in 2003, 
and registered downward trend till 2005. This decline may be attributed 
to environmental factors. Millet production registered upward trend 
during the period 1985-2005 from 44 thousand tons in 1985 to 205 
thousand tons in 2005. Mechanized farming, new variety of seeds, use of 
fertilizers in proper qualities is some of factors responsible for the growth 
of Millet production. 
Production of Barley shows variations during the period "Between" 
1985-2005. However, production of Barley in Saudi Arabia decreased 
massively suddenly by 121 thousand in 1985 or 54.7 percent, from 138 
thousand tons in 2003 to 67 thousand tons in 2004. Again in 2005 
production of Barley declined to 47 thousand tons. The decline was in 
response to the government policy aimed at reducing water intensive 
crops consequently grain production decreased during 2005 by 190 
thousand tons or 5.9 percent from 8194 thousand tons in the preceding 
years to 8004 thousand tons in 2005. 
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Cultivated area of wheat production witnessed a great fluctuation e.g. in 
2000 the cultivated area of wheat were 419,220 hectares which rose to 
488,876 hectares in 2005. Area under cultivated of sorghum in 1995 were 
3000 hectares which increased to 7,934 hectares in 1990 and almost 
constant till in 2001 but it suddenly fell down by 910 hectares in 2002 
and again increased to 4198 hectares in 2005. 
Millet was another food grain being cultivated in Saudi Arabia. Millet 
was being cultivated in 35,000 hectares in 1985 which increased to 
137,874 hectares in 1990 and to 180,100 hectares in 1995. After that it 
fell 158,582 hectares in 2000 and remained almost constant till 2002 and 
then started falling and reached to the level of 1034, 96 hectares in 2005. 
The cultivated area of barley also showed upward trend increased from 
3,200 hectares in 1985 to 55,771 hectares in 1990. After that cultivated 
area of barely from 45,685 hectares in 1995 to 25550 hectares in 2000 
and reached to a very lowest level of 7479 in 2005. However total area of 
cultivation for food grain remained almost constant during the study 
period. It shows that effort was more made to maintain the cultivated area 
for food grain. 
Agricultural production in the kingdom covers cereals, vegetable, fi-uits 
and dates. Among the cereals, wheat has received special attention in 
agricultural research at the beginning of the second plan. The Ministry 
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Started a program of multiplying improved wheat seeds which have 
become increasingly popular among farmers due to their high yields. A 
total of 600 tons of selected seeds of the three hybrid varieties (Mexipack, 
Jiory and Dirab) has been distributed to farmers. The improved wheat 
program has been supplemented by a subsidy program fertilizers, 
agricultural equipment and local wheat production. There has accordingly 
been a significant development in wheat production in the kingdom. 
Other cereal crops like barley sorghum and millet also underwent similar 
stages of improvement (Selection, multiplication and distribution). Barley 
is in the multiplication stage following the selection of two improved 
seeds out of more than 200 tested varieties. Distribution of the improved 
seed to farmer began at the beginning of the third plan Sorghum and 
Millet is still undergoing research and the improved varieties are expected 
to be instituted by the end of the present plan. 
In 1985 the production of sorghum was 6 thousand tons which rose to 12 
thousand tons in 1995 represent 50 percent increase from production 
level of 1985. 
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Table-4.1: GRAIN PRODUCTION OF SAUDI ARABIA 
(PRODUCTION THOUSAND TONS) 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Year 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Wheat 
22,29 
17,24 
17,34 
17,87 
2,082 
2,436 
2,524 
2,775 
2,648 
Sorghum 
6 
9.34 
12 
8 
9 
9 
9 
9 
7 
Millet 
44 
170 
199 
212 
248 
240 
242 
284 
205 
Barley 
121 
425 
250 
118 
231 
137 
138 
67 
47 
Total 
Grain of 
4,138 
2,204 
2,168 
2,592 
2,856 
2,951 
2,951 
3,194 
3,004 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
forty four Annual Report Riyadh 2006 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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According to latest data from the Ministry of Agriculture cultivated area 
of grain in Saudi Arabia witnessed fluctuations during the period 
"Between" 1985-2005. In 1985 total cultivated area of grain was 64300 
hectares, which shot up by 34.2 percent to 11978,304 hectares in 1990. In 
1995 due to climatic and physical reasons grains cultivated area went 
down by 56.7 percent. This is a doubt on substantial decline. Table no. 
(4.2) explain the variation in cultivated area of grain in Saudi Arabia. 
TabIe-4.2: GRAIN CULTIVATED AREA OF SAUDI ARABIA 
(AREA HECTARES) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Year 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Wheat 
566.000 
770.616 
385.340 
419.220 
426.167 
498.509 
516.747 
523.061 
488.876 
Sorghum 
3,000 
7,934 
7,500 
6,552 
7,358 
910 
6,727 
5,401 
4,196 
Millet 
35,000 
137,874 
150,100 
158,582 
158,582 
165,877 
141,869 
29,865 
103,496 
Barley 
32,000 
55,771 
45,685 
25,550 
25,550 
25,425 
22,535 
9,952 
7,479 
Total Grain of 
Which 
643,000 
978,304 
624,125 
660,926 
660,926 
706,751 
699,224 
685,350 
631,652 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
forty four Annual Report Riyadh 2006 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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Obviously increasing salinity, water scarcity, and desertification are the 
main courses for the decline of cultivated area of grain. 
The kingdom fruits and vegetables production are denoted in the table no. 
(4.3), and the table no (4.4), shows the cultivated area of fruits and 
vegetables of Saudi Arabia. 
Table-4.3: PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLE AND FRUITS 
(PRODUCTION THOUSAND TONS) 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Year 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Tomato 
327 
387 
458 
277 
396 
409 
424 
480 
496 
Watermelon 
374 
392 
459 
390 
251 
272 
283 
331 
364 
Dates 
59 
527 
617 
712 
818 
830 
86 
941 
970 
Total 
1,577 
2,2804 
2,2720 
1,983 
3,307 
2,478 
3,545 
3,933 
4,123 
Source:- Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency forty four 
Annual Report Riyadh 2006 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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1200 
•«• 1000 
c 
•2 800 
oTomato 
•Watermelon 
a Dates 
0- 198519901995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Year 
The tomato production of Saudi Arabia in 1985 was 327 tons wiiicli 
increased 387 ton in 1990, 488 tons in 1995 ton, 409 tons in 2002 and 
480 tons in 2004, the watermelon production of Saudi Arabia was 374 
tons in 1985, which rose to 390 tons in 2000 and 394 tons in 2005. 
Vegetable production has also increased appreciably over the past five 
years resulting in occasional surplus for export of the gulf countries. 
The table no (4.3), shows the production of tomato and watermelon of 
Saudi Arabia which is a highly increased from the Saudi research centers 
have been established to support farmers and provide them with the 
development in the fields of agricultural. The government also decided 
and provided consultancy, concession many loans and, subsidies for 
agricultural advancement. 
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Cultivated area of dates during the period "Between" 1985-2005 has been 
constantly increasing as shows in Table no. (4.4). The cultivated area of 
watermelon production Saudi Arabia has been regularly showing 
fluctuation. In 1990 it was 21,970 hectares which rose to 25,676 hectares 
in 1995, 14044 hectares in 2000, 17852 hectares in 2001. 
Table-4.4: CULTIVATED AREA OF VEGITABLES AND FRUIT 
(AREA HECTARES) 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Year 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Tomato 
24,000 
24,593 
27676 
11,378 
18,549 
17,832 
18,271 
17,061 
17,301 
Watermelon 
19,000 
21,970 
25,676 
14,044 
17,832 
15,904 
16,415 
17,187 
18,148 
Dates 
63,000 
72,399 
100,859 
141,57 
142,45 
139,929 
141,421 
148,801 
150,744 
Total Vegetable 
131,000 
159,390 
209,770 
297536 
231695 
268472 
255871 
259417 
265679 
Source:-Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
forty four Annual Report Riyadh 2006 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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NATURAL VEGETATION 
Rangelands in Saudi Arabia extend over more than 175 m ha (about 75% 
of country land area) while wood land forest occupy only 2.7 m ha, and 
are limited to the south western highland. The diversity in landscape has 
been reflected in terrestrial plant species diversity. Range vegetation as 
well as forest understory vegetation has long history of grazing by 
livestock and wildlife herbivores. In recent decades however major 
change have occurred in vegetation composition and diversity because of 
the human activities of which over grazing is a major factor. There is 
some evidence that current wildlife conservation practices are not 
supported by parallel emphases on vegetation (Assaeed, 2001, 1). 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is located between latitudes of 24to30 
degree north and 46 to 46 degree longitude, of an area of 22400 sq km. 
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about four fifth of the Arabian peninsula It used to be bordered on the 
west by the Africa continent and on the east by Iran. The topographic 
changes with resulted and in the formation of the Red Sea and Arabian 
Gulf area had its impact on the type of plants that grow in Arabian 
peninsula. As a result the types of plant that grow in the Arabian 
Peninsula are over identical with those in Africa, Asia and the 
Mediterranean region (Beaomount, 1976, 119). Due to the climate change 
over the ages, certain geographic areas underwent formal changes to 
adjust to the environmental conditions and consequently certain 
indigenous plants grew in these areas. In the Arabian Peninsula, there are 
about 350 types of indigenous plant from which about sixty types are in 
the kingdom (Assaeed, 2001, 2). 
Generally, plant that grow in the Arabian Peninsula are adapted to such 
difficult conditions as drought, high temperature, and very salty soil, thus 
most of these plants are desert plants with particular characteristics 
(Fao,1999,3). 
Despite the difficult conditions mentioned above the plants growing in 
the kingdom are quite diverse. There are more than 2,700 types of plant 
in the kingdom, which can be classified into more than 130 categories. 
Most these plants grow in the southern region, while small tree grow in 
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the mountain area and valleys. Annual plants, on the other hand grow in 
the desert plain after rainfall (Fao, 1999, 3). 
The inhabitants of the kingdom have relied on wild plants for raising their 
cattle and sheep. Some of these plants are used as food. There are about 
100 percent that are edible, either as cooked or fresh food (Fao, 1998,4). 
Muslim scholars have pointed out that some of the wild plants can be 
used to cure many diseases. Many wild plants in the kingdom are still 
used in medicine. Scientific studies have shown that many wild plants in 
the kingdom can be used for pharmaceutical products to cure many 
diseases (Assaeed, 2001, 4). 
Plant Diversity Conservation Practices 
In Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of rangeland and 
forest management. The major land uses in these two natural resources 
are grazing by livestock, recreation and tourism. The National 
Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development (NCWCD) runs 
a chain of 13 wildlife reserve comprising about 3% of the country land 
area where conservation of certain wildlife species has a major priority 
(Assaeed,2001,4) Summary of some selected plant in Saudi Arabia 
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Table-4.5: 
P l a n t 
O o m m u n i t y 
Oesei - t 
JPanicum 
tt4tgicftirn 
RhantGi'iunt 
epc2p/?cfsiirri 
Af'temisici 
he.rhct-cMHyct 
Acacia tortilis 
A\ncenriia 
marina 
A eluraptts 
la^opo ide.s 
Juniperus 
prt:>cera 
Acacia asak 
H n b i t a t D o m i n a n t S p e c i e s 
P l a n t C o m m u n i t i e s C^^rasses , S e d g e s , U n d c r - s l i ^ i r u b s an<l T r e e s > 
S a n d y so i l 
A e o U a n s a n d s 
Sane ly p l a i n s 
O r a v e l y p l a i n s a n d 
w a d i s 
W a d i s , g e n t l e s l o p e s , 
r o c k y a n d g r a v e l y s o i l s 
M a l o p l i y t i c 
S a l i n e f la ts a l o n g s e a 
c o a s t s 
C o a s t a l a n d i n l a n d sa l t 
ma i - shes 
I^asizirus scincHcus. f*enriixetvifrj cflxfisurfi. 
Calli^oriLiiti cofTios7-/rTi, iKdcjltHciopsis ci/iata.. 
Astenatharurri for.skal&i, f^agonia s pp . , 
Maloxylon salicomicztryt 
M. ciliata. f*. turgiciurn, C camnsum, 
AdonsoJiia nirca 
Achillea fragrantissin^a, Att^i/iera gar-cini. 
MGliartthirmtm lippii 
M. salicornicitm. A. fragfantissirna, A. gctrairii. 
JW. lippii 
Lyciiari shawii. Acacia t^hrenh^fgiana, -P. 
titr-gicft^m 
P l a n t O o n m i u n l t i e s 
P u r e s t , tuariita p o p u l a t i o n o r \v i th Hhizophara 
rnuct~o nata 
Ivlay f o r m p u r e s t a n d s 
JVlounta inous P l a n t C o m m u n i t i e s 
A b o v e 1 7 0 0 i n a l t i t u d e 
s l o p e s 
B e t w e e n 1 0 0 0 - 1 5 0 0 n i 
a l t i t u d e o n h i l l s i d e s a n d 
p l a t e a u s 
Th&nicda triandra, Hyparrh&nia hirta, Mentha 
langifolia 
Andropogan distachyus. Arisfic/a coerztle^cens, 
Stipagr-astis obrusa. Cenchrus ciliai'is 
Source: http//faculty:ksu.edu.sa/assaeed/publication/symposiayrange-diversity-cons.pdf 
It is estimated that more than 300 plants species are used for medical 
purpose, as fodder and for honey production (Fao, 1999,2). 
Plants are closely related to the environment where they grow, since the 
environment provides the plants with the factors necessary for their 
growth. These environmental factors are, in turn interrelated, and they 
affect one another. Species classified in Saudi Arabia forest are mostly 
Acacias and some wild olives. These forests are managed as protective 
rather than productive forests. Thus plants that grow in any area are 
condition by the environment at factors of that area. These plants also 
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constitute an organic unity where they depend on one another (Fao, 1999, 
2). 
LIVESTOCK 
The recent years, the government of the Kingdom has come to recognize 
that Hvestock, most of which is owned and managed by Bedouins 
households, is a major resource of the nation and that the livestock sector 
of the economy should be encouraged and developed (Nimblock, 1980, 
85). 
The herds of camels, sheep and goats which are owned managed by 
Bedouins household represent a significantly large element in the non-oil 
based or derived wealth of Saudi Arabia (Hitti, 1953,72). 
In the 1970, increasing incomes in urban areas stimulated the demand for 
meat and dairy product, but by the early 1980s government programs 
were only partially successful in increasing domestic production. Bedouin 
continued to raise a large number of sheep and goats. Payments for 
increased flocks, however, had not resulted in a proportionate increase of 
animals for slaughter (Nimblock, 1980, 85). Some commercial feedlots 
for sheep and cattle had been established as well as a few modem 
ranches, but by the early 1980s much of the meat consumed was imported 
(SAMA, 2000, 128) Although the meat supply was still largely imported 
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in the early 1990s, domestic production of meat had grown by 33 percent 
between 1998 and 1999, from, 157 thousand tons to 159 thousand tons. 
This increases, however, masked the dominant role of traditional farms in 
supplying meat. Although new projects accounted for some of the rapid 
growth during the 1980s a sharp decline of roughly 74 percent, in beef 
stock production by specialized project during 1989 resulted in only a 15 
percent, fall in meat output. This reversal also highlighted the problems in 
introducing modem commercial livestock-rearing techniques to the 
kingdom (Middle East and North Africa, 2003, 515). Egg production also 
increased rapidly during the 1980s.The number of broiler chicken 
increased 374 thousand tons in 1998 and to 391 thousand tons in 1999. 
Commercial poultry farms, however, greatly benefited from government 
incentives and grew rapidly during 1980s chickens were usually raised in 
controlled climatic conditions. Despite the doubling of output, as a result 
of the rapid rise in chicken consumption, which had become a major 
staple of the Saudi diet, domestic production constituted less than half of 
total demand. (Britanica, 1926, 987). 
Although their number is decreasing, many thousands of Bedouins still 
pursue a nomadic life style and continue to supply animals and animal's 
products to the Saudi economy. Meat from the desert animals does not 
match the amount or quality of imported frozen meat, but there is a 
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demand for fresh lamb and mutton, especially for traditional feasts. 
Increasing number of Bedouin families divide their time between desert 
nomadic and crop rising or other economic pursuits in village on the 
perimeters of their tribal dirham (Held, 1998, 282). 
The settled farmer and traders are needed the nomads to train. Nomads 
would graze and breed animals belonging to sedentary farms in return for 
portions of the farmer's produce (Britanica, 1926,987). 
At its founding, the Kingdom inherited the simple, tribal economy of 
Arabia. Many of the people were nomads engaged in raising camels, 
sheep, goat, cattle and assess. Agriculture production was localized and 
subsistent. The kingdom's development plans have given domestic food 
production special attention, and the government has made subsidies and 
generous incentives available to the agriculture sector. The camel is the 
chief support of nomadic life in Arabia without the camel the Bedouin 
could never move far from water fit for human beings. With the camel 
they can survive for month on its milk and penetrate deep into the desert. 
The camel also furnishes food, clothing, fuel transportation and power for 
drawing water or for ploughing (Britanica, 1926,987). 
Domestic livestock production witnessed modest expansion and lagged 
behind the rapid growth in demand for meat. This was due to the drought 
conditions and overgrazing which affected the quality of pasture lands. 
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However, as a results of subsides on animal feed, extensive credit 
facilities for ranching projects and expansion of fodder production as an 
agricultural by production, livestock production is expected to expand in 
future to satisfy an increasingly large proportion of the rise in 
consumption (SAMA, 1990, 191). 
Table-4.6: ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK AND 
POULTRY 
(THOUSAND HEADS) 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Camels 
814 
824 
865 
862 
879 
869 
Sheep 
10315 
10646 
11621 
12112 
11787 
11548 
Goats 
5594 
5478 
5654 
5643 
5002 
4853 
Cows 
322 
332 
361 
352 
382 
413 
Totals 
17045 
17280 
18501 
18969 
18050 
17683 
Poultry 
425 
424 
475 
536 
432 
506 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources Saudi Arabia monetary agency 
45th annual report,(2009 )Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
Estimate number of Livestock and Poultry 
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FISHERIES 
Fisheries in Saudi Arabia are being developed under an agreement signed 
with a British firm in early 1976 (SAMA, 1976, 34). A multipurpose 
fishing research boat of net was purchased and a new type of net was 
introduced on the Red Sea coast which has helped achieve a more than 
fivefold increase in average catch (Britanica, 1926, 965). 
Important on both coasts, fishing has been especially developed on the 
east coast. Traditional fishing methods have been replaced by modernized 
techniques and equipment, with ships operating primarily out of 
Dammam, and there are processing and freezing plants in Dammam and 
Al-Khobar. Additional facilities are opening in the new port and 
industrial city of Jubail. With all of the Gulf littoral states intensifying 
fishing efforts, over fishing has occurred, and the total Gulf catch peaked 
in 1996-1997 (Held, 1998,283). 
The kingdom's consumption of fresh and'frozen fish is estimated at 44 
thousand tons annually of which only 16 thousand tons is accounted for 
by domestic production. The government has therefore, directed its effort 
towards the development of the kingdom's fish and marine resources. 
The Marine Research Center in Jeddah, has conducted several studies and 
experiments, including on full survey of the kingdom's coasts, the 
identification of fishing development projects, the determination of the 
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most suitable nets and fishing methods as well as the best fish locations. 
The kingdom has participated in the Arab Fishery Company which plans 
to undertake fishing in the high seas (Shomq, 1999, 112). 
The government of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been actively 
promoting, ambitious food self-sufficiency programmes, and provides 
financial incentives and appropriate technical support to the private 
sector. Aquaculture has been including in this programmes and therefore 
the Ministry of Aquaculture and water together with the cooperation of 
Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O) established the fish farming 
centre (FFC) in 1982 on the Red Sea coast 50 km north of Jeddah 
(Thobaiti, White, 2008,1). 
The centre is a marine aquaculture research institution which undertakes 
research and development programmers to identify the most suitable fish 
and shrimp species for culture and the optimal culture systems suited to 
the conditions found in the kingdom. It undertakes the initial research 
programs then scales up to pilot scale to test and demonstrate the 
production systems and techniques. It has a marine hatchery facility, four 
culture system (ponds, pens, cages and tanks). Baobab Tilapia culture 
facility, laboratories and aquarium display area. It pioneered commercial 
techniques for marine culture of Tilapia in pens and cages, and the culture 
of giant tiger prawn in lined ponds, which has led to commercial farms 
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being established in the kingdom using these techniques. It has worked 
closely with local feed manufacture to develop standard fish feeds 
(Thobaiti, White, 2008, 2). 
The centre aims to support the growing aquaculture industry by 
continuing the development of successful culture systems and techniques, 
by providing practical training courses for local farmers and by providing 
information in the form of operational Manuals and Guidelines 
(Thobaiti,White,2008, 3). 
Aims of the Centre 
The purpose of the project is to create within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and water, a centre of technical expertise for fish and prawn culture 
which can direct and support the development of aquaculture in the 
kingdom with research and development projects, this team of specialists 
wills develop the application of existing technologies and production 
system suited to local environmental conditions. They will advice and 
guide investors and entrepreneurs for the growth of the aquaculture 
industry in the kingdom (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3). 
The centre will conduct research and development programmers as well 
as extension services to support the development of a national 
aquaculture industry (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3). 
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The fish farming centre presently has a full programmers of research and 
development projects. (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3. 
Identifying the most suitable local species for culture as well as test in the 
culture of some exotic species which have good potential for the export 
market (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3). 
Developing and testing under pilot scale conditions, different culture 
systems and where necessary adapting them then to local environmental 
conditions (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3). 
Undertake nutritional research and important species and develop feeds 
using locally available ingredients. Work will feed local manufacture re-
produce economical larval and grow-out feeds (Thobaiti, White, 2008,3). 
Undertake waters quality analyses in culture facilities and monitor the 
adjacent lagoon to identify any possible effects of the farm on the local 
environment (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 3). 
Conduct short practical training courses for government staff and local 
farmers. Produce training manuals and operational manuals on basic 
culture techniques (Thobaiti, White, 2008,4). 
Undertaken diseases research on important fish and shrimp species. 
Provide a basic diseases diagnosis and treatment advisory services to 
local fish farmers (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 5). 
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Establish a full reference library with subscriptions to the important 
aquacultures journals. Prepare and distribute a bi-monthly newsletter 
entitle 'Arabian Aquaculture Newsletter (Thobaiti, White ,2008,7). 
Undertake disease research on important fish and shrimp species, Provide 
a basic disease diagnosis and treatment advisory service to local fish 
farmers (Thobaifi,White, 2008, 10). 
Achievement of the Centre 
Since the establishment of the fish farming centre in 1982, a number of 
important achievements have been made. This has contributed to the 
development of commercial marine aquaculture ventures along the Red 
Sea coast (Homeiedan, 2008, 227) 
The centre has successfully demonstrated the feasibility of different 
culture systems in the Red Sea. Fish and shrimp have been successfully 
grown in floating cages, fixed fish pens, fiberglass tanks and plasfic lined 
ponds. Research has been carried out to establish the optimal stocking 
density, water exchange, feeding system etc (Homeiedan, 2008, 227). 
The centre has worked together with local feed manufactures to develop a 
suitable fish feed using locally available ingredients. The centre is also 
developing fry diets for Tilapia and rabbit fish (Homeiedan, 2008,227-8). 
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The centre has estabhshed, by research, the benefit of fish and shrimp 
poly culture for maintenance of water quality and pond hygiene, when the 
prawn is grown in conjunction with rabbitfish. Both species have 
improved growth rate and survival rate. This finding has been tested on a 
commercial scale (Thobaiti, White, 2008,10). 
Marine Fish Hatchery:-
The marine fish hatchery comprises of five sections, the broad stock 
holding tanks, the egg incubation tanks, the five food production unit, the 
larval tanks and the fry tanks, the hatchery is designed to produce 
approximately 500,000 fry per year. It is designed to allow the production 
of different fish species (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 11-12). 
Marine Prawn Hatchery:-
The marine shrimp hatchery is located in the same building as the fish 
hatchery but is separate rooms. It also comprise of a broad stock holding 
facility, larval rearing facility and post larval nursery facility sharing the 
live food production unit with the fish hatchery. The shrimp hatchery is 
designed to produce approximately 250,000 post larval per month 
(Thobaifi, White, 2008, 12). 
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Onshore Culture Facilities 
The shored based culture facihties consist of large semi-intensive earth 
ponds and intensive tanks and race ways. The centre pumps its seawater 
supply from deep both holes located adjacent to the lagoon. This water is 
therefore filtered through the coral, has a relatively stable temperature 
and salinity but suffers from low oxygen levels (Thobaiti, White, 2008, 
12-13). 
Pond Facilities 
The pond facilities comprise of four small nursery and four larger grow-
out ponds. These ponds are lined with EPDM plastic liner to prevent 
water loss through seepage. Half of the ponds have medium sized gravel 
substrate and half are clean. This wills allow research into the effect of 
substrate on growth performance. Trials carried out have included shrimp 
production at 45 pieces/m2 polyculture of fish and shrimp, and 
production of rabbitfish (Thobaiti, White, 2008,13). 
Tank Facilities 
The tank facilities comprise of fiberglass raceway and tanks. These tanks 
are provided with pumped water and air. Research on intensive culture 
techniques can be undertaken in these facilities. Tribal's already carried 
out have included the culture of shrimp at 45 and 90 pieces/m2, Tilapia 
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and rabbitfish production, and shrimp and fish polyculture (Thobaiti, 
White, 2008, 13). 
OFF SHORE CULTURE FACILITIES 
Cage Facilities 
The centre has a variety of different designs of cages, locally constructed 
commercially sized cages (5 m x 5 m) were made from wood with barrel 
flotation and smaller research cages (2.5 mx 2.5 m) of similar design. 
Scottish designed kames cages were also imported and are used for 
research purpose. Reinforced netting is used for all netting as nylon 
netting is quickly damaged by hole created by wild reef fish. Trial 
undertaken has included the production of Tilapia and rabbitfish. Prawn 
culture at 45 and 90 pieces/m2, and density trials for Tilapia and 
rabbitfish (Thobaifi, White, 2008,19). 
Pen Facility 
The centre has developed a design of fish pen that is suited to the local 
environment and presently has four commercial sized pens (l,250m2), 
And 6 smaller research pens (Homeiedan, 2008,229). 
Baobab Tilapia Culture Unit 
The baobab culture system was developed in Kenya for the breading and 
production of Tilapia in brackish water condition. The design and 
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technology was brought into the kingdom and is presently being tested 
and adapted to the local environment conditions found along the Red Sea 
(Homeiedan, 2008, 229). 
The environment of the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf provides area with 
many kinds of fish with economic value. There are more than fifty 
families containing 200 kinds. The famous fish families of commercial 
value, preferred by the Saudi customers are the emperor fish, grouper. 
Jack red snapper, barracuda, pomfret, Spanish mackerel, rabbitfish and 
bugle fish (Homiedan, 2008,238). 
There are eight of these kinds in the Red Sea, and three in the Arabian 
Gulf. Some of the important ones are emperor fish, abukiya, Karsit, 
mahisini, and abu Zahwa (Homiedan, 2008,238). 
Groupers usually live in shallow water around coral reefs and are 
predators. They belong to a group of excellent quality fish. Among the 
best known of these are various kinds of grouper, milk fish, and najil 
(Homiedan, 2008,239). 
There up to twenty-seven kinds of Jack fish, the majority of them found 
in the Red Sea. They are mostly predatory and living near the coral reefs. 
It is known that they stay in their environment for a long time. They have 
excellent commercial value of these kinds are the large and small jack 
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fish, the Jedba, the Qaza, and the trevally, Spanish mackerel can be as 
long as 130 cm and particular kind of fish is preferred in the market for 
its good taste and usually live in a fixed place, this lack of small bones. In 
addition to the great number offish in the water of the Red Sea, there are 
many kinds of shellfish, such prawns, shrimp and crayfish. There are also 
in the Gulf and the Red sea a number of gristly fish such as sharks. 
(Homiedan, 2008, 239). 
WATER RESOURCES 
Water is the most important Natural Resources without it one cannot 
survive and Saudi Arabia water is available in scarcity. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia there are no free flowing perennial rivers (Presely, 1999, 
25). The nation's water supply depends on rainfall and ground water. 
Distribution of water varies widely. Except for the western and central 
region, ground water resources are sufficient enough to encourage further 
an agricultural development (Knauerhase, 1975, 36). 
Saudi Arabia annual rainfall in less than 100 millimeters, in most areas, it 
has only about 233 million cubic km. of internal renewable water 
resources. These water resources provides only minimal amount of water 
even of Saudi Arabia current population. They total about 156 cubic 
meters per-person- less than one-seventh the total for a citizen of the 
United States (Cordesman, 2003,299). 
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A reliable supply of water for both domestic and agricultural is one of the 
prerequisites for human survival. As a result perennial water sources have 
played a crucial role in the sitting of settlement and growth of economic 
activity in Saudi Arabia (Beaumount, 1978, 32). 
As for water, the main target in the kingdom's sixth five year 
development plan is the reduction of total water consumption from 18.2 
billion cubic meters in 1995 to 17.5 billion cubic meters in 1999, and a 
decrease in the use of non renewable ground water from 14.8 to 13 billion 
cubic meters over the same period. These target, to be achieved by 
reducing the rate of water consumption in agricultural at an average 
annual rate of 2.2 percent, and by rationalizing consumption rates for 
other purpose are being implemented by; the water affairs department at 
the Ministry of Agricultural and Water, which oversees the water sector, 
including the potable water supply the slain water conversion corporation 
(SWCC), which manages the desalination plants (Saudi Arabia, 2000, 1). 
The Al-Hasa Irrigation and drainage Authority, which focuses or reach 
and development of water resources, and the Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs, which manages household water supply and waste water 
disposal. Water is natural resources which must be highly valued and 
conserved. The kingdom draws its water from four mains sources-
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surface, ground, desalinated and reclaimed technique (Agriculture 
Development, 1992,2). 
Water planning is an integral part of the comprehensive planning process 
in the kingdom, for all four categories of water, surface, ground, 
desalinated, and reclaimed. By the end of fifth plan the water sector had 
achieved the following (Beaumount, 1978, 4). Optimal production 
capacity of the desalination plants to produce about 1.9 million cubic 
meters per day, with a potential expansion of another 1 million cubic 
meter completion of three new dams to bring the total number to 
183million cubic meter with a combined holding capacity of 450 cubic 
meters, and additional dams under construction to increase this by 
another 325million cubic meter and review of existing water legislation, 
including issue of resolution prohibiting water drilling in certain areas 
suffering from, depletion on non renewable ground water (Agricultural 
Development, 1992, 2). 
Thirty five desalination plants have been built to produce potable water 
from sea water and raw groundwater along the Red Sea coast and the 
Arabian Gulf coast using the multistage flush system and reverse 
osmosis. At present Saudi Arabia is the largest producer or desalinized 
water in the world. Annual water production has reached about 795 MCM 
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in 1995 and was expected to reach about 1050 MCM within ten years 
period (Abderraman, 2008, 2). 
The country's mean annual surface runoff has been estimated at more 
than 2 billion cubic meters per year. The country has eleven renewable 
alluvial aquifers with an estimated combined mean annual recharge of 
nearly 1 billion cubic meters per year (Merri Report, 1985, 56). 
According to the World Resources Institute the renewable groundwater 
and surface water resource overlap, i.e. the entire renewable groundwater 
resources originate in recharge from rivers (Wadis) so that total 
renewable water resources are in the order of 2 BCM/year, Surface 
resources and renewable aquifers are concentrated in the west and 
southwest, where rainfall is higher (Held, 2000, 239). 
Groundwater is stored in more than twenty layered principal and 
secondary aquifers of different geological ages with groundwater quality 
varying between sites and aquifers. Isotopic analysis show that the fossil 
ground water in three aquifers ten to thirty two thousand years old. The 
estimated groundwater reserves to a depth of three hundred meters below 
ground surface are about 2,185 billion cubic meters with a total annual 
recharge of 2,762 MCM. The renewable groundwater resources are 
mainly stored in shallow alluvial aquifers and in basalt layers of varying 
thickness and width, which are found mostly in the southwest. These 
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aquifers store about 84 billion cubic meters with an average annual 
recharge of 1,196 MCM (Abderrahman, 2008, 2). 
There are 33 wastewater treatment plants with a capacity of 748 million 
cubic meters per year, and 15 more are under construction, (2008). Much 
of the treated wastewater is being reused to water green spaces in the 
cities (landscaping), for irrigation in agriculture and other uses (Water 
Supply and Sanitation in Saudi Arabia, 2008, 3). 
Water use Total municipal water use in Saudi Arabia has been estimated 
at 2.1 billion cubic meters (BCM), per year in 2004, or 9% of total water 
use. Agriculture accounts for 88% of water use and industry only for 3%. 
Demand has been growing at the rate of 4.3% percent annual (average for 
the period 1999-2004), in tandem with urban population growth (around 
3%) (Water Supply and Sanitation in Saudi Arabia, 2008, 3). 
Water supply is usually not metered neither at the source nor the 
distribution point. It is tentatively estimated that average water 
consumption for those connected to the network ranges between 200 to 
280 liters per capita per day, a level similar to the United States (Water 
Supply and Sanitation in Saudi Arabia, 2008,4). 
Water reuse in Saudi Arabia is growing, both at the level of building and 
at the level of cities. For example, ablution water in mosque is being 
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reused for the flushing of toilets. At the city level, treated wastewater is 
being reused for landscaping, irrigation and in industries such as refining 
(Beaumount, 1978, 5). 
An unknown, but large proportion of the population is dependent on 
supply through water tankers at a much higher cost, and at much lower 
levels consumption, than those connected to the network (Held, 2000, 
239). 
Source of Water for Municipal Supply 
Desalination plants provide about half the country's drinking water. 
About 40% comes from groundwater. The remainder comes from surface 
water (9%) and reclaimed wastewater (1%). Desalinated water is 
prevalent along the coast, surface water in the southwest region and 
groundwater elsewhere. The capital Riyadh, however, is supplied to great 
extent with desalination water pumped from the Arabian Gulf over 467 
km. to the city located in the heart of the country (Water Requirement, 
2000, 1) 
There is an urgent need to increase water and power capacity in order to 
keep up with a growing population and urbanization trend, with a 
population reaching more than 27 million in 2007 and growing at an 
average annual rate of 2.2 percent. The government faces major 
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challenges in meeting the water need of its burgeoning population over 
the next 20 years (Saudi Arabia's Water & Wastewater in Saudi Arabia, 
1). 
History and Recent Development 
The Saudi water sector like the entire country, has undergone tremendous 
changes over the past decades from a systems based on the use of local 
renewable water resources for small scale irrigation and limited domestic 
uses to system largely based on the use of desalinated water and fossil 
groundwater for large-scale irrigation and domestic, commercial and 
industrial uses at a level comparable to developed countries 
(Abderrahman, 1989, 14). 
The saline water conversion corporation created in 1965, has been an 
important player in this process of change. Until 1994 domestic water use 
was entirely free in Saudi Arabia. (Abderrahman, 1989,14). 
The main public institutions in charge of overseeing this transformation 
were, until recently, two separate Ministries. The Ministry of Agricultural 
and Water was in charge of irrigation and water resources management; 
and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was in charges of water 
supply and sanitation. With the creation of the Ministry of Water and 
electrically in 2003, the water functions from these two Ministries were 
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transferred to this new Ministry, which is now the sole Ministry in charge 
of the water sector in the country. (Water Supply and Sanitation in Saudi 
Arabia, 2008, 4). 
Subsides promoting irrigation of cereals have recently been reduced, 
resulting in a reduction of water use for irrigation and reduced pressure 
on fossil aquifers (Held, 2000, 240). 
The government has launched an ambitious program to promote the 
participation of the private sectors in the development of water resources 
(Water Supply and Sanitation in Saudi Arabia, 2008, 10). 
Tariff and Cost Recovery 
The kingdom has an increasing block tariff structure, but the majority of 
the consumers fall in the first two blocks where water charge is minimal. 
Customers with a water uses of less than 100 cubic meters per month pay 
hardly anything for water. In other countries where increasing block 
tariffs are used, the lifeline consumption benefiting from a lower tariff 
level in typically set a 20 cubic meters per month or less. (Water Supply 
and Sanitation in Saudi Arabia, 2008,10). 
The tariff level and structure, combined with a lower share of metering, 
provide little or no incentive to conserve water. Proposals for water tariff 
adjustments have been formulated, but so far no decision has been taken. 
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There is no recovery of the cost of wastewater collection and treatment 
(Water Requirement, 2000, 3). 
Cubic meters of water supplied by a water tanker may cost as much as 6 
riyals, or about 20 times more than water supplied through the network. 
The combination of low tariffs for those connected and low coverage 
forces non-served citizens, which are often poor, to pay up to 40 times 
more for water than connected households. (Water Supply and Sanitation 
in Saudi Arabia, 2008, 10-13). 
The government of Saudi Arabia realized the problems created by the 
combination of arid climate condition, limited water supplies, and rapid 
growth in water demand, and introduced specialized agencies for water 
production and distribution, as well as regulation, measures, and fatwa in 
agreement with Islamic law to achieve effective water demand 
management in the interest of the community and its natural resources 
(Water Requirement, 2000, 14). 
Water policies and strategies should address the allocation of water in 
accordance with market values, conservation, pollution control, and 
improvement of the coordination of efforts between water institutions. 
Technical research and development, as well as manpower development 
and training, also essential aspects of any water programmers. Key 
policies should address short and long term programmers for agricultural 
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development, capacity building, and review of water pricing subsidies, 
development of application of appropriate technology, institutional 
arrangements, and water importation. (Water Requirement, 2000,14). 
Table-4.7: PAST AND FUTURE PROJECTED WATER DEMAND 
OF SAUDI ARABIA 
(Million cubic meter) 
Year 
1990 
2000 
2005 
Domestic 
1508(9.3) 
235(13.2) 
6450 (26.7) 
Agriculture 
14600(89.6) 
15000(84.4) 
1600(67.4) 
Industry 
192(1.2) 
415(2.3) 
1450(6.0) 
Total 
16300 
17765 
2420 
Source: Compiled By ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia) 
Secretariat from Country. Report and International Sources 1994, and 1999 
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DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
The statement of National Industrial policy 1974 has remained the basis 
of industrialization in the kingdom since its introduction. Recognizing 
that industrialization can improve standards of living, through greater 
output and better employment opportunities, the primary objective of the 
policy become that of diversification away from the oil sector (Vassiliev, 
2000, 30-31). By so doing the kingdom can be protected from external 
factors affecting the votatility of the oil market and lessen a significant 
reliance upon both exports and imports. While the statement emphasizes 
the establishment and expansion of the manufacturing sector it also 
specifically includes the promotion of industries based upon agricultural 
(Frank, 1979, 43). More recently industrial policy has focused upon the 
potential for privatization in the kingdom of a number of state-operated or 
state- controlled enterprises these include Saudi Arabia Basic Industries 
Cooperation (Sabic), Saudi Telecoms and Saudi the national airlines. 
(Farsy, 1989,36). 
Industry is the glamour sector of economic development. People look to 
industrial development to provide much needed employment, generate 
higher individual and national incomes, relieve balance of payment, 
constraints through import substitution, open up markets for primary 
products such as those from the mining and fishing sector, give the 
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country greater economic independence, generate new tax revenues and 
ftimish an important source of national pride. By and large, these hoped 
for benefits of industrialization are sensible and realistic- provided a 
country make sensible choices (MEED, 1999,19). 
In view of the country's almost total lack of modem infrastructure in the 
early 1950s, construction activity has been second only to oil in 
importance to the domestic economy. The petroleum industry has created 
the need and supplied most of the funds for a building boom in 
government and business facilities, villas and palaces for the royal family 
and official, and homes for employs of the oil companies and other 
concerns. This activity has proceeded unabated for several years and 
appears likely to continue (Todaro, 1997, 73). Most material requirements 
cement and steel for reinforced concrete in particular are imported, and 
much of the best residential construction in such cities Jeddah and Al-
Riyadh is entrusted to foreign Arab firms accustomed to this type of 
works rather than to less experienced local contractors. Later interest has 
been stimulated in the development of domestic construction material 
clay and gypsum and in the local manufacture of such items as cement 
block, bricks, and titles. In 1956 a cement factory project was established 
near Jeddah. (Shaw, 1982,48-50). 
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The first impetus to Saudi enterprises in the field of construction was 
given by Aramco's requirements, for its own operations and the housing 
of its workers. Local Arab contractors have been entrusted to carry out 
these projects Saudi contractors have built houses, sewers roads, 
hospitals, school, dining hall, social centers, stores, post offices, mosques, 
laundries, libraries, and cemeteries. This period saw the rapid expansion 
of new road and rail networks, construction of desalination plants for 
drinking and industrial use, and the setting up of the foundations for a 
modem communication system. Over the years, Saudi contractors have 
gained experience and have improved their capabilities through the 
purchases of modem equipment (El-Mallakh, 1982, 20-22). 
The traditional handicraft industries of Saudi Arabia include the weaving, 
dyeing and embroidery of cloth, mat and basket wearing, pottery making, 
particularly the large porous water jugs used by pilgrims, the working of 
gold, silver and lesser metals into omaments or daggers with sheaths 
studded with semiprecious stones, and some woodcarving and 
leatherworking. These products are seldom exported and except for the 
woven robes of Al-Hasa, they are generally of low quality and command 
only a local market (Turner, 1979, 9). 
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Black tent clothes made from goat's hair, occasionally combined with 
rough wool, and rugs in natural color of brown white and black are 
woven by most Bedouins families (Bashili, 1977, 62-65). 
The handicraft industries have experienced a general decline in the recent 
years under the impact of increasing import of cheap manufacturing items 
and a decline in the use of such articles as embellished daggers. (Lipsky, 
1959, 232).The number of workers employed in handicraft industries was 
never large and is negligible today (Bashili, 1977, 62-65). 
Fishing, pearling, the gathering of black coral and sponges, maritime 
commerce, and the related shipbuilding industry have long occupied the 
population of the coastal towns and the techniques used in this activates 
are generation old. Maritimes industries employ about 2 percent of the 
labor forces (Young, 1983, 10-12). Of all the production yielded by the 
seas on the east and west of the peninsula, pearls have had most 
significance for the economy, although the Saudi Arabia was small 
compared with that of neighboring states. Shipbuilding is an active 
industry in many of the port towns of Saudi Arabia, particularly Jeddah in 
al-Hejaz and Qizan in Asir. Gold and other ores have been worked for 
several centuries by rudimentary methods at isolated mines in Al-Hijaz 
and Median but diggings have been abandoned as accessible lodes were 
exhausted. (Evans, 1995, 32-38).Salt deposits near Kaf in the North West 
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have provided a few thousand tons for export a year, and a deposit near 
Qizan has been worked by the government. Desultory expoloitation of 
semiprecious stones-camehn, chrysoprase, and agate -and some emeralds 
reportedly found in Asir have yielded little in terms of either quality or 
quantity (Young, 1983, 12). 
In 1954 Saudi Arabia made an unsuccessful effort to incorporate the oil 
industry into its economy through an agreement with Aristotle Onassis. 
Whereby all Saudi Arabian, oil that was not transported by tankers 
directly owned by the concession companies would be transported by 
joint govemment-Onassis tanker line. The concession companies 
protested this action, since most of their oil was transported by chartered 
ships. .Eventually in 1958, the shipping agreement was declared a 
violation of the 1933 concession agreement by a three member arbitration 
board (Bashih, 1977,79). 
By the early 1970, industry was still dominated by firms in services, 
trade, and commerce. In general industry was characterized by the small 
number of employees, per establishment, the lead that construction had in 
large establishment and high percentage of manufacturing establishment 
employing only one to four percent (about 90 percent) (Azzan, 1993,67). 
In 1970 a survey of 294 manufacturing establishment from the largest 
such as Aramco's refinery, to most of those hiring only ten people 
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provided the first glimpse at the structure of large scale industries (Azzan, 
1993,67). 
The 1970 survey found that most of the plant operates substantially below 
capacity underutilization averaged 64 percent for the plants surveyed. The 
reason the plants failed to operate near full capacity was not given but 
presumably included shortages of skilled manpower and materials, 
competition from imports and limited domestic markets. The under 
utilization of capacity continued into the mid 1970s; for some of the 
important industries in 1971 and 1972 industrial surveys shows a similar 
pattern for that years (Young, 1983, 24). 
Party because of private sector reluctance to invest in manufacturing and 
partly because of growing oil revenues, the government was involved 
early in the 1960 in some basic industries. In late 1960s Petromin 
established a steel rolling mill in Jeddah, using imported billets a urea 
fertilizer plant in Al-Dammam with 49 percent private Saudi capital, and 
sulfuric acid plant in the same location. In the early 1970, as oil revenues 
grew a coordinated plan emerged to collect and distribute gas that was 
flared to two yet-inbuilt industrial sites, where it could be used in basic 
industries. (SABIC, 2008,4). 
The Saudi government has consistently placed its trust in the private 
sector and free markets. Policy statements indicate a belief that free 
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competition makes for efficient investment decisions. Low product costs 
and price levels in the interest of both producers and consumers, for this 
reason policy dictates no restrictions upon output levels in private sector 
or price control the same time monopolies must be regulated, this is 
clearly the long-term vision of a private sector dominated, free market 
economy (El-Mallakh, 1982, 39) 
The first stages of industrialization have necessitated some interference 
with free markets and a substantial role for the public sector. Essentially 
the government's stance as set out in its policy statement of 1974 has 
been that public sector should be involved in initiating financing and 
sharing in the management of industrial projects that are too large or too 
complicated technically for the private sector to undertake alone. 
(Yamani, 2000,20). 
Nevertheless, private sector involvements should be maximized and 
government should always be willing to transfer its involvement in 
projects to the private sector when this is in the public interest policy is 
also clear that state has a responsibility to provide the infrastructure and 
institutional foundation on which manufacturing industry can be 
established.(Phibly, 1968, 56-58). 
The last 30 year of development have been very consistent with the 
framework offered by this policy statement in recent years an increasing 
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emphasis has been given to the switch of activities from public to private 
sector a central objective of the sixth development plant (SABIC, 2002, 
4). 
Naturally the composition of the Saudi sixth development plan was very 
different to that the first plan. The main feature of the development 
process have changed and with it the requirements of any five year 
development plan whereas the first two plans heralded periods of massive 
public sector spending and infrastructure development the sixth reflects 
the increasing importance of the private sector and the transfer of 
economic activity out of the public sector. Earlier plans could be more 
specific as to what the public sector was expected to do in each planning 
period because the government by definition controlled public sector-
related activities. What the government cannot do now, nor would want 
to do give its economic philosophy is dictate what the private sector will 
do. The emphasis now is upon 'indicative planning (Anderson, 1998, 36-
38). 
To understand the process of industrial development in Saudi Arabia it is 
necessary to appreciate the current role played by the government and 
semi-government institutions and enterprises (Anderson, 1998,36-38). 
• Ministry of planning 
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• Ministry of Industry and Electricity (MIE) 
• Saudi Industrial Development fund (SIDF) 
• Saudi Arabian basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
• Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu. 
These are the driving force for industrialization 
Ministry of Planning 
This is responsible, with the help of government spending agencies, for 
the drafting and implementation of the kingdom's development plans 
which are the framework for the industrialization process. In 1995 it 
introduced the sixth development plan (1995-2000) (SABIC, 2008, 2). 
This not only confirms the kingdom's industrial policy, but identifies the 
emphases which are to prevail over the next five year. The follow up 
department in the Ministry is responsible for continuously checking the 
progress of the plan (Corcoran, 1981,21). 
Ministry of Industry and Electricity 
This administers industrial policy; under its control are the licensing of 
manufacturing projects, the supervision and expansion of industrial 
estates (cities) and regulation for encouraging and protecting national 
industries (Homeiedan, 2008,222). 
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Saudi Industrial Development Funds (SIDF) 
Founded in 1974, the SIDF is at the heart of the government's financial 
incentive programmers for industry (Industrial development of Saudi 
Arabia, 2008, 1). Now focused upon supporting industries projects, it 
previously was also responsible for funding the electricity sector, a 
function now performed by General electricity organization (Corcoran, 
1981,22). 
Saudi Arabia Basic Industry Corporation (SABIC) 
With the establishment of Sabic in 1976, the government undertook a 
major effort to create domestic petrochemical industry that was designed 
to augment oil export earning and to use abundantly available domestic 
resources, particular associated gas supplies (Corcoran, 1981, 22). 
The investment has been guided by a two phase strategy. The first phase 
(1976-1987) strategy included a number of large capitals intensive and 
export oriented petrochemical projects that have been completed. Its aim 
was to produce bulk products such as ethylene, polyethylene, melamine, 
methanol, and downstream products including derivatives of ethylene 
(Ghamri.1998, 1-2). Moreover during this period, Sabic undertook the 
construction of plants to produce fertilizer (urea, sulfuric acid, and 
melamine metals steel, rods, and bars), supporting industrial products 
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(nitrogen), and intermediate petrochemical products (vinyl chloride, 
monomer, polyvinyl chloride and MTBE). Sabic also acquired share in 
two Saudi aluminum companies and expanded overseas by investing in a 
Bahrain! petrochemical complex. Sabic has made considerable 
development, with power productivity mounting to more than twenty 
million metric tons a year. This is due to the development of local as well 
as international markets. It has Expansion programmers to keep the 
development of marketing parallel with that of the production. Most of its 
project is set up according to the system of joint projects, with a number 
of selected pioneering international technology companies (Presely, 1999, 
19). 
Sabic affirms the quality of its products and advanced services. These 
companies have setup its industrial complex for development and 
research, which was officially opened on December 1994 (Presely, 1999, 
19). 
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Map 5.1: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF SAUDI ARABIA 
Economic Activity 
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Source: http://ww^.lib.utexas.e(lu/inaps/atlasmiddle-east/saudi-arabia-eco.ing 
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SABIC MAIN SECTOR 
Petrochemical and their derivatives make up the biggest sector of Sabic 
with a total production of millions of tons contributing to the 
development of the light industry sector (Corcoran, 1981, 23). 
Fertilizer 
Sabic has taken part in achieving a full agricultural increase during the 
last decades through production of fertilizers which carry the Sabic mark 
(Corcoran, 1981,23). 
Iron and Steel 
The Saudi iron and Steel company (Hadeed) owned by Sabic is regarded 
as the biggest producer of Iron and Steel in the world. In employs the 
direct reduction method (the electricity bow furnace) and its total 
production (Steel, bars, Wire, Coil and Section) was more than 9.6 
million tons (Corcoran, 1981,23). 
The supporting industries 
The National Gas Industry Company (Ghaz) produces oxygen and 
nitrogen to support the production process of the Jubail industrial 
institutions. In 2007, Ghaz completed the third stage expansion program 
to increase the annual production of Oxygen to 976 thousand tons and to 
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nitrogen 479 thousand tons. This expansion was meant to complement 
Sabic production programs and expansion projects (Presely, 1999, 21). 
Cement and the construction Materials 
There are ten stock companies for cement and building materials. The 
most recent company established was that of Tabuk. These are the main 
sector of Sabic these sector works to develop the Sabic industrialization 
of Saudi Arabia (SABIC, 2008, 3). 
Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu 
In 1975 the royal Commission for Al-Jubail and Yanbu was created. The 
commission was given authority to plan construct, manage and operate 
the infrastructure needed to support the basic industries the government 
intended to build and to satisfy the community needs of the work force 
employed in these industries (Corcoran, 1981, 23). 
The commission was also to promote investment in secondary and 
supporting industries, to develop effective city government, and to train 
Saudis to take over as many jobs as possible. The commission received 
an independent budget to facilitate its work (Corcoran, 1981,23). 
These five governments and semi government institution help to the 
development of Industries of Saudi Arabia. 
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INDUSTRIAL CITIES 
The establishment of the industrial cities is regarded as a phase of support 
and encouragement, because it lessened the burden of factory 
construction and industrial planning and regulation. Two industrial cities 
have been built, one in Jubail and the other in Yanbu by the Royal 
commission to create principal industries out of oil petrochemical 
products and metals, as well as and to create secondary industries. The 
basic equipment has been set up in Jubail, an area of around 1.3 sq 
kilometers including sixteen basic industries complex which depend 
altogether on the exploitation of the natural gas which had been wasted 
without any economic value (Farsy, 1978, 34). 
The industrial city of Yanbu was set up on an area of eight square 
kilometers to create principal as well as secondary industries. To achieve 
the objectives of a balanced regional development, and to encourage the 
industrial sector, six industrial cities have been set up in Riyadh, Jeddah, 
Dammam, Mecca, Qasim and Ahsa (Presely, 1999,27). 
OBJECTIVE AND POLICY 
Industrial Development Objective 
Industrialization in the kingdom in carried out by both the public and 
private sector. Because the country adheres to the concept of a fi-ee 
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economy, the government has intervened in industrial development of the 
country only when it has felt it essential for the welfare of the people. The 
government has been continuously encouraging the private sector to 
undertake industrial and other investments as a means of diversifying the 
economy. When the size of the investment has been large and beyond the 
capacity of the private individuals, however, the government itself has 
undertaken the capital investment. A number of organizations have been 
established by the government to develop the basic industries in the 
kingdom (Evans, 1995,94). 
The Saudi Arabian governments approach to industrialization seems to 
have been guided by five major objectives (Azzan, 1993, 52) 
1. To assure the availability of essential consumer good, free of the 
disruption caused by international events. 
2. To lay the basis for a greatly broadened pattern, of industrialization 
by starting the domestic production of iron and steel. 
3. To assure the availability of construction materials. 
4. To demonstrate to private investors the feasibility of certain 
industrial and mining projects by making initial investments in 
industries not previously carried on in the country. 
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5. To assist private investment by giving suggestions, technical 
assistance, and credit or credit guarantees. 
The primary objective for industrialization is certainly the eventual 
establishment of an industrial production base that will reduce the 
country's heavy dependence on oil as the main source of income (Azzan, 
1993,52). 
Diversification in aimed at developing those industries that will maintain 
the economic viability over the long term and includes the development 
of hydrocarbon based industries and those contributing to national 
security and social prosperity. To attain this goal the government wishes 
to establish a complex of export oriented heavy industries in collaboration 
with foreign and domestic enterprise based on hydrocarbon and minerals, 
with a view to exploiting the country's potential comparative advantages 
in this field (Auty, 1990, 64). On the other hand it wishes to provide 
incentive and external economies to the private sector to establish a 
number of industries supplying the basic consumer and development 
needs of the economy, thus reducing the country's dependence on 
imports (Bashili, 1977,43). 
These basic industries consideration underlay most of the government 
specific industrial objective, which include (Auty, 1977, 43). 
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• Increasing the economy's capacity to produce at competitive cost 
as wide a range of products as possible for domestic as well as for 
exports markets. 
• The industrial exploitation of the substantiated comparative 
advantages arising from low-cost energy raw material from 
hydrocarbon related industry, minerals, agricultural and fishery 
resources. 
• Widening and deepening the kingdom's access to modem's 
technology. 
• Achieving fuller capacity utilization in the private manufacturing 
sector. 
• Developing a regionally balanced industrial sector, 
• Increasing productivity through closer approach to optimal size of 
plants. 
• Reducing dependency of expatriate workers by national skills 
creation, through the development of general and technical 
education and on the Job training of nation workers. 
• Promoting inter linkage among industries. (Looney, 1982, 164). 
Industrial Policy 
There are clearer a wide range of option available for carrying out the 
industrialization programmers. The policy choice taken in Saudi Arabia 
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place the greatest faith in the private sector and in the forces of 
competition only through competition, it is believed can investment 
opportunities be effectively selected, production cost kept at a minimum 
and prices determined in the interests of both consumers and producers. 
Free competition should be encouraged and for this reason the 
government excludes the possibility of imposing quantitative restriction 
on output in the private sectors, or price controls it does however, see 
some merit in regulating monopoly power (Montagu, 1994, 34). 
In the short term there is a major role for the public sector to play in 
industrialization. This role must be as a partner to the private sector and 
not as competitor. The public sector should be prepared to supplement 
private sector activity, initiating financing and sharing the management of 
industrial projects that are too large or too complicated technically for the 
private sector to undertake alone (Romahi,2005,66). But wherever 
possible, private-sector involvement should be maximized and the 
government should always be willing to transfer its involvement in 
projects to the private -sector when this in the public interest, secondly 
the government must provide the infrastructure and institutional 
foundation on which manufacturing industry can be established 
(Montague, 1994, 34). 
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All of this might appears to give the private sector a total freedom in its 
own development. But there were to be control upon its activities. The 
industrial policy document brought with it the imposition of an industrial 
licensing system. Large industrial projects were only allowed to 
commence after the granting of a license, licensing was not to be a 
formality but given only on proof of the contribution of the project to the 
development process. This was one means of regulating the private 
sector. The second was to introduce a system of encouragement 
applicable only to those projects which the government deemed relevant 
for economic development (Wade, 1990, 52). This list of encouragement 
is very extensive government assistance with the selection of industrial 
projects, setting up businesses industrial surveys and feasibility studies, 
government loans and possible government equity participation (on 
favorable tenns to private industry) the possibility of subsidization and 
exemption from custom duties on imported equipment and primary 
materials, tax exemptions, Tariff protection from competing and imports 
(together with measure against dumping) and sites on industrial estates at 
low rentals (Al-Masood, 1989,46). 
Furthermore the government promised to give priority to local products in 
its own purchases and assistance in export markets. Granting of these 
mainly financial incentives is not automatic, but at the government's 
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discretion; hence again tliere is a means of regulating the direction in 
which the private sector develops (Montague, 1994, 38). 
Finally industrial policy, over the last decade has always been conscious 
of the need for foreign assistance in this industrialization process. The 
early policy pronouncements welcome the use of foreign capital 
technology and personal skilled personnel in private-sector developing 
(Wade, 1990, 54), although recently policy has been lees positive towards 
the import of labor, particularly unskilled labor. A definite and planned 
industrial pattern of development is emerging as a result of this policy. 
Oil-refining capacity is being extended to serve both domestic and export 
markets and natural gas is being harnessed to assist industry as a cheap 
energy source. Oil and gas are being employed particularly in the 
development of petrochemical industries and energy intensive industries 
such as basic metals iron, steel and aluminum (Romahi, 2005,29-34). 
Manufacturing industries are being set up to complete with imports and 
eventually to supply exports markets, again especially those industries 
which are able to utilize the raw materials offered by the Saudi 
hydrocarbon sector are being favored in this expansion (Romahi, 2005, 
36-39). 
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INDUSTRIAL PROCESS OF SAUDI ARABIA 
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PETROCHEMICALS INDUSTRIES 
Petrochemical is another way that Saudi Arabia can diversity its 
petroleum-based economy and have a higher potential profit margin. 
While a number of Gulf countries are involved in petrochemical 
operations, Saudi Arabia has created a massive industry (Hambleton, 
1982, 286). By 1987 Saudi Arabia had a total often major projects under 
consideration or in final design. These had a total capacity of over 3 
million tons per year (Cordesman, 2003, 494). 
In November 1993, a 700,000-ton-per year plant began operation in 
Jubail. In July 1994, a 700,000 ton-per-year complex at ibn Sina started 
operations. By the end of 1996, the kingdom had invested SR 1105 
billion in such industries. As a result, Saudi petrochemical companies 
were producing more than 20 million tons of products a year and 
exported to more than seventy five countries. The sixth development plan 
called for the fiirther expansion of the petrochemical industry and for 
growth at an annual average rate of 8.3% a year during the period 
"between" 1996-2000, the plan also called for total capacity to increase 
from 23 million tons in 1997 to 28 million tons in 2000 (Cordesman, 
2003,495). 
Saudi Arabia did not quite meet this goal. Nevertheless, in 2001; the 
kingdom was the leading producer of petrochemical in the West Asia, 
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with 20 million tons of petrochemical and polymer production and 4.5 
million tons of fertilizer production (Cordesman, 2003, 495). 
Saudi basic industries corporation (SABIC) has become the third largest 
exported of Saudi Arabian petrochemical and the largest petrochemical 
producer in the world (SABIC, 2006,2). 
Sabic has been the major success story of the industries sector. Between 
1990- and 1997 it increased its annual productive capacity of 
petrochemical metals, plastic and fertilizers from 13 million tones to just 
over 22 million tones. By 1997 it had more than a 5 percent share of the 
world petrochemical market, with key areas of production in basic and 
intermediate chemicals thermoplastic polymers, fertilizers and metals 
(Aarts, 2005, 19-26). 
For 1997 result for Sabic show a strong revenues production and profit 
situation the latter brought about partly by the improvement of world 
prices in some key Sabic product net profit rose to SR 4.6 billion in 1997 
up by 4.5 percent on the 1996 levels, sales revenues reached SR 4.023 
billion up from SR 20.834 billion in 1996. Production levels also 
increased to 23.7 mmt in 1997 compare to 23.9 mnt in 1996, with total 
assets of SR 68.2 billion, (as at 31 December 1997). SABIC is the 
industrial giant of the West Asia, and an increasingly by major force in 
worldwide markets (Aarts, 2005,28). 
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However, the volatility of the export markets for Sabic products is 
demonstrated by the downturn in the first nine month of 1998. A net 
profit of SR.1.74 51 billion is 51 percent, down on the same period in 
1997. This is despite a 5 percent increase in production. Sales revenues 
were 26 percent down as world price for petrochemical related products 
have fallen; fertilizer prices are have reportedly down by 33 percent 
chemicals by 30 percent and polymer by 21 percent in this period. The 
Asian crises has also has its impact with Sabic sales to the region down 
by 26 percent by October 1998 (Aarts, 2005,28). 
In 2005, Sabic was the West Asian's largest (in terms of market 
capitalization) and most profitable publicity listed non oil company, the 
world 11* largest petrochemical company, ranked 331 on the fortune 
Globe 500 for 2005. The second largest producer of ethylene glycol and 
methanol in the world the third largest producer of polyethylene and 
overall the fourth largest producer of polypropylene and polyolefin 
Standard and Poor's and Fitch rating claimed Sabic to be the world's 
largest producer of polymers and the gulf region's largest steel producer 
for 2005 and assigned Sabic 'A' corporate credit rating. That same year 
Bloomberg ranked Sabic as the 13* largest company in the world in terms 
of market capitalization (at the beginning of 2005) and the second largest 
by market value outside the US and UK in 2004. In the value of Sabic 
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shares listed on the Saudi Stock Market, increased 170% while its net 
profit increased by 112% from 2003 to 2004 (SABIC,2006,2-3). 
During recent few years, petrochemical industries in the kingdom have 
occupied an advanced rank on both regional and international levels in 
view of the financial capabilities and huge natural resources available to 
the kingdom. Petrochemical industry utilized oil and natural gas basic 
raw material for its products. The petrochemicals industry is composed of 
two main sector, the first is basic chemical such ethylene and propylene, 
which are derived from oil or gas. The second is convertible basic 
chemicals, which are used directly in a number of industries such as 
plastic, rubber and fertilizers (SAMA, 2009,178). 
According to the data of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic), the 
kingdom's share of petrochemical products stood a 78 percent of the total 
chemical products of the GCC countries during 2008, 53 percent of the 
West Asia total chemical production and 3.8 percent of the world total 
production. The kingdom's share of fertilizers was 43 percent of the GCC 
countries total production of fertilizers, 30 percents of the West Asia total 
production and 2.4 percent of the world total production (SAMA, 2009, 
178). 
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THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
Most of Saudi Arabia electric power generating capacity was build during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, after the establishment of the first 
municipal power plant in 1950, the development of the industry occurred 
largely in the private sector (Newbery, 1999, 24-29). By 1980 about 
ninety five private companies supplied electric services, leading to a 
totally decentralized system. Voltage and cycles different between towns 
and even with towns, preventing consumer from standardizing equipment 
and appliances, consumers suffered from chronic power failures, voltages 
fluctuations, and poor repair services, Hospitals and large plants often had 
their own generations. Planners estimated that only 54 percent of the 
potential demand for electricity had been met in 1978 (Joskow, 1985, 67-
69). 
Saudi electricity policy in the 1970 and 1980 was geared towards 
supplying very low-cost electricity through high level of subsidization 
and rapid growth of electricity capacity. Between 1975 and 1985 SIDF 
provided low-cost long term finance, in total SR. 39.9 billion for capital 
projects in electric utilities. Since 1985 the General Electricity 
Organization has taken over this ftinction. Private investors in electricity 
companies are guaranteed a 7 percent rate of return by the government. 
Industrial users of electricity are also subsidized by the government via 
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the Ministry of Industry and Electricity such that industrial consumption 
has been priced a only SR. 0.10 per Kwh (Klein, 1988, 44). 
In the early 1970 the government embarked on a twofold plan to organize 
the sector and to stimulate ftirther investment. The system relied to 
private sector participation with strong government oversight and 
planning. Early attempts to standardize the system called for all new 
generators to be 60 hertz with distribution voltage of 127 and 220 volts 
(Banks, 1999, 72-74). In 1976 the first of a series of regional companies, 
Saudi Consolidated Electric Company (Sceco), was formed for the 
eastern region (Sceco-East) ownership of the regional companies which 
amalgamated their facilities under Sceco, remained locally held. The 
government had some equity participation, but the regional companies 
retained administrative autonomy (Klein, 1998, 58). The government 
requested Aramco to mange Sceco-East because of its large share of 
generating facilities and its management expertise. Regional companies 
for the central and southern parts of the country were formed in 1979; 
Sceco-West was established in 1981. The goal was to link the generators 
in a region and improve planning and service (Berrie, 1992, 68). 
Eventually the regional companies would be tied together to form a 
nationwide grid. The government owned General Electricity Corporation, 
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which served rural areas, participated in the regional companies in areas 
where it was active (Newbery, 1999,37-40). 
In recent years the rapid growth of population, combined with low-cost 
electricity has led to excess demand for electricity .The government has 
had to review its policy accordingly. The government has to invest in the 
industry in order to raise capacity, at the same time the level of 
subsidization has been reduced (price has risen) in the hope that this will 
encourage a more efficient use of available capacity 
(Azzan,1996,48).After the early 1960s generating capacity expanded 
rapidly. By 1979 generating capacity amounted to 4.214 megawatts. By 
1990 this capacity had quadrupled to 16,549 megawatts. Between 1975 
and 1979 consumption of electricity increased 37 percent yearly while the 
number of consumer rose 16 percent yearly. During the 1980, the 
consumption growth rate slowed to 23.8 percent of electricity consumed. 
Although in the Eastern province, given the location of country's major 
industrial complexes, industry demand accounted for more than 60 
percent of electric consumption. Industrial users in the other regions 
consumed lees than 5 percent of total electivity generated (Trebing, 
2000,13-15). 
Electricity policy nor addresses a number of areas, in addition to the 
rationalization of electricity pricing certainly full privatization of 
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electricity utilities is an objectives in the medium to long term, and it is 
hoped that electricity, can be provided to the 40 percent of population not 
yet served. There are also desires for a regionally integrated electricity 
network across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. There are 
as yet no common standards on specification across the different electric 
utilites unification needs to be accomplished. Additionally the northern 
region is served by a large number of electric utilities and is therefore 
fragmented (Cordesman, 2003,297). 
By 2000 the government intends to reorganize and improve efficiency in 
these utilities so as to raise the quality of service in the northern region 
(Cordesman, 2003,298). 
By 2000 consumption of electricity grew to 108 billion Kwh, and peak 
load to 23,310 Mw, with 69 percent of the population served by 
electricity (Presley, 1999, 24). Electricity and dual production regulating 
authority was established in 2001 within the framework of the 
government's efforts to reform and restructure the electricity sector. It 
was entrusted with the responsibility of regulating dual production (which 
include production of electricity along with declined water or steam).The 
main objective of the establishment of the authority is to ensure justice 
and equality among all beneficiaries from the electricity sector, from 
producers conveyance- distribution and trading sectors to the end-
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consumers. The Authority's task include the periodical review of 
electricity tariff, coming up with proposal and reporting them to the 
council of minister submitting financial report and compiling financial 
information from service provides in the kingdom setting up technical 
and administrative standards to be adhered by the services provide, 
settlement of legal disputed between subscribers and services providers, 
and proposing regulations that encourage the private sectors to invest in 
the electricity industry and secure an attractive environment for 
investment (SAMA,2009,192). 
According to preliminary data, electricity consumption in the kingdom is 
estimated to have risen by 7.0 percent over the preceding year to 
181,097.6, giga-watts/h during 2008 (Wharton, 22March, 2010). 
Data of the Saudi Electricity company showed increases in sales by 
regional classifications of electricity during 2008. The sales of the 
southern Region-branch went up by 11.6 percent, followed by the central 
region branch by 7.5 percent, the western region branch by 6.8 percent, 
and eastern region branch of 5.5 percent (SAMA, 2009, 192). 
During 2008, the central region branch accounted for 31.0 percent of total 
sales of the Saudi Electricity Company in the kingdom. It was followed 
by the western region branch (30.7 percent), the eastern region branch 
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(30.6 percent), and the southern region's branch (7.7 percent) (Wharton, 
22March, 2010). 
The government was interested in developing the electricity industries 
through efforts to vary the foundation of economy and to reduce the 
principal reliance on the export of crude oil. In this fields (the electricity 
industries) there are seventeen industrial stock companies with a capital 
of 13,774 billion Saudi Riyals. Most of these companies have made an 
improvement in their financial management valued at 12,5 billion Saudi 
Riyals, with Sabic representing 80.3% (Homiedan, 2008,220). 
TRANSPORT 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has built a massive network of modem 
roads linking all part of the country's railway network and air transport 
services offered by Saudi Arabian airline the largest air carrier 
transportation has also witness's rapid development, including the 
establishment, of a number of kingdoms with the rest of the world 
(Lipsky, 1959, 224-225).Today, Saudi Arabia has a well development 
transport network. The transport network of Saudi Arabia, for 
convenience, could be divided (Pesely, 1999, 34), Into four major 
segments; 
1. Road Network 
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Railways 
3. Airtransport 
Sea Transport 
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Road Network Saudi Arabia 
The construction of modem roads in the Kingdom is something new. In 
1954, the total length of the roads was 237 km. This number rose to 8,440 
km by 1970 and then jumped to 18,051 km of paved roads and 24,185 km 
of agricultural roads in 1980. The statistics have indicated that the total 
length of inter-city roads was more than 122,000 km in 1990 (Held, 2000, 
257). Of these 4,400 km of high speed, dual-carriage highways made up 
3,6% and 33,751 km of one-way roads made up 27.8%. There were 
83,365 km of paved rural roads, a proportion of 86. 6%). The rate of road 
length compared with the number of the population was 7176 km for each 
100,000 people. The total cost of road construction in the kingdom was 
about 1308 billion Riyals by the end of the fifth development plan 
(Beling, 1980, 96). The construction of these roads has been carried out 
according to the most modem highway specifications in the world. These 
roads include the Mecca/Medina road at a length of 321 km, the 
Riyadh/Sudair Qasim road at a length of 373 km, the Riyadh/Taif road at 
a length of 750 km, the Hadria/Hafar al Bahim/Rafha dual carriage way 
at a length of 613 km and the Qasim highway network at a length of 1417 
km (Held, 2000, 249). Ring roads continue to the built around some main 
cities in the kingdom to facilitate the movement of transportation and the 
crossing of local traffic. This network was supplied with bridges, 
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flyovers, underpasses, services side roads, lightening services, forestry 
and safety equipment. The most important of these roads are the Riyadh 
ring road with a length of 63.2 km, and Buraida ring road with a length of 
fifty-eight kilometers, the Jeddah ring road which is 1,036 km long, and 
the joint road of the Eastern Region cities whose length is 108 km 
(Beling, 1980,96). 
Total length of roads excluded by the Ministry of Transport up to the end 
of 2007 amounted to 53.8 thousand km, of which 14.9 thousand km were 
main roads, linking major regions in the kingdom with international 
borders and serving major urban areas of domestic and international 
significance. 9.2 thousand km secondary roads linking major cifies within 
regions, 29.7 thousand km feeder roads branching out of secondary roads 
and serving towns, villages and agricultural areas (SAMA, 2009, 223). 
Total road constructed and opened for traffic during fiscal year 2008, 
stood at more than 5,000 km against 2,852 km, increasing by 2,162 km or 
75.8 percent over the previous year. The share of main roads amounted to 
503 km against 17 km in the preceding years rising by 486 km, secondary 
roads accounted for 174 km, against 760 km, declining by 586 km from 
the previous year. Feeder roads stood at 968 km against 1,238 km, 
decreasing by 270 km from the previous year (SAMA, 2009,225). 
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Work was underway in 2007 implementing many asphalting projects 
throughout the kingdom, amounting to 494 at the end of the fiscal year 
2008, with a total length of 27.5 thousand km at a total cost of about SR 
32 billion (SAMA,2009,225). 
RAILWAYS 
Before the end of world war 11, were no land roads and airports in the 
kingdom. At the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the 
kingdom had started to build roads and to use modem means of 
transportation (Farsy, 1989, 67). King Abdul Aziz al-Saud, may God 
bless him, had recognized the importance of the transportation sector in 
the development process from the beginning, so he made his wise 
decision to construct the railways to be the first modem means of 
transportation in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With the growth of the oil 
industry in the kingdom after the Second World War, demands increased 
to import equipment and gear through the Dammam seaport. Lorries were 
used to carry them to Riyadh. The growing population in Riyadh had led 
to an increase in the demands for food and other requirements of life. 
Consequently, the king recognized the need for a railroad connecting 
Riyadh with Dammam. So he ordered a complete study for the project. A 
group of experts from many international companies was organized (El 
Mallakh,1982, 156). A report was submitted in 1947 on the bases that the 
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project would serve Dammam, Buqaiq, Ahsa, Kharj, and the Riyadh 
region. The project was commissioned to be carried out by the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco). The execution of the project started 
on 01.04.1947 lasted five years and nine months, and was handed over to 
the Saudi Government 31.12.1952. At the beginning of the project, the 
total length of the railroad was 634 km (SAMA, 2006,205). 
The last decade has witnessed a great development in the area of railroad 
construction, represented by the execution of many large projects costing 
more than 3,021 million Riyals (SAMA, 2006, 208). These include the 
construction of the customs station in Riyadh (the dry harbor) to help 
Saudi traders to load their goods directly from ships instead of loading 
and unloading the same goods more than once. This station provides all 
necessary facilities. At a value of 390 million Riyals, these projects also 
include relocating the old railways and building direct railways from 
Hoflif to Riyadh, doubling the Railway between Dammam and Hofuf as 
well as constructing new-sub-railways and side railways, and 
constructing three new stations in Riyadh, Dammam and Hofuf Also on 
the list in expanding maintenance transporting equipment establishment 
and supporting transportation fleet by purchasing modem trains and 
railroad coaches for passengers and carriages for transportation of goods 
(Transportation in Saudi Arabia,2002,2). 
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The Council of Minister's Resolution No. 98 dated 22.05.2006 was 
issued, establishing "Saudi Arabian Railways Co." (SAR) to manage and 
operate the north-south railway which will connect Hazm Al-Jalamid 
Govern ate in Al-Jawf region with Ras Al-Zour Port on the Arabian Gulf 
coast, parting through Hail and Al-Qasim regions, in addition to an 
extension connecting Burayadah with Riyadh and another one connecting 
Ras Al-Zour with Al-Jubail, this railway network is 4,200 km long 
(SAMA,2007,215). The Ministry of Finance and Economy represented 
by the Public Investment Fund in-charge of financing and supervising the 
project (Saudi Arabia Raiways, 2009,4). 
AIRTRANSPORT 
Due to the long distances that separate the main cities of the kingdom, air 
transportation seemed the most comfortable. Saudi Arabia Airlines 
(Saudis) provides a domestic transport network that covers all parts of the 
kingdom through twenty four-well equipped and well-maintained 
domestic airports. Saudi is also equipped with modem planes and 
organizes tours anywhere in the desert (Transportation and 
Communication, 1999, 3). The three international airports of the kingdom 
are king Abdul-Aziz International Airport in Jeddah, King Khalid 
International Airport in Riyadh and King Fahd International Airport in 
the Eastern Region; other international Airlines company is operating in 
215 
Chapter-V 
major airports to provide another international travel network. In all 
airports of the kingdom, city and domestic transportation services such as 
car rentals, comfortable buses provided by Satco (Saudi Arabian Public 
Transport Company), taxis hotel Limousines and Trains between Riyadh 
and Dammam are available (SAMA,2006,208). 
During the last few years, tourism has provided a substantial 
contribution to the national income. Investments in current services for 
domestic tourism have been estimated to reach 4,5 billion Riyals. This 
figure confirms the trend for more domestic tourism by the people of the 
kingdom (Richard, 1995, 187). The potential in evident when looking at 
the total Saudi expenditure on international tourism during 1994 at 19,8 
billion Riyals and during 1990 at 50 billion (KAS-CPO, 2000, 184-191). 
The numbers indicate the economic importance of tourism and the 
justification for further investment in the domestic tourism industry 
(Heinberg, 2003,92). 
The air transport sector witnessed good growth in the number of air 
transport users (Gros, 1997, 72). According to the data of General 
Authority of Civil Aviation, the number of passenger who traveled by air 
during 2007 amounted to 42.2 million, increasing by 1.7 million or 4.1 
percent over 40.5 million in 2006 (including passengers by Saudi Arabian 
Airlines and foreign airlines). The Cargo shipped by the civil aviation 
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during 2008 amounted to 564,8 thousand tons, recording an increase of 
45.4 thousand tons or 8.5 percent over the preceding year. Civil aviation 
passengers accounted for 80.8 percent of the total 52.2 million passengers 
during 2008 compared to 80.4 percent in the preceding year (SAMA, 
2009,209). 
SEA TRANSPORTATION 
Sea transportation is regarded as one of the most important means of 
transportation in the kingdom, because the kingdom looks over the Red 
Sea and the Arabian Gulf and is the biggest oil exporter in the world 
(Lipsky, 1959, 224-245). It has a sea shore of 1,800 km on the Red Sea, 
and another of about 610 km on the Gulf, where many new seaports have 
been constructed (SAMA, 1986, 134). Large new trading ships have been 
brought to form the core of the Saudi fleet. Developed and modernized 
for efficient transportation of the large volume of Saudi trade to foreign 
countries, this fleet also links the kingdoms seaports with other Arab and 
the international seaports (Kechichian, 2001, 186). The Saudi National 
Company of Sea Transportation was established by a Royal Decree, 1978 
with a capital waved at 500 million Riyals (Bakr, 2001, 84). The 
government contribution was at a rate of 25%. The company's capital 
increased in 1982 to one thousand million Riyals. The company 
transports exports and imports from or to the kingdom. In addition to the 
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transportation of passengers, the fleet exhibits high specifications and can 
accommodate about 10,778 typical containers carrying all kinds of goods 
(KSA-CPO, 1980, 164-166). Regular transportation has been organized 
by the company from the kingdom to the Southeast of the United States 
of America, to the east of Asia and to Europe. The company carries out 
some activities in the field of petrochemical transportation (Metz, 1993, 
63). 
The kingdom, cooperated with five other Gulf countries in establishing the 
United Arab Navigation Company in 1976 with a total capital valued at 
500 million Kuwait dinars. The kingdom's rate of contribution was at 
19.3% of the total company capital. The kingdom also took part with nine 
other Arab countries in establishing the Arabian Sea Company for oil 
transportation in 1953, with a capital valued at 500 million American 
dollars (Wells, 1976, 88). Established for the transportation and 
marketing of the Arab Oil products the company now possesses nine 
carriers with a total capacity of about 40,2,588 tons. The kingdom in one 
of the countries that established the Arab Academy for Sea 
Transportation, which aims at preparing the cadres for managing and 
developing the Arab Commercial fleets (Metz, 1993, 63) 
The kingdom has also joined a number of International organizations and 
corporations which are concerned with matters of sea transportation and 
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sea safety. These include the International Arab Organization the 
International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Conference for 
Development and Trade, The Kingdom also signed the United Nations 
Accord for Sea Regulations as well as a number of treaties and 
agreements especially related to international sea transportation and 
safety regulations. The General foundation of seaports was established in 
1976 with the responsibility of developing the kingdom's seaports and 
improving its working efficiency. The foundation has achieved its 
objectives by employing progressive technical methods so that the 
number of docks had risen from 27 to 182 in 1993, with twenty-three of 
these in the King Fahd industrial Seaport in Jubail, and twenty-three of 
these in the King Fahd Seaport in Yanbu. These have been especially 
built to transport industrial products. The manpower productivity at the 
commercial seaports has risen from 161 thousand tons in 1986/1987 to 
281 thousand tons in 1991/1992 and the productivity in the industrial 
seaport had risen from twenty-two thousand tons to about 159 thousand 
tons in the same period. The number of available docks in the main 
seaports by the end of the fifth developing plan was 179, with an increase 
of 3%. This is about four times as much as it was before. The available 
capacity of the seaport was increased by more than forty-times since 1992 
up to about 247 million metric tons yearly. The industrial capacity makes 
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about 74% of the available total capacity at all seaports (SAMA, 1994, 
179). 
The General port authority started in 2007 to execute a project for 
designing and establishing a new port in Ras Al-Zour by the specialized 
Chinese Company under a contract is 30 months as from the date of 
signature (SAMA, 2008, 200). It includes designing and engineering 
works construction and supply works, shoveling and water cooling 
works, and other works such as road paving and asphalting and 
constructing infrastructure of the new port (Kechichian, 2001, 189). The 
new port will consist of three main piers, with a capacity of more than 20 
million tons annually and they can receive ships with a cargo of 70 
thousand tons. In addition, there will be a fourth pier for supporting 
services. The authority is in the process of renovating and deepening 
many piers of the kingdom's ports (SAMA, 2007, 200-209). 
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Chapter - VI 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
Human Resource Development in Saudi Arabia has acquired a 
considerable attention after having realized the important role of human 
beings in socio-economic as well as political development of a country. 
This has attracted the attention of policy makers as well as researchers, 
leading to the analysis and study of various factor of human resources 
development (Dietl, 2006, 36). 
The objective of the present chapter is to examine the importance of 
demographic features, population structure, education and health, is the 
development of human resources (Wilson, 2004,126). 
Human resource is the backbone of social, political and economic 
development of any country. Hence, for the all round development of a 
country is necessary to harness the potentials of human beings and make 
them useful (Wilson, 2004, 126). 
Human resource development in a complex and intricate subject for a 
better understanding, it is necessary that the subject, should be viewed 
from a number of angles such as the demographic trends, economically 
active population, occupational structure of labor force, dependency ratio, 
educational structure and skills, and health and nutrition (Clifton, 
1985,12). 
221 
Chapter - VI 
The present study has been divided into four sections: In section no one, 
the development of human resource in Saudi Arabia in analyzed in the 
light of demographic features, as demography in the first and foremost 
aspect, the role of which could not be ignored while studying the human 
resources-section two deals with the population structure. The section 
three highlights the educational profile of Saudi Arabia. However 
education plays a very vital role in the human resource development and 
hence could not be neglected- Section four presents the analytical study 
of inequalities in the distribufion of basic health facilities. Furthermore an 
attempt to analyze the health profile is made. 
Saudi Arabia has drawn attention to some of the important achievements 
in the kingdom's human development programs, which include a 
significant increment in life expectancy, bringing it to be the largest 
among three countries in the world. Saudi Arabia's female enrolment 
ratios in primary, secondary and intermediate education levels have also 
risen considerably, making them among the highest in the world 
(Cordesman, 2003, 7). Saudi Arabia's has doubled the expenditure on 
development sectors, indicafing a widely recognized need to provide 
more attention of Saudi Arabia human development. These important 
achievements aside, significant challenges remain. The great challenge in 
Saudi Arabia's rapid population growth is which in turn necessitates 
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wider distribution of development benefits, a more urgent need for 
increased education and health services, and greater employment 
(Wilson, 2004, 123). 
Policymakers and economists generally agree that manpower 
development is the cornerstone of the development process. Quality of 
human resources is the most important indicator of the level of 
development and must receive corresponding close attention. Human 
resources development can be argued to be a more realistic, reliable and 
pervasive indicator of development than any other single factor since it is 
invariably a necessary condition for all kinds of growth (Looney, 1991, 
2). 
POPULATION OF SAUDI ARABIA 
The consequence of rapid population growth of economic performance 
takes over the various issues from the impact of demographic pressure on 
development expenditure of capital formation. Studies have emphasized 
the importance of demographic transitions (Jain, 2005,4),specifically the 
demographic transition given rise to a cycle in population growth and the 
age structure, economic growth is not linked to population growth as such 
but rather to the changing age structure of the population (Cordesman, 
2003,13). 
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Map 6.1: SAUDI ARABIA POPULATION 
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Until the mid-twentieth century the territories that today comprise Saudi 
Arabia, were sparsely populated, with coastal settlement and small 
trading towns in the interior and some agricultural settlements - such as 
the Hofuf oasis of Al-Hasa-in the east and the mountainous region of Asir 
in the South-West. Before oil the entire population of the area was less 
than one million; by 2000 (Dietl, 2006, 34), though still sparsely 
populated, Saudi Arabia had one of the highest rates of population 
increase in the world. The population of Saudi Arabia has been rising 
since the 1960s at the highest rate in the Islamic world apart from that of 
neighboring Yemen. The population numbered over twenty-two million, 
and demographers estimate that by 2020 it will exceed 33.4 million. 
Almost three quarters in Saudi Arabian nationals are under thirty years of 
age and over 57 percent under the age of twenty (Jain, 2005,7). 
Table-6.1: POPULATION OF SAUDI ARABIA 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9 
10 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Population of 
Saudi 
643944 
7894779 
9566040 
11426440 
13163436 
14925536 
16854157 
17270181 
17691336 
18115550 
Population of 
Non-Saudi 
861165 
1424862 
2331019 
3760866 
4972161 
5548087 
6264837 
6408668 
6551242 
6991723 
Total 
Population 
105109 
9319641 
11897059 
15187306 
18135597 
20473623 
23118949 
2367889 
24242578 
25107273 
Sources:- Central Department of Statistics and Information, Ministry of Economy and Planning. 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency Forty Fifth Annual Report 2009 Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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The fertility rate remains high, despite the decline from 6.80 births per 
women in 1990 to 4.4 births per women in 2000. This fertility rate still 
greatly exceeds that the neighboring countries such as Iraq, with 4 births 
per women, Jordan with 4.7 or Bahrain and the UAE with 3.3 births per 
woman (CIA, 3June 2003). Only neighboring Yemen has a higher 
fertility rate, with 6.2 births per woman, and a large indigenous 
population of seventeen million compared to around 16.2 million in Saudi 
Arabia (excluding foreign residents). The kingdom's population is 
nevertheless expected to exceed that of its northern neighbor Iraq by 2010 
(World Info Zone, 2010, 1). Over one-quarter of the Saudi Arabian 
population is accounted for by foreign residents, mostly migrant workers 
from South Asia and the Philippines, the latter accounting from around 
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250,000 annual arrivals, while over one million travel between South 
Asia and the Kingdom annually. There are in addition at least 600,000 
workers, in Saudi Arabia from neighboring Yemen and around 400,000 
from Egypt (Ellen, lOctober, 2003). The replacement of foreign nationals 
by local citizens has resulted in a more modest increase in the male 
expatriate population which rose by around 0.4 percent annum during the 
period 1992-1999, with few Saudi Arabian women entering the 
workforce; however the number of expatriate women rose rapidly over 
the same year 3.1 percent annum (CIA, 3 June, 2010). 
Table-6.2: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE CHILDREN 
BORNAVOMEN 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
3. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Total Fertility Children 
Bom/Women 
6.80 
6.70 
6.70 
6.70 
6.70 
6.70 
6.48 
6.41 
3.38 
6.34 
6.31 
6.25 
6.21 
6.15 
5.64 
4.4 
4.0 
Sources:-CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
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TabIe-6.3: BIRTH RATE 1000 PER YEAR 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Year 
1990-1994 
1995-1999 
2000-2004 
2005-2009 
Birth Rate 
(AVERAGE) 
38.2 
37.99 
32.63 
29.01 
Sources:-CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia 
htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-worldfactbook/sa-html 
228 
Chapter - VI 
^r 
^ -
Birth Rate (Average) 
^-^ 29.01 38.20 "~--
^^ipHHIf ^^^A 
'~~~'~~~-. ^ 
01990-94 
• 1995-99 
D 2000-04 
D 2005-09 
As in other developing countries, in Saudi Arabia large families were 
largely a reflection of high infant mortality rates as parents had many 
children in order to ensure that at least some survived (Fazili, 1997, 27). 
With greatly improved health provision there has been a substantial 
declined infant mortality rates in the Kingdom, from 70 per 1000 per 
annum in 1990 to 13 per 1000 in 2006 much lower than in neighboring 
countries such as Iraq, where infant mortality exceeds 100 per 1000 live 
births. The trend in Saudi Arabia is similar to the UAE, where the infant 
mortality rate has fallen to eight per thousand live births comparable with 
that of the healthiest countries in the world (CIA, 3 June, 2010). 
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Table-6.4: INFANT MORALITY RATE 1000 PER YEAR 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
INFANT 
MORTALITY RATE 
70 
71 
60 
50 
59 
52.1 
48.9 
43.9 
41.34 
38.8 
52.9 
51.25 
49.59 
47.94 
13.24 
13.24 
12.81 
12.41 
11.94 
11.54 
Sources;-CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
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Empirical evidence suggests there is a demographic transition in most 
countries, with declines in birth rates lagging behind falls in infant 
mortality rates (Ellen, 1 October, 2002). It is during this period of 
demographic transition that population increase most rapidly before the 
rate of growth declines and the population eventually stabilizes (Dietle, 
2006, 47). Saudi Arabia has been going through this period of transition 
since the 1970s, and it may last until 2020 or beyond one consequence 
has been an enormous increase the in numbers in education (M.H.Syed, 
2007,214-218). 
Saudi Arabia's population in the past grew at the rate of 3.88% per 
annum during the 1990-94, 3.62% during the period of 1995-99, 3.7% 
during the period 2000-04 and 2.09% during the period of 2004-09. (CIA, 
3June, 2010)"Demographic shifts towards a lower birth rate are common 
in developing states, particularly as urbanization increase, women enter 
the labor forces and economic pressure leads to smaller families. So far, 
however the impact of such shifts on Saudi Arabia has been limited 
(M.H.Syed, 2007,214-218). 
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Table-6.5: POPULATION GROWTH RATE OF SAUDI ARABIA 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Year 
1990-94 
1995-99 
2000-04 
2004-09 
Population Growth rate 
3.88% 
3.62% 
3.7% 
2.09% 
CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
Population Growth Rate (%) 
01990-94 •1995-99 02000-04 02004-09 
The peculiarity of 'demographic transition' taking place in Saudi Arabia 
which is characterized by the high birth rate and low death rate is also 
reflected in the age structure of the Saudi Arabia population. Rapid 
population growth and youthful profit of Saudi population have serious 
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implication for not only economic development but also for the Saudi 
labor market and the social sector (education, health, social security and 
allied subjects) (Cordesman, 2003 17). Besides housing education and 
health the kingdom must spend more on infrastructure transport, water 
sewers and power. It has also to address the question of direct and 
indirect subsidies in social security, food stuff, electricity and agricultural 
problems (Held, 2000, 264). 
Table-6.6: POPULATION DEATH RATE 1000 PER YEAR 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Year 
1990-1994 
1995-1999 
2000-2004 
2005-2009 
Death Birth Rate 
6.2 
5.2 
5.2 
2.5 
CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
/ 
'v5.20 
Death Rate (Average) 
2.50 6.20 ^^-
5.20 , _ ^ « ^ ^ 
N D1990-94 
• 1995-99 
D 2000-04 
02005-09 
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"Existing population momentum will place massive pressure on the Saudi 
budget and suitable infrastructure and services will probably require 
better sources of revenues, such as a real income tax, reductions in 
entitlements, and prices much closer to market levels. Saudi Arabia 
simply cannot afford a patriarchal solution to its youth explosion or 
cumulative under-funding of key services and infrastructure (Molouk, 28 
March, 2003, 4). 
TabIe-6.7: LIFE EXPECTANCY RATE MALE 1000 PER YEAR 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Life Expectancy Male Per 
Year 
64 
65 
65 
66.25 
66.5 
66.79 
67.72 
70.03 
68.67 
66.11 
66.4 
66.7 
50.1 
73.05 
73.46 
73.66 
CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
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Table-6.8: LIFE EXPECTANCY RATE OF FEMALE 1000 PER 
YEAR 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
LIFE EXPECTANCY OF 
FEMALE 
67 
68 
66 
66.2 
66.5 
70.3 
71.4 
71.86 
71.96 
72.52 
69.85 
69.51 
70.2 
45.67 
78.2 
77.55 
77.78 
CIA THE World Factbook- Saudi Arabia htt/ciagovlibrary/publication/the-
worldfactbook/sa-html 
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Rapidly expanding and young population profile poses a major challenge 
to the existing socio-political set up in Saudi Arabia. Bom in the era of 
information revolution, this segment of Saudi population is increasingly 
educated, urbanized and modem in its outlook. It will not easily be 
"contained", by Saudi patriarchy and by state. As such the Saudi society 
suffers from crises rising expectations which cannot be met by 
authoritarian Saudi regime (Wilson, 2004, 32). 
HEALTH SERVICES 
Saudi Arabia is ranked sixth in the West Asian and North African 
countries in health care facilities. Life expectancy is among the highest in 
the region, but spending on health is low, and there are many 
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insufficiencies in the system, well exemplified with a rather high child 
mortality rate at almost 22 percent per 1000 (Wilson, 2004, 52). 
A 2007 World Health Organization report estimates that 61% of the 
health force is expatriates, and there are problems with a rapid turnover 
(Wilson, 2004, 52). 
Medical care is free for all citizens, but health facilities in rural areas are 
limited. Administration is divided between several agencies. The main 
functions are operated by the Ministry of Health; Saudi military operates 
many institutions, while other agencies provide services, like the Ministry 
of Education which provides health care for students. In addition, there 
are many private institutions (Fazili, 1997,36). 
Over recent decades health conditions have improved significantly, and 
many diseases are heavily reduced. Rather there has been an increase in 
non-communicable diseases, in particular cardiovascular disease and 
diabetes. The government gives the health sector high priority in order to 
provide in all Saudi citizens with free, high standard healthcare 
(Fazili,1997,37). 
In 2006, there were 220 hospitals, both general and specialist, around the 
country, cooperating with, and l,925health centers. The private sectors 
provide about 15 percent of the total number of hospitals beds, but have a 
higher turnaround of patients than government hospital. Programmers 
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have been launched to provide family practitioner services at the primary 
health care level. 
Table-6.9: NUMBER OF HOSPITALS AND BEDS 
S,No. 
] . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
19985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
J 999-2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Ministry of Health 
Hospitals 
298 
324 
329 
344 
348 
362 
374 
378 
387 
409 
Beds 
49764 
52233 
52701 
53852 
53615 
54486 
55568 
56004 
56638 
58551 
Private Sector 
Hospitals 
84 
116 
130 
147 
146 
159 
176 
185 
202 
216 
Beds 
9493 
12401 
13360 
14465 
13208 
15061 
17257 
17597 
19578 
21028 
Total 
Hospitals 
382 
440 
459 
491 
533 
599 
628 
641 
664 
704 
Beds 
71917 
71803 
80127 
82940 
83743 
87311 
91203 
92541 
95296 
99172 
Sources:- Ministry of Health Total-Including the other Government Agencies SAUDI 
ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports Year 2007 page 467 Table(13) 
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The total number of hospitals managed by the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
at the end of 1990 was 162 with a total of 25,902 beds and in 2006 the 
number hospital was 213 with a total of 30137 beds (SAMA, 2000, 64). 
The number of hospital run by government agencies other than the 
ministry of Health was 409 in 2003-04, with a capacity of 58551 beds. 
The number of private health care center rose from 4924 in 1985-86 to 
22335in 2003-04 (SAMA,2005,121). 
The size of labor force in the health care sector grew rapidly during the 
fifth development plan period as to commensurate with the overall 
expansion of health services, the total number of physicians increased by 
62.2 percent from 29,761 in 1990 to 78587 in 2006. (SAMA, 2009, 238) 
A policy of free medical services and treatment for all citizens was first 
introduced in the reign of King Faisal. In pursuance of this aim there has 
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been a major acceleration in facilities for both curative and preventative 
medicine. Better standards of health individual are more able to 
participate in the community and in social interaction (Cordesman, 2003, 
20). 
Table-6.10: ALLIED HEALTH PERSONNEL 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Ministry of Health 
24306 
29138 
32712 
35723 
39298 
40381 
42803 
45328 
36980 
41692 
Other Government 
Agencies 
8500 
12460 
14041 
14465 
18155 
19316 
20959 
20589 
21964 
25165 
Private Sector 
4924 
6305 
7515 
9972 
7761 
10553 
16701 
13024 
19819 
22335 
Total 
37730 
48440 
54260 
60160 
65214 
70250 
80463 
78941 
78763 
89192 
Sources:- Ministry of Health. SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports Year 
2007 page 467 Table( 13) 
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Since the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia has made an all round progress in the 
tield of public health. During the past three decades extensive and state of 
the art public health infrastructure has been set up in place. Much of this 
was already achieved by the early 1990s. Various indicators relating to 
public health clearly reflect this point. Thus by 1990 almost 90% of the 
Saudi population has access to improved water sources (Jain, 2005,19). 
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Table-6.1I: NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS AND NURSING STAFF 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-
2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Ministry of Health 
Physicians 
21685 
24557 
27041 
28454 
30601 
29983 
29193 
29920 
32422 
36069 
Nursing 
26010 
54338 
59923 
65712 
70906 
69386 
72441 
73621 
72707 
78066 
Other Government 
Agencies 
Physicians 
7229 
8512 
9497 
9797 
12715 
13602 
13744 
14787 
15001 
16474 
Nursing 
16932 
18455 
20899 
23907 
31156 
32126 
34000 
34876 
34919 
37234 
Private Sector 
Physicians 
7145 
9322 
11248 
14792 
16217 
17503 
18846 
18498 
18757 
25027 
Nursing 
11149 
15913 
17187 
21539 
19920 
21388 
23875 
25872 
26363 
31376 
Total 
Physicians 
36059 
42391 
47786 
53043 
59533 
30958 
61783 
63205 
66180 
77570 
Nursing 
78595 
89803 
98009 
118336 
121950 
123200 
130316 
134369 
133989 
146676 
Sources:- Ministry of Health. SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports Year 
2007page468Table(l4) 
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LABOUR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Three decades ago, the Saudi labor force was characterized by high 
ilHteracy and the near absence of quahfied manpower. With the lack of 
basic resources that could give rise to agricultural or industrial 
development the majority of Saudi's were not involved in productive 
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activities that would normally generate a trained labor force (MEED, 11 
October, 2002, 224). Although oil had already dominated the economy, it 
did not become significant until the late 1960s. Moreover, being a highly 
capital intensive industry, even oil did not contribute significantly to the 
formation of an industrial labor force. But the rise of oil revenues in the 
early 1970s has made it possible for the government to set up 
development plans aimed at diversifying the economic structure 
developing the industrial base reducing dependence on oil exports 
earning (Well, 1976, 26). The real dilemma that Saudi Arabia will 
continue to face is its desire to achieve a high rate of economic growth 
while, at the same time, avoiding the social cost associated with rising 
unemployment among nationals (UNDP, 2003, 11-13). During the period 
"Between" 1990-2006, the total labor force of Saudi Arabia increased 
5592854 to 6384403 (SAMA, 2007,119). 
During the 1970 and 1980s the government rather insulated Saudi labor 
from competing with the foreign labor through expanding public sector 
jobs and widening the subsidy programs'. Two significant results have 
emerged (1) A drastic drop in the participation of the Saudi labor force in 
private productive economic sector and a phenomenal growth in public 
service job, and (2) the creation of a dual labor mark one for Saudi 
workers and the other for foreign workers, polices by the government to 
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regulate conditions under which foreign workers (Sallahuldeen, 15 
August, 2003, 11). 
Since the mid 1970s the labor market started to be segmented into Saudi 
and non-Saudi sub-markets with wages each sub-market being 
determined by different dynamics and by different institutions 
(Knauershase, May, 1976,11). 
Unemployment 
Much attention has been focused on the problem of unemployment in 
Saudi Arabia, not least because this is believed to be a factor fuelling 
social discontent among the young and encouraging a minority towards 
support for militant extremism (Bosbait, Wilson, july2005, 542). 
The Saudi Arabia budget allocates more funds to education many and the 
vast majority of young people benefiting from secondary education, many 
seem ill equipped for the job market. Many Saudis appear to enter higher 
education because they get modest scholarship from the government as 
students, rather than because they are motivated by their courses or regard 
them as relevant to subsequent possible employment (Well, 1976, 30). 
However, the unemployment rate in Saudi Arabia has been increasing 
since 1999 accounting to almost 12.2% in 2006, compared with 8.10% in 
1999 (SAMA,2000, 96). The main factor is that each year substantial 
number of Saudi males is entering the job-markets. Moreover, Saudi 
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Arabia's education system is also responsible for this growing rate of 
unemployment, specialized training centers are still lacking in the 
country. As a result trained or specialize personnel are still in shortage 
(Bosbait, Wilson, 2005, 544). 
As there is no unemployment's benefits in Saudi Arabia the number of 
unemployed cannot be estimated by counting benefit claimants. The data 
that exists in form survey but as there all have different remits in terms of 
how the question on unemployment are posed and geographical scope 
(Tash, 2002, 16), it is not surprising that estimates vary considerably. 
What is more certain from demographic data is that each year since 2000 
over 150,000 additional Saudi males were potential entrants to the labor 
market, and that these numbers will exceed 250,000 by 2012, but that is 
not imply that all these male school and university levels were actively 
seeking jobs (Bosbait, Wilson 2005, 544). 
With virtually unlimited supply of foreign labor the private sector was 
able to expand without being constrained by the limitation of local labor 
force addition such expansion was achieved while benefiting from the 
low-level wages of foreign workers (Wilson, 1995, 52). Consequently the 
free labor impact policy created a wage structure that reflected the 
flexibility of importing different skills and not the extent of searching 
domestically (Al-Awadh, 2002, 45). The relative scarcities of local labor 
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skills did not affect the wage structure since demand for all needed still 
could be met through imports with the average wage remaining relatively 
low under the pressure of an inflow of foreign workers, forces, to attract 
Saudi Labor to the private sector have been neutralized (Yamani, 
2000,186). Regardless of skill Saudi labor trended to flow into less 
competitive activities, especially those which were directly or indirectly 
controlled by government (Khan, 2001, 76). 
TabIe-6.12: LABOUR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Total labour 
force* (on-the-
job) 
5592854 
5713345 
5808615 
5913009 
5875041 
5411795 
6145564 
6384403 
Unemployment Rate percentage 
Saudi** 
8.10 
8.15 
8.34 
9.66 
10.35 
10.97 
11.52 
12.02 
Non-Saudi** 
0.84 
1.11 
0.93 
0.79 
0.79 
0.80 
.80 
080. 
Total** 
4.35 
4.57 
4.62 
5.27 
5.56 
5.82 
6.05 
6.25 
*The Source of 2003,2004,2005, and 2006 Data is The Ministry of Labour and 
Ministry of Civil Services. 
••Unemployment Rate For The Year 2003,2004 and 2005 are Estimates Sources 
Central Department of Statistic And Information Ministry of Economy of Planning 
Sources:- of SAMA (Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency) Annual Report 43 Year 2008, 
p. No. 390. 
247 
Chapter - VI 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 
14 
12 
10 
® R 
I 6 
§ 4 
Q. ^ 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Year 
•Saudi -•—Non-Saudi Total 
Total Labour Force on the Job 
5411795 
6145564 
6384403 
5713345 
ni999 12000 D2001 D2002 12003 02004 12005 02006 
248 
Chapter - VI 
STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
The largest sources of employment in Saudi Arabia are construction, 
retail trade and finance and real estate. Although over one million 
workers are employed in construction and a further million in retail trade, 
most construction employment involves housing and commercial projects 
for the private sector, as the major infrastructure schemes funded by the 
government have been undertaken at a slower pace in recent years 
reflecting constraints on the state budget (Bosbait, Wilson, 2005, 555). 
For the workers housing and commercial projects large numbers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers are required, most coming from the 
Indian subcontinent. They are paid relatively modest wages for the long 
hours they work, but this keeps construction costs low and results in 
building work being considerably cheaper to carry out in Saudi Arabia 
than the western countries (Arab News, 10 May, 2002, 14). Few Saudi 
Arabian nationals even the unemployed - are interested in jobs in the 
construction industry (Cordasman, 2003, 302). 
The Ministry of Planning projection in the Seventh Development Plan 
indicate the extent to which the private sector will be expected to account 
for the major job-creation efforts during the period leading up to 2020 
(UNDP,llNov, 2003,17). The demand for labor by the private sector is 
expected to grow by a further 50 percent within this period with the 
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number of non-Saudi Arabians employed expected to decline by over 
one-third. If the target of employing over 8.2 million local nationals in the 
private sector is to be achieved by 2020 it will require both a huge 
training effort and the ability of business to maintain and enhance 
competitive while restricting their workforce completely (Bosbait, 
Wilson, 2005, 545). The experience of the local national's show what can 
be achieved, but it will require a change of business culture and employer 
attitudes toward local nationals (Sallahudeen, 15 August, 2003, 23). 
Table-6.13: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE GOVERNMENT 
SECTORS (SAUDI AND NON-SAUDI)* 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Year 
1970-75 
196-80 
1981-86 
1987-92 
1993-98 
1999-04 
Number of Employment in Government sector 
Saudi's 
Male Employee 
729886 
987819 
1733384 
2374068 
2598535 
2652235 
Non-Saudi's 
Male Employee 
180447 
361729 
728001 
304546 
1719945 
259296 
Total 
910333 
1349548 
2461386 
2678614 
4318486 
291159 
*The Statistics Include Men Working Under The Following Ladders:- (Public Ladder 
of Employees, Salaries Ladder of Health Jobs Ladder of Educational Job, Ladder of 
Teaching Staff and Teaching Assistance, Judge, Ladder of Investigation Staff and 
Public Prosecutors and Ladder of Wage, Earners 
Sources:- Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Report 43 year 2008 P. 
391 
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EDUCATION IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The current educational structure in the country is not too dissimilar from 
that of many western countries, with the exception that boys and girls are 
taught separately (Iqbal, 1982, 111). Education in Saudi Arabia is divided 
into three separately administered systems: general education for boys, 
education for girls and traditional Islamic education (for boys). Both 
sexes follow the same curriculum and take the same annual examinations. 
Public education, at both the university and secondary school level, has 
never been fully separated from its Islamic roots. The education policy of 
Saudi Arabia included among its objectives the promotion of the belief in 
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the one God's Islam as the way of hfe, and Muhammad (PBUH) as Gods 
Messenger." The establishment of secular western-oriented schools after 
World War II broke with the traditional Islamic system of education. 
However, a large part of the new curriculum is devoted to religion, in 
particular, the memorization of the Quran, interpretation and 
understanding of the Quran (Tafsir) and the application of Islamic 
tradition to everyday life are stressed. Religion is also studied at the 
university level alongside other subjects, and is compulsory for all 
students (M.H.Syed, 2007,240). 
Saudi Arabia tries, through its plans and programs to make Education for 
All a realistic practical dimension for its education policy in its general 
guide lines. The state policies in this field are based on a stable 
ideological belief that establishes education as an obligation for every 
individual (Haidar, 2003, 12). 
Education in Saudi Arabia is controlled by four main organizations: 
(1) The Ministry of Education 
(2) The General Presidency for Girl's Education 
(3) The Ministry of Higher Education 
(4) The Public Institution for Technical Education and Vocational 
Training. 
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Public education in Saudi Arabia is composed of three stages that 
constitute the flow chart in addition to the kindergarten stage. Flow chart 
allows passing from one stage to another in a natural graduation 
corresponding to the students', physical and psychological characteristics 
in their different growing stages (MEED, 21 June, 2002). The public 
education flow chart starts with the primary education stage that 
represents the basis of the education Pyramid. It covers six years starting 
from six year old children and can accept a three-month margin for new 
entrants if they have made preliminary education. The students who 
succeed at the end of the six year period gets a "primary education 
certificate" that allows him or her to continue in the intermediate stage. 
Intermediate schooling begins at age twelve and lasts for three years 
(Bosbait, Wilson, July, 2005, 533). The flow chart ends with the 
secondary stage that is at the summit of the public education chart. 
Secondary stage hosts from age fifteen to eighteen and is geared toward 
either the arts and sciences or vocational training. This stage provides 
more specialized studies and more general culture as well as a preparation 
for entering universities. In the secondary stage, courses are varied in 
accordance with the pupil's psychological and mental maturity. Nearly all 
children attend school until they are twelve years old, but many do not 
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continue beyond that Public education from prescliool through university 
is free to all citizens (M.H. Syed, 2007, 247). 
Most Saudi Arabian schools are run by the government, which also 
provides schools for children and adults who are blind, deaf, or physically 
or mentally challenged. Administratively two organizations oversee most 
education institutions in the kingdom. The Ministry of Education 
supervised the education of boys, special education programs for the 
handicapped, adult education, and junior colleges for men. Girl's 
education was administered by the Directorate General of Girl's 
Education, working in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education. 
Currently Saudi Arabia has 28 universities 24000 schools and Ministry of 
Education which was established in 1954 controls the following types of 
education for boys (M.H. Syed, 2007,464) 
• Public education (primary, intermediate and secondary). 
• Teacher's training 
• Special education 
• Adult education and literacy campaign 
The General Presidency for Girl's Education, established in 1960-AD, 
was responsible for girl's education in Saudi Arabia. They are allowed to 
obtain services, knowledge and skills in order to become active members 
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of the society and manage all the following types and stages of education 
for girls (M.H.Syed, 2007, 465) 
• Pre-primary education (kindergarten) 
• Public education (primary, intermediate, secondary) 
• Female teachers training in all its levels 
• Education faculties 
• Female adult education 
• Vocational education and training 
• The Quran Teaching 
It also supervises private education for girls. 
The Saudi government in 1980 all the training centers and institutes 
attached to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as well as the 
technical institutes of the Ministry of Education were merged in one 
institution "the general institution for technical education and vocational 
training." The purpose was to develop technical education and vocational 
training and to create work force for industry, agriculture and other 
developmental programmes (SAMA, 1982, 186). 
The Ministry of Higher Education was established in 1975 with the 
objectives to establish new institutes of higher education throughout the 
country and expand existing ones. The Ministry of Higher Education 
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embarked on a long-term master plan to enable the Saudi educational 
system to provide the highly trained manpower for the country's various 
developmental programs launched by the government after 1970s. 
Currently Saudi Arabia has 25 major universities and a large number (35) 
of other institutions of higher education. Besides, Saudi government also 
encouraged the private institutes of higher education (Vonbluenguy's, 
22june, 2010). The purpose is to provide undergraduate and postgraduate 
programmes in various disciplines so that Saudi students can obtain 
degree in almost any field within the country and in a special 
circumstances, students should go abroad to pursue specializations. King 
Fahd in 1993, known as main architect of the modem education in Saudi 
Arabia, introduced new provisions for the Higher Education Council and 
the University system to improve efficiency of Saudi Universities in new 
fields. In Saudi Arabia the largest number of students is taking 
undergraduate degrees in Islamic Studies, with engineering, sciences, 
education, the humanities and medicine being ranked the next most 
popular subjects. Women predominate in Islamic studies and education 
while men do so in engineering, science and medicine, and to a lesser 
extent in humanities (Haidar, 2003,12-14). 
By the 2003-04 academic years, there were around 200,000 students at 
Saudi Universities and colleges, a dramatic improvement over the 7000 
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Students enrolled in 1970 (SAMA, 1975,128). Following table explains 
the number of students (Male and Female) enrolled in various universities 
and colleges during the Seventh development plan (2000-2004). 
Enrolment in secondary education increased at an average annual rate of 
well over 10%-^  during 1999-2000, substantially faster than the 
population in the age group. The total number of students enrolled in 
secondary education during the period 2000-2005 were 5.08 million of 
which about more than 50% were girl's students. The annual number of 
graduates increased from 324,423 in 2000 to 505,932 in 2005. The 
average annual rate of increase in higher education was in excess of 15% 
during 2000-2005, although most of this increase tools place in colleges 
and technical schools rather than universities. Similarly enrolment of 
students in Higher Education increased from 375,492 in 2000 to 603767 
in 2005 (SAMA, 2006, 267). The data and statistics show that the 
education sector in Saudi Arabia witnessed overall development in all 
levels of education (M.H. Syed, 2007,244). 
General Education 
The government of Saudi Arabia has always recognized the importance 
of providing educational opportunities to girls as well as boys. Promoting 
the concept of equal educational opportunities for sexes posed a problem 
but that was ameliorated by Islamic insistence on the importance of 
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learning in general and the high status accorded to women within Islamic 
society in particular. General education in the kingdom consists of 
kindergarten, six year of primary school and three years each of 
intermediate and high school. The Ministry of education sets overall 
standards for the country's educational system oversees special education 
for the handicapped. In 2003 the general presidency for Girls education 
was dissolved and its fiinctions taken over by the Ministry. The ministry 
administers the girl's schools and colleges, supervise kindergartens and 
nursery schools and sponsor literacy programs for females. The first 
government school for girls was built in 1964 and by the end of the 1990s 
there were girl's school in every part of the kingdom. Government 
agencies and the private sector provided general education for both boys 
and girls within Saudi Arabia: General presidency for girl's education 
(GPGE), military and security colleges; and some other government 
agencies. Student enrollment at the elementary strategy (ages 6 to 11) 
have increased at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent for males and 4.9 
percent for females over a period of 35 years (from 1970-2005) (SAMA, 
2006,280). 
After elementary education students can attend either high school 
offering programs in both the arts and sciences, or vocational school. 
Student's progress through high school is determined by comprehensive 
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exams conducted twice a year and supervised by ttie ministry of 
education. Table no (6.14) shows the number of primary, intermediate 
and secondary schools exist in Saudi Arabia. 
The dramatic quantitative growth of the educational system since the 
introduction of the first development plan in 1970 has been more than 
matched by an improvement in the quantity of education. One measure of 
this emphasis is that while the number of students in the educational 
system increased six fold between the 1970 and the 1990s the number of 
full time teacher grew more than nine-fold. The kingdom's ratio of 15 
students to every teacher is one of the lowest in the world. The 
government however continues to work to improve education standards. 
Enrollment at intermediate stage (ages 12 to 14) rose at an average rate of 
8 percent for males and 11 percent for females; while at the secondary 
stage (ages 15 to 17), enrollments increased by 5.8 percent for males and 
11.5 percent for females over the same period (SAMA,2009,297). 
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This has been achieved by raising the quality of teacher training 
programs, improving standards of evaluation of students and increasing 
the use of educational technology. One aspect of this is the introduction 
of computer sciences at the secondary level. In 2000, an ambitious school 
computer projects was named after Deputy Prime Minister and 
commander of the National Guard Crown Prince Abdullah. In addition, 
the administration of the educational system has also been enhanced by 
delegating greater authority to the regional boards. Government education 
agencies infrastructure has also expanded considerably since the 
beginning of the first development plan in 1970.From 1970, the number 
of boys school increased from 1889 to 12424, in 2005 the number of 
girls' school increased over the same period from 406 to 12040 (SAMA, 
2006, 280).The relative growth in the number of girls' school also is 
apparently impressive, although it is from a much smaller base. These 
growth rates have been achieved largely in response to specific financial 
allocations to the education sector by government. 
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Higher Education of Enrolled Students 
Entering a new era of rapid development of the country's infrastructure 
and economy in the early 1970s Saudi Arabia devoted special attention to 
fostering higher education. Established in 1975, the Ministry of higher 
education embarked on a long term master plan to enable the Saudi 
Arabia educational systems to provide the highly trained manpower 
necessary to run the country's increasing sophisticated economic 
(Ministry of higher education, 2005,4 ). 
One of the first objectives was to establish new institutes of higher 
education throughout the country and expand existing ones. By 1999 
there were eight major universities and a large number of other 
institutions of higher education. By 2003 there were also several private 
institutes of higher education with more planned. Another objective was 
to establish undergraduates and post-graduates programs in most 
disciplines at Saudi universities and colleges. As a result Saudi students 
can now obtain degree in almost any field with in the country and if 
necessary pursue specializations abroad (AIN-AL-YAqeen, 15December, 
1997). 
Between 1996-2000 the number of students, in higher education 
increased from approximately 124,588 to about 170, 921, a 26.9% 
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increased. Equally dramatic was to increase in the girls students at the 
university level from 113665 to 204571 during the same period, amounts 
44.4% increased (SAMA,2003, 287). In 2005 the total number of 
graduate and post graduate in higher education were enrolled almost 
about 603767, accounting 4.9% percent increased from the preceding 
years. The total number of female students increased from 239, 597, in 
2001, to 350216in 2005, representing 31.5%)percent surge. The male 
student also shows same trend during the period, "Between" 2001-2005 
from 197108 to 25355 (SAMA, 2006, 268), registering 22.2%percent 
growth. This rapid growth in enrolled number of students in higher 
education was due to the goal set by Saudi government in sixth and 
seventh development plans. The establishment and growth of faculties of 
Arts and sciences medicines and technology have been accompanied by 
the growth in religious institute of higher learning. The number of 
students enrolled in religious institutes of higher learning too witnessed 
programs showing tenfold increased from 1996-2005 (M.H.Syed, 2007, 
443-445). 
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Table-6.17: HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLED STUDENTS IN 
INTERMEDIATE DIPLOMA 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
intermediate 
Diploma of Male 
13,832 
14,000 
13,369 
13626 
19,783 
25,492 
46,509 
58,191 
64,974 
67,049 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
intermediate Diploma of 
Female 
15,401 
13,142 
13806 
14,164 
18,469 
20,119 
11,583 
10,791 
14,132 
17,943 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
intermediate in 
Diploma of Both Male 
and Female 
29233 
27,142 
27,175 
27,790 
38,252 
55,611 
58,092 
68,982 
79,106 
84,992 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports 
Year 2007 page 459 Table(5) 
Higher Education Enrolled Students in Intermediate Diploma 
90000 
80000 
^000 
®000 
^000 
^000 
^000 
^000 
10000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Intermediate Diploma of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Intermediate Diploma of Female 
a Higher Education Enrolled Students in Intermediate Diploma of Both Male & Female 
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Table-6.18: HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLED STUDENTS IN 
HIGHER DIPLOMA 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Diploma of Male 
258 
358 
617 
882 
1,041 
1,069 
1,026 
1,255 
1,640 
1,351 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Higher Diploma of 
Female 
67 
228 
234 
230 
539 
337 
259 
145 
321 
319 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Higher Diploma Both 
Male and Female 
325 
586 
851 
1,112 
1,580 
1,406 
1,285 
1,400 
1,961 
1,670 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports 
Year 2007 page 459 Table(5) 
Higher Education Enrolled Students in Higher Diploma 
(A 
2500 
2000 
c 
(0 
o 
o 
•7 
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1000 
500 
0 .XLD jJl^IL, 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Higher Diploma of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Higher Diploma of Female 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Higher Diploma both Male & Female 
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Table-6.19: 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLED STUDENTS IN 
BACHELOR DEGREE 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Bachelor Degree of 
Male 
104,212 
120,210 
125,609 
143,958 
143,925 
153,797 
144,205 
153,946 
164,332 
178,450 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Bachelor Degree of 
Female 
93,486 
105,135 
138,875 
155,498 
180,498 
213,715 
233,233 
291,473 
318,704 
327,482 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
Bachelor Degree Total 
Both Male and Female 
197,698 
225,345 
264,484 
299,456 
324,423 
367,512 
377,438 
445,419 
783,036 
505,932 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual 
Reports Year 2007 page 459 Table(5) 
350000 
300000 
Joooo 
^0000 
flSOOOO 
^boooo 
Joooo 
Higher Education Enrolled Students in Bachelor Degree 
CM njLOLi JllJ J 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Bachelor Degree of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Bachelor Degree of Female 
a Higher Education Enrolled Students in Bachelor Degree of Female 
271 
Chapter - VI 
Table-6.20: HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLED STUDENTS IN 
MASTER 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students 
Master in Male 
3,659 
3,811 
3,877 
4,199 
3,586 
3,587 
3,819 
4,674 
4,922 
5,562 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students 
Master in Female 
1,564 
1,674 
1,934 
2,406 
2.188 
2,418 
2,605 
2,868 
2,914 
3,579 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students 
Master Both Male and 
Female Total 
5,253 
5,485 
5,811 
6,605 
5,774 
6,005 
6,424 
7,542 
7,836 
9,141 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual 
Reports Year 2007 page 459 Table(5) 
(0 
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0) 6000 
5 4000 
(0 
o 2000 
i 0 
Higher Education Enrolled Students in Master 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Master of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Master of Female 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Master of both Male & Female 
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Table-6.21: HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLED STUDENTS IN 
PH.D 
S.No. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students in 
PH.D of Male 
831 
781 
759 
864 
977 
1,107 
960 
1,290 
1,006 
1,139 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students PH.D 
of Female 
460 
386 
417 
552 
462 
707 
601 
711 
79! 
893 
Total Higher Education 
Enrolled Students 
PH.D Male and Female 
1291 
1,167 
1,176 
1,416 
1,439 
1,814 
1,561 
2,001 
1,797 
2,032 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports 
Year 2007 page 459 Table(5) 
2500 
«, 2000 
« 1500 
2 1000 
(0 
500 
Higher Education Enrolled Students in Ph.D. 
W.rilMiJil 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Ph.D. of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students in Ph.D. of Female 
D Higher Education Enrolled Students in Ph.D. of both Male & Female 
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Table-6.22: HIGHER EDUCATION TOTAL ENROLLED STUDENTS BOTH 
MALE AND FEMALE 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1977 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students 
Total Male 
124,588 
140,862 
145,965 
165,605 
170,921 
197,108 
198,699 
219,356 
236,874 
253,551 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students Total 
Female 
113,665 
123,227 
157,934 
175,607 
204,571 
239,597 
250,621 
305,988 
336,862 
350,216 
Higher Education 
Enrolled Students Both 
Male and Female 
238,253 
264,089 
303,899 
341,212 
375,492 
436,705 
449,320 
525,344 
573,736 
603,767 
Sources:- Ministry of Higher Education SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports 
Year 2007 page 459 Tab)e(5) 
if> 
0) 
w 
Higher Education Total Enrolled Students both Male & 
Female 
700000 
550000 
B 400000 
250000 
100000 Jl JlAJl MAM A 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
n Higher Education Enrolled Students Total of Male 
• Higher Education Enrolled Students Total of Female 
c Higher Education Enrolled Students Teal of both Male & Female 
In 1993 the late king Fahd, who had always been closely associated with 
the development of education in Saudi Arabia ,introduced new provisions 
274 
Chapter - VI 
for the higher education further improving the efficiency of Saudi 
universities by offering programs in new fields encouraging greater 
cooperation among Saudi institutes of higher learning and increasing 
involvement of teaching staff in the operations of facilities (M.H.Syed, 
2007, 446). 
By the 2003 -2004 academic year, there were around 200,000 students at 
Saudi universities and colleges, a dramatic improvement over the 7,000 
student enrolled in 1970 (SAMA, 2005, 264) of that number, more than 
one half are female students, studying at the five universities king Saud, 
king Abdul-Aziz, king Faisal, Imam Muhammad bin Saud and umm al 
Qura. These universities accept both male female students (M.H. Syed, 
2007, 446). 
King Saud University 
The oldest university in country is King Saud University in Riyadh, when 
it first opened in 1957 (Iqbal, 1982,116). 
Islamic university; 
The Islamic university at Medina founded in 1961, serves as a center for 
Islamic student and teaching Islamic culture (Iqbal, 1982, 116). 
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 
The King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals are founded in 
Dhahran in the Eastern Province in 1963 (Iqbal, 1982,118). 
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King Abdul Aziz University 
The Eastern province's King Faisal University, with two campuses in 
Dammam and Hufuf, offers a range of programs including medicine 
administrative studies and, architecture and urban planning founded in 
1975 the university is famous for its outstanding agriculture and 
veterinary sciences programs (Iqbal, 1982,128). . 
King Khalid University The most recent of the public universities is king 
Khalid University in Abha, in Asir province, which opened in 1998 with 
five faculties of education Medicine, Islamic law and fundamentals of 
Religion, Arabic and Administrative studies (Iqbal, 1982, 222). 
Table-6.23: HIGHER EDUCATION NUMBER OF TEACHING STAFF 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Professor 
1084 
1122 
1248 
1219 
1300 
1320 
1355 
1413 
1482 
1504 
Associate 
Professor 
1778 
1780 
1932 
1906 
2584 
2134 
2220 
2254 
2339 
2428 
Assistant 
Professor 
4547 
4751 
5189 
5258 
5586 
5977 
6544 
7006 
7895 
8447 
Lecture 
2576 
2884 
2964 
3255 
3607 
4267 
4518 
4977 
5495 
6123 
Lecturer 
2970 
3178 
3585 
3960 
4222 
4595 
4509 
4500 
4605 
4580 
Teaching 
Assistant 
346 
606 
1750 
1395 
2126 
2388 
2772 
3209 
3344 
3755 
Total 
13301 
14371 
16668 
17293 
18925 
20681 
21918 
23359 
25812 
26812 
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Number of Teaching Staff in Higher Education 
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D Lecture 
lAssociate Professor DAssistant Professor 
iLecturer DTeaching Assistant 
The educational policy aims at making education plans and programs 
accessible to all the members of the society and at preparing them for 
participating in building their society and achieving their ambitions 
"Education for All" is an Essential (Iqbal, 1982, 226). . 
Vocational Training of Saudi Arabia 
Generally it was thought that lack of money and physical resources of a 
country in Coal, Iron, Manganese, Gold, Silver, oil and many other 
varieties of mineral wealth were major problems hindering the progress 
of a country. It was not realized that economic development does not 
solely depend on its natural recourses but on the techniques that have 
been evolved and the 'know-how' methods that have been adopted 
through education imparted to the citizens. Educations makes the people 
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conscious of intellectual power and manual skills which they many use 
for the economic betterment of their society. (Iqbal, 1982, 110-114), 
The Kingdom has identified technical and administrative training as an 
essential sector of education to support the country's economic and social 
development graduates of training programs in health care, agriculture 
and teaching and other area are steadily filling positions at industrial, 
agricultural and social institutions throughout the county. The general 
organization for technical educational and vocational training, along with 
Ministry of labor and social affairs operates most of the Kingdom's 
vocational training centers and higher institute as of technical education 
(Aamad, 1999,82). 
The Ministry of education operates vocational and secondary schools and 
several other government agencies run institutes or training centers in 
their particular specialties (SAMA, 1999, 65). 
The vocational training in the Kingdom started in 1970 when four 
vocational training centers were established in Riyadh, Jeddah. Dammam 
and Buraydah. The enrolments in these centers were approximately 760 
and during the first development plan (1970-74) two more centers were 
established in al Jawf and Abha (SAMA, 1973, 82). 
The second development plan endorsed measures to expand and improve 
the vocational training programs through the rapid provision of well 
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equipped training facilities. The recruitments of qualified training staff 
with industrial experience and the institution, to uniform system of skill 
certification throughout the Kingdom (SAMA, 1977, 119). 
The third development plan (1980-85) emphasized much the vocational 
training. It was decided to increase the number of vocational training 
centers.(SAMA,1981,123). The vocational training development in the 
Kingdom has five major operational responsibilities (Ahamad, 1999, 
128). 
1. Vocational Training Centers. 
2. Pre-Vocational training Centers 
3. On-The Job Training programs with private establishment 
4. Programs Evaluation 
5. Purchasing 
Table-6.24: TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Technical 
Colleges 
573 
2290 
5626 
9822 
13862 
14628 
22878 
42470 
63936 
76913 
industrial 
secondary 
Institutes 
8613 
11605 
14190 
16174 
17230 
15861 
17327 
20476 
23480 
24265 
Commercial 
Secondary 
Institutes 
13931 
15735 
14223 
15852 
21330 
20470 
15522 
14088 
15454 
13264 
Agriculture 
Institutes 
435 
792 
807 
1208 
1511 
1660 
1309 
770 
614 
512 
Technical 
Inspectors 
Institutes 
826 
1412 
2039 
2629 
3398 
4029 
4486 
5123 
6158 
5893 
Vocations 
Training 
Center 
17319 
18776 
18995 
18354 
17719 
15740 
21960 
22762 
27179 
25902 
Total 
4141697 
50810 
55880 
64039 
75050 
72388 
83482 
105689 
136821 
149961 
Sources:- General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training. 
SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports Year 2007 page 462 Table(8) 
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Technical Education and Vocational Training (Total 
Number of Students) 
80000 
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Years 
-Technical Colleges -•-Industrial Secondary Institutes 
Commercial Secondary Institutes ^^Agriculture institutes 
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These institutions teach for example, machine, tooling, metalworking, 
electro-mechanics, and auto mechanics, offering young Saudi the 
opportunity to learn skills that are in high demand, and courses 
specifically tailored to meet the needs of unemployed Saudis (Ahamad, 
1999, 128). 
Saudi Arabia, like other developing countries need the following types of 
technical manpower of various productive sectors (Ahamad, 1999, 128). 
These are the important aspects of vocational training. (Ahamad, 
1999,155). 
1. Semi-Skilled 
2. Skilled 
3. Technician 
4. Design Engineer and Researches 
5. Engineer 
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TabIe-6.25: TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
NUMBER OF GRADUATES 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991992 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-02 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Technical 
Colleges 
134 
574 
1069 
2602 
3673 
3825 
3650 
6087 
12094 J 
20710 
Industrial 
secondary 
Institutes 
1903 
2054 
3224 
3794 
4023 
3879 
3055 
4035 
4994 
6713 
Commercial 
Secondary 
Institutes 
3154 
3665 
3805 
3350 
4320 
5205 
4833 
3505 
3667 
4190 
Agriculture 
Institutes 
75 
406 
1876 
223 
269 
400 
397 
240 
123 
174 
Technical 
Inspectors 
Institutes 
232 
174 
561 
576 
814 
1006 
1137 
1305 
1521 
1836 
Vocations 
Training 
Center 
12536 
12023 
12921 
12266 
12258 
10795 
10743 
11185 
13161 
14109 
Total 
18057 
19369 
21792 
22810 
25357 
25110 
23815 
26357 
35560 
48042 
Sources:- General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training. 
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Another important institution, designed to address the country's shortage 
of Administrative personnel is the institute for public administration 
established in Riyadh in 1961 as a semi-independent public agency. The 
institute provides basic as well as in -services training for civil servants, 
carries out research and assists government agencies in administration, 
communication and computer sciences. Today, it has branches in 
Dammam and Jeddah and a special branch in Riyadh for training women. 
It offers students' courses in administration, law, accounting, computer 
sciences, maintain personnel management, secretarial skill and 
management planning (Iqbal, 1982, 118-120). 
Table-6.26: TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
NUMBER OF SCHOOL 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Technical 
Colleges 
2 
8 
12 
12 
12 
12 
21 
24 
37 
52 
Industrial 
secondary 
institutes 
16 
16 
16 
16 
17 
21 
24 
20 
20 
20 
Commercial 
Secondary 
Institutes 
22 
22 
22 
26 
30 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
Agriculture 
Institutes 
2 
2 
2 
3 
6 
7 
8 
8 
7 
6 
Technical 
Inspectors 
Institutes 
6 
6 
6 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Vocations 
Training 
Center 
49 
57 
59 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
63 
68 
Total 
97 
111 
117 
127 
135 
142 
155 
154 
169 
188 
Sources:- General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training. 
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The education system of Saudi Arabia seeks to bestow the legacy of 
Islam and wisdom of the past upon new generations, while training them 
to meet the challenges of the future. King Fahd has always expressed 
Saudi Arabia's commitment to provide the country's youth with 
opportunities to develop their capabilities, whether their interests are 
technical, scientific, or artistic, student today have the chance to pursue 
knowledge in a wide variety of fields, in the most modem educational 
institutions (Iqbal, 1982, 118-120). 
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TabIe-6.27: TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING NUMBER OF TEACHING STAFF 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Year 
1985-86 
1987-88 
1989-90 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1997-98 
1999-
2000 
2001-02 
2003-04 
Technical 
Colleges 
169 
530 
913 
1524 
2047 
2238 
2789 
3255 
4202 
52171 
Industrial 
secondary 
Institutes 
1536 
1595 
1716 
2091 
2306 
2490 
2333 
2315 
2533 
2485 
Commercial 
Secondary 
institutes 
1105 
1046 
995 
1133 
1382 
1324 
1219 
1128 
1102 
982 
Agriculture 
Institutes 
85 
89 
79 
133 
208 
238 
243 
257 
117 
115 
Technical 
Inspectors 
Institutes 
167 
204 
246 
367 
523 
639 
739 
769 
812 
738 
Vocations 
Training 
Center 
2177 
2611 
2458 
2676 
2946 
2956 
2980 
2711 
2922 
3000 
Total 
5239 
6075 
6408 
7924 
9412 
9885 
10302 
10435 
11688 
12591 
Sources: - General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training. 
SAUDI ARABIA Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Reports Year 2007 page 464 
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The vocational and technical education at the secondary level prepares 
the semi-skilled skilled workers and technical On account of low 
enrolment in vocational and technical education there is shortage of 
middle level manpower in the Kingdom. Shortage of manpower has been 
a major constraint for the Kingdom development. It has been realized by 
the Saudi authorities that the success of economic development plans 
relies to a great extent on the availability of an adequate number of 
competent persons for the various jobs from the managerial class to the 
semi-skilled workers in both the public and private sector (Ahamad, 
1999, 226). 
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IMPACT OF SOCIO ECNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
To understand fully the impact of economic change and development it is 
necessary to reflect upon the changes in the Saudi social structure which 
have resulted from sudden wealth and rapid modernization, and to assess 
those traditional element which endure (Yamani, 2003, 192). During 
1970s decade, large scale migration took place from ruler areas to urban 
centers, people change their occupations, acquired more wealth learned 
new tastes and attitudes, educated their children, and moved into new 
homes. High-rise building, modem highway networks, glistening new 
airport, and large scale electrification projects and industrial cities dotted 
or landscape once barren and uninhabitable (Peteson,2002,12). 
The decade following the quadrupling in 1973 of the price of oil 
witnessed unprecedented infrastructural change resulting from plans 
initiated in the late 1960s (Richard, 2003, 164). The First Five Year 
Development plan, inaugurated by King Faisal in 1970, sought to expand 
the economy, improve government services, and invest in the long-term 
objective of developing human resources through education and training, 
but the absence of basic facilities, skilled manpower, and modem 
managerial techniques severely hampered the effort. The sudden surge of 
revenues in 1970s was a mixed blessing, eliminating the planned deficit 
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while simultaneously introducing severe inflation and bottlenecks (Long, 
2002, 86). 
The Second Five Year Plan, announced in 1975, attempted to address the 
problems which had frustrated the previous plan. The plan concentrated 
on four major areas for developments: physical infrastructure, 
hydrocarbon resources, government administration, and stimulation of the 
private sector (Dekmeijian, 2003, 402). To solve the problem of 
manpower, the government spent vast sums of money to expand 
educational facilities at home and send eligible young men abroad for 
advanced degrees (Sau, 2004, 4232). Soon new faces appeared in 1975, 
as recently educated Saudis holding masters degrees and PhDs from 
western universities were promoted to high level government posts. Six 
months after the assassination of king Faisal in March 1975, his 
successor, king Khalid, formed a new cabinet which included a large 
number of highly educated commoners, sought for their presumed 
technical skill and understanding of modem managerial techniques. At 
the same time the government established new agencies to implement the 
goals of the plan, headed by the young technical elite (Long, 2002, 88). 
Two government agencies, the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) 
and the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) provided interest free 
loans to individuals and companies in private sector (Peteson, 2002, 11), 
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enabling Saudi to build homes and establish small commercial or 
industrial ventures, helping to relieve the housing shortage and to 
encourage the growth of an entrepreneurial sector (Fandy, 1999, 211).. 
By 1980 many of the plan's objectives were fulfilled, particularly the 
infrastructural goals. The Third Five Year Plan shifted its focus from 
construction of physical plant to qualitative improvements in maintenance 
of national fixed capital. It also sought to maximize the use of domestic 
has foreign skilled manpower and replace foreign manpower by Saudis 
wherever possible (Fandy, 1999, 211). The Third Five Year Plan (1980-
85) also emphasized improvements in social welfare, continuing efforts to 
upgrade heath care, quality of education, and coping with the problems of 
rapid economic and social change through expansion of social services in 
both the urban and regional areas. In an effort to train members of the 
adult population the government undertook a massive project to built 
technical training institutes throughout the kingdom (Peteson, 2002,12). 
Socio-economic development programmers' launched by the government 
led to the emergence of a different social stratum in Saudi Arabia, A new 
middle class has evolved tremendously during the past 30 years or more, 
and impact of economic change and progress in development has been to 
transform many traditional social relationships and to create new 
expectations and demands (Dekmejian, 2003, 400). This process has been 
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accentuated by shifts in social class and demography. The immense 
industrialization projects at the new cities of Jubail (on the Gulf) and 
Yanbu (on the Red Sea) ftjrther influenced the social fabric of mosaic of 
Saudi Arabia and their perception and has widen their occupational 
horizons. Recent studies have attributed the rise of this new group to 
education, wealth, urban entrepreneurship, technocracy, managerial 
bureaucracy, and of course, the armed services officer crops (Kechichion, 
2003, 115). The so-called new middle class took maximum advantage of 
government-subsidized education and interest free loans. Increasing 
domestic production, especially in agriculture, and greater emphasis on 
the role of the private sector were the focus of the next four five year 
plans, with an added effort since 2000 to reduce dependence on oil 
revenues and to develop human resources, implement privatization policy 
and improve productivity within the government (Quandt, 1981, 96). 
The social impact of this process of development has been enormous, 
despite the traditionally conservative nature of Saudi society and the 
government's conscious efforts to foster economic change while 
simultaneously seeking to avoid social change. Not surprisingly, rising 
standards of living and better health care have resulted in an population 
explosion. An annual population growth rate estimated at 4-5 percent in 
1990 and 2-6 percent in 1999 has resulted in a total population officially 
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estimated at 21.3 million— including 5.7 million expatriates (as of 1999) 
-and projected to rise 33.7 million by 2015 (Subhan, 2003, 346). Some 
50 percent of this population is under 18, and the education pipeline in 
full from end to end. The result is more than 175,000 new secondary 
school graduates each year, most of when are now having great difficulty 
in finding employment. Dissatisfaction and despair today can easily turn 
to bitterness and alienation tomorrow (Peteson, 2002, 350). 
Another important change has been the urbanization of the population. 
The urban proportion of the kingdoms population stood at 85 percent of 
the total in 1999. Riyadh's population, estimated at 30,000 in 1930 and 
300,000 in 1968, stood at 1.2 million in the 1974 census and is presently 
estimated at 3.5 million. Jeddah and the Eastern Province conurbation of 
Dammam and al-Khobar are not far behind. Such demographic shifts 
have grave implications for tribal and regional loyalties or identities for 
relationships within extended families for the manner in which poor 
groups are fonned (Looney, 2004, 81). 
Saudi Arabia middle class exhibits general characteristics similar to other 
middle classes in West Asia, at the nature, composition training 
background and demands of this class will have a significant impact on 
the fiiture duration of Saudi Arabia as a political community (Dawisha, 
2003, 3889). It is safe to assume that the traditionally organic nature of 
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Saudi society and the stable relationships between the monarchy and its 
subjects will be affected by the influence of middle class within the Saudi 
polity (Nadim, 2003, 17). 
West Asian societies have traditionally consisted of a small, powerful, 
and wealthy upper class and a large powerless class of landless un 
educated, and unskilled workers, peasants and nomads. A very small 
middle class of entrepreneurs has usually managed to exist somewhere 
between these two extremes of the social spectrum Saudi Arabia is no 
exception (Sau, 2004,4235). 
The Saudi upper class has always included the royal family, tribal 
Shaikhs, the Ulama the Sharia Judges, and the country's wealtheir 
merchant families. This class has ruled the country, has benefited 
economically from the system and has had a definite interest in 
maintaining the family-controlled and family directed status quo. In the 
modem history of Saudi Arabia, the elite have acted as an extension of 
the house of Saud. It has perceived its legitimacy as an integral part of the 
royal family's Wahhabite directed and tribal supported rule (Kawach, 
2003, 16). The upper class has been traditional in every aspect of its 
behavior in the exercise of power, authority, and influence in the 
adherence to tribal customs; and in its confession, interpretation, and 
defense of the Muslim faith, moreover it has perceived itself as the 
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ordained guardian of the divine order of things in Arabia. Mysticism and 
economic power have combined to keep this class in control for many 
decades. Whatever conflict or tension has existed within the upper class 
over the years has always been over personalities were over the raison 
d'etre or philosophy of the class itself (Fandy, 1999,214). 
The lower class in Saudi Arabia has namely included the majority of the 
nomadic Bedouins, the unskilled workers and the land tenants in rural 
areas. This class has held no political power whatsoever, nor has it 
actively worked toward any social change (HoUen, 1981, 1065). The 
group has not perceived itself as a part of a nation, rather it has 
considered itself a part of much smaller tribal or familial units that are 
economically, politically had socially self-sufficient. In the middle of the 
spectrum, a very small middle class has traditionally existed in the 
country. It has consisted of a sprinkling of small shopkeeper's low-level 
civil servants, clerics and artisans. It has wielded no power or influence, 
nor has it performed any functions which might has linked it to the 
influential stratum of the population (Dekmejian, 2003,401-402). 
Oil revenues and the expanding educational base have combined to create 
a new and diverse stratum of professional, managers, administrators, 
adequately trained teachers, lawyers, army officers, pilots, skilled 
workers, electronic engineers and technicians, planners, corporate 
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managers, and systems analysts. The common characteristics of this class 
.in its occupational foundation it perceived itself and is perceived by 
others in terms of the functions it performs and the unquestioned need for 
these functions in the building of a modem state (Long, 2002,287). 
The new middle class exercise its authority through the immaterial 
positions and other high bureaucratic offices its members hold since no 
political parties exist in Saudi Arabia and since politics still remains the 
prerogative of the royal family through the person of the king, the new 
middle class exercises its influence more in economic policy making than 
in the political sphere constitutional question, indeed all major political 
questions are the affair of the royal family (Alkadiri, 2003, 555). Even 
when a major economic policy is contemplated, the views of expert 
technocrats are solicited and considered, but the final decision rests with 
theking(Hollen, 1981, 10671). 
Another marked characteristic of the new middle class in Saudi Arabia is 
that it includes an increasing number of younger foreign educated (mostly 
western) and well traveled royal princes. These princes are the sons and 
nephews of the Saud brothers and uncles who have ruled Saudi Arabia for 
over a generation, and technically they belong to the royal family or the 
upper class (Dekmejian, 2003, 190). Yet their secular orientation, 
attitudes on modernization perceptions of nation building in the country 
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national consciousness advanced education and technical training have 
made them more attuned to the hopes and aspirations of the new middle 
class. These princesses find themselves in the unique position of being 
able to exercise influence through three channels simultaneously: the 
royal family, the formal bureaucracy, and the new middle class. As a 
special group and unique elite within the new generation of Saudis, this 
group of princess will have a strong impact on the future course of Saudi 
politics (Kechichion, 2003,119). 
The absence of organized political activity in the country, the sparsely 
distributed population and the nature of the country's terrain make it 
almost impossible, at least in the foreseeable fiiture, for any major 
political upheaval or revolution to occur in Saudi Arabia. Any political 
changes or socio-political reforms will be effected by the royal family 
and not necessarily as a result of popular demands (Ochsenwald, 1981, 
1069). 
In sum, the new middle class although numerically small, has succeeded 
in penetrating the higher echelons of the government structure. Positive 
contributions have been made by this class to the process of 
modemizationss in the country, and there is no reason why this 
contribution should not continue (Dawisha, 2003,140). 
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REFORMS MOVEMENT 
The socio-economic transformation of Saudi society lias, no doubt, 
marked the beginning of the period of considerable political tension 
within the Kingdom (Wilson, 2004, 52). The modernization 
programmers' have, indeed, engendered the stability and internal 
security of the regime (Nadwi, 2001,12). 
Emergence of Reformists 
The presence of liberals or reformist in Saudi Arabia is not new 
phenomenon. Their origin and development could be traced back with 
historical development of kingdom (Fuller, 2003, 30). The members of 
liberal group are generally belonging to the new middle/social class that 
emerged gradually with the process of socio-economic transformation of 
Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia they are commonly known as "the liberals" 
while their Islamist opponents labelled them as "secularists". These 
liberals in Saudi Arabia are also commonly designated as reformists who 
have adopted a middle path while pursuing their reform programme 
(Bowen, 2008, 665). Their continuous endeavor for political and socio-
economic reform in democratic fashion gave rise of a new trend in 
domestic Saudi Arabian politics popularly known as the "Liberal Trend". 
Throughout their endeavor they have consciously pursued the demand 
for, political reform and socio-economic development in outside the 
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official Islamist frame work (Ansari, 2003. 12). They are small in number 
but have managed to create a democratic, nationalist and anti-Wahhabi 
political platform by forging alliances with the different components of 
the Saudi intellectual field thereby giving birth to a new constituency 
made up of proponents belonging to the diverse stratum of the society. 
The activists and thinkers of this new constituency advocate reform 
within the existing political structure such as constitutionalism, 
modernization, political participation, human rights for all including 
women and minorities, relaxation of religious control etc. It is interesting 
to note that the members of this liberal constituency enjoy the support and 
sympathy from among the royal family especially of King Abdullah 
(Bling, 1985, 360). They have succeeded in mobilizing the opinion of the 
people in favor of the need of reform. Their ideas and views regarding 
reform got overwhelming support and endorsement from the expanding 
educated sector of Saudi population and enlisted support of the 
government bureaucracy tribal leaders, the intelligentia, businessmen, 
academician, military officers etc. They share an alternative vision of the 
Saudi societal development based on democratic values. This new trend 
of Saudi intellectual framework is considered by some observers as "non-
Islamist current, or "Saudi liberalism. It would be appropriate to discern 
their existence as a separate class or group. The profile of this group is 
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well defined and the common characteristic of this class is its 
occupational foundation. They are considered as the most important 
segment of the society in term of the functions they perform. Their role in 
the building of a modem state is generally appreciated. This nebulous 
group consists of diverse stratum of professional managers, government 
bureaucrat, engineers, planners, military officers, the intelligentia 
academician etc (Raphaell, 2005, 519). 
Due to appreciable huge strides in the field of education level of illiteracy 
has come down in Saudi Arabia. Further socio-economic development 
and modernization programme helped to create the awareness among the 
masses. As a result, social condition in Saudi Arabia has changed and a 
spirit of national consciousness has begun to coalesce. The factors of 
alliance between the royal family and the conservative elements such as 
tribal sheikhs, the Ulamas and the Sharia judges have for the most part 
ceased to exist. And the idea of popular sovereignty has slowly but 
perceptibly started gaining acceptance. There is growing evidence that 
since the tragic events of 11 September 2001 liberal trend in Saudi Arabia 
emerged in greater openers as a new social force that could influence the 
dynamics of Saudi politics. The fierce attack on Saudi Arabia by the 
western media after 11 September 2001 created a nationalist atmosphere 
of unity in the country. These developments in Saudi Arabia and the 
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increasing influence of liberal may present grates challenge to the 
government and politics of Saudi Arabia as well as to royal family 
(Okuhilk, 2004,22). 
Reformist Role During Important Events 
The events of 11 September 2001, the alleged involvement of Saudi 
nationals in the attacks, the US war on Iraq and total support provided by 
Saudi Arabia to the US, have all contributed in creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and political instability in Saudi Arabia. These developments 
marked a new low in Saudi-US bilateral relations and threatened to 
disrupt the foundation of the US-Saudi relations based on "strategic 
partnership". And the strategic alliance that existed for over five decades 
appeared no longer a point of strength (Zuhur, 2005, 26). The stormy 
relationship with the US increased the Saudi sense of insecurity. The 
critics of Saudi Arabia questioned the value and validity of continuing the 
US strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. Moreover the alleged 
involvement of Saudi nationals in the attacks denigrated its image in the 
world, and pushed Saudi Arabia centre-stage, forcing the spot light onto it 
(Bowen, 2008, 116). 
On domestic front Saudi Arabia faced mounting pressure of liberal 
elements for a wide-ranging and comprehensive reform in the existing 
political order. These liberal elements seized the new political climate 
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created after the events of 11 September as an opportunity to pursue their 
agenda of reform. Their aspirations put an already fragile social fabric 
under extra stress in Saudi Arabia. They took the advantage of the new 
political environment prevalent in the Saudi Arabia and have presented 
the most elaborate document, pertaining to reform, entitled "Strategic 
Vision for the Present and the Future 2000" to Crown Prince Abdullah in 
January 2003 (Zuhur, 2005,34). 
In view of the increasing influence of the liberals in the society and the 
growing popular disgust with authoritarian rule, King Abdullah has taken 
steps to relax control over public dialogue and announced the partial 
municipal election. These measures helped liberals to create wider 
consensus on their views and ideas. These developments in Saudi Arabia, 
indeed, show the internal contradiction between conservatives and liberal 
elements. However, liberals are considered as a formidable challenge to 
the government and ruling elites of Saudi Arabia. A close examination of 
the activities of the liberal elements indicate that they emerged and 
played crucial role at times when important development took place in 
the region. Their role and activities were more conspicuous during and 
after following important development such as!2: Rise of Nasserist Pan-
Arabism [1952-1970], occupation of Grand Mosque in 1979, Gulf crisis 
of 1990-1991 and after the involvement of Saudi nationals in the events 
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of 11 September 2001 (Zuhur,2005,10). 
A study of the activities of liberal elements during these developments 
will spell out their growing influence in the sociopolitical evolution of 
Saudi Arabia. It also becomes imperative to examine carefully their 
reformist programmes and its likely impact on kingdom's political 
stability and internal security (Raphaeli, 2005, 519). 
Rise of Pan Arabism 
The phenomenal with which Pan Arabism became the predominant 
radical ideology in the West Asian region in the 1950s resulted in large 
number from Egypt's onslaught against Western colonialism and against 
the establishment of Israel. It was the first populist emerged as a powerful 
force under the leadership of Jamal Abdul Nasser that challenged the 
Saudi Arabia's Islamic ideology in 1950s was the heyday of Nasser rule. 
He captured the attention and imagination not only of the Egyptian 
people but also of the Arab world's (Sheikh, 2003,16). Soon he became a 
leader of the Non-aligned movement and mobilized people all over the 
Arab world in favor of Arab unity. Nasser's concept of Arab socialism 
was taken as threat by the Saudi ruler who was apprehensive of 
revolutionary incursion into his Kingdom. King Saud expressed his 
concern over Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world arid his pro-
Soviet maneuvers (Ansari, 2003, 21). Moreover many Arab considered 
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Egypt as the, headquarter of Arab nationalism due to its geographic, 
social and cultural position. They accepted unequivocally Egypt's 
centrality in the Arab world and its capabilities to head the Arab 
nationalism movement. These prevalent perceptions in the Arab world 
those days caused great concern to the Saudi ruler who considered these 
popular sentiments as threat to the regime (Bling, 1985, 365). 
Soon under Nasser's leadership Arab nationalism became a revolutionary 
movement which resonated among the mass of Arab people. The 
immense upsurge in the popularity of Arab nationalism was bound to 
have impact on other radical movement and parties such as Bath ideology 
and party (Munro, 2000, 36). Both Nasserist and Bathist variants of Pan-
Arabism were strongly secular and modernizing ideologies seeking to 
promote accelerated socio-economic change in the Arab world. The 
primary focus of Arab nationalism in 1950s and 1960s was imperialism 
and imperialist hegemony over the area. In their views Israel was the 
illegitimate offspring of perfidious imperialist conspiracies against the 
Arab world. They castigated both Israel and the west as enemies. Indeed 
the Pan-Arabism current swept the Arab World in 1950s and 1960s a fact 
that attested the popularity of Nasser (Hourani, 1999,454). 
The Saudi, on the other, shared the Arab world's sense of injustice over 
the creation of Israel, but they did not share the secular socialist concept 
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of Pan-Arabism. Saudi Arabia found itself in sharp conflict with the 
revolutionary forces in the Arab world that were responsive to president 
Nasser of Egypt. In the meantime some major developments took place in 
and around Saudi Arabia which threatened the Saudi regime. Among the 
development that challenge the monarchial order in Saudi Arabia were 
the anti-American agitation and the strike by oil workers in the Shia's 
populated eastern province during 1955-1956, the formation of the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 between Egypt and Syria, the Iraqi 
revolution and the overthrow of the Hashemite kingdom in 1958, and the 
civil war of the Yemen [1962-67] (Qaradawi, 1999, 278). There was 
sharp ideological confortation between the conservatives and 
revolutionary regime of Saudi Arabia and Egypt that took military 
dimension in Yemen civil war. Nasser sent troops and provided military 
aid to the new Republicans in Yemen. Saudi Arabia decided to extent 
support the Royalists. Nasser accused the Saudi King of being a 
reactionary (Bowen, 2008, 128). Saudi Arabia accused Nasser of 
interfering in the internal affairs of other Arab nations, The ascendance of 
radical and secular ideologies such as Nasserism and the nationalism of 
the Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq in late 1950s and 1960s created an 
atmosphere for the emergence of reformist faction from within the royal 
family (Cordesman, 2003, 132). The reformist faction of the royal family 
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popularly known as group of "free Prince' led by King's younger brother 
prince Talal Ibn Abd-al-Aziz. They demanded for a constitutional reform 
and a limited form of an elected Parliament. However, their demand for 
political reform was out rightly rejected by the crown Prince Faisal and 
other senior princes of the royal family. To press their demand these 
prince Talal Abd-al-Mushin, Badar, Nawwaf and their followers in 
August 1962 left Saudi Arabia for Egypt in support of the nationalist 
cause of President Nasser. They established at Cairo and openly criticized 
the Saudi regime. The Saudi leadership felt very much on the defensive 
(Qaradawi, 1999,278). 
King Saudi took steps to check the onslaught of the Arab nationalist 
against the traditional monarchies. He established school for women as a 
modernization step and support the views of Saudi intellectual about 
reform. This thus encouraged liberal trend in the country, Crown Prince 
Faisal, on the other, indirectly the liberal trend supporting the Islamic 
traditions. However, influence and impact of reformist elements grew and 
gained in the midst of ongoing political struggles and rivalries within the 
royal family especially between the King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal 
during 1958-1964 (Nadwi, 2001, 14). As a result, Faisal in 1964 replaced 
his brother king Saud as the king of Saudi Arabia. Soon after becoming 
the king in March 1964, Faisal announced his intention to rule the 
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country in accordance with the Islamic traditions. His period witnessed 
the decHne of Nasserism and the rise of Islamism. He revived and 
strengthened the royal family's traditional alliance with the Wahhabis and 
enlisted the support of the country's conservative elements: tribal Sheikhs, 
the Ulama and the Sharia judges, who helped in maintaining domestic 
political stability (Raphaell, 2005, 15). He also established link with the 
Muslim Brotherhood's transnational Islamist movement. Faisal diluted 
the growing influence of the Arab nationalist and socialist by encouraging 
and propagating the Islamist cause. During his regime political parties 
and organizations were equally non-existent and popular participation 
was not tolerated. The growing supremacy of conservative elements 
indeed subdued the liberal trend initiated by the free princess in Saudi 
Arabia (Dekmejian, 1994, 631). The free princess movement could not be 
prolonged rather short-lived and in 1964 these princess returned to the 
royal fold under an offer of clemency. Nevertheless the liberal trend or 
reformist project was short-lived, its powerful symbolic impact was 
strong. The decline of Nasserism and rise of Islamism were the added 
factor in making the reformist agenda of the free princess ineffective 
(Lacroix, 2004,348). 
Seizure of Grand Mosque 
The event of the seizure of Grand Mosque in November 1979 by neo-
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Ikhwan group led by Juhayman Al-Otaybi further strengthened the 
control of conservative and Islamic in routine affairs of Saudi Arabia. The 
event was extremely serious as all the army and security commanders 
were dismissed' and replace by new persons after the crisis (Sheikh, 2003, 
43). There were widespread press reports of fiirther unrest within the 
country. On December 21, 1979 some 20,000 troops had sealed off four 
major oil - producing towns on the eastern coast following demonstration 
by the Shia's Muslim population. Religious programming on the radio 
and television had been intensified and application of Islamic law was 
tightened (Lacroix, 2004, 347). The action {seizure of Grand Mosque} of 
the neo-Ikhwan group enjoyed the support of neo-traditionalist popularly 
known as Salafiyah, who began to appear in the 1970s in tandem with 
other religious opposition in Saudi Arabia. They strongly opposed the 
presence of the western forces in Saudi Arabia and the Islamic world. 
They also regarded the Saudi state as corrupt and unlslamic. Some well 
known figures of Salafiyah opposition group viz. Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Sulayman al-Massari, Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Skeikh Salman al-
Awdah, became famous for their fiery sermons surprisingly delivered in 
Mosque in al-Qasim region of central Arabia during 1980s and 1990s. 
Saudi government took healing step and in order to channel the 
discontent announced the preliminary details of the proposed third five 
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year development plan with an investment of more than $200bn. In the 
proposed plan special emphasis on agriculture, mining and infra-
structural facilities was given (Sheikh, 2003, 10). King Fahd had 
promised a kind of consultative Assembly to provide a venue for the 
expression of social discontent. He initiated modernization programme in 
the country, established schools for women or girls but control of female 
education was placed in the hand of the Ulama through the General 
Presidency for Girl's Education. His pursuit of development was accepted 
by the conservatives and Islamists grudgingly. The appointment of an 
arch-conservatives Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz as Mufti - a position 
signifying the highest religious authority in the country further attested 
the growing control of conservatives in the affairs of Saudi Arabia. They 
infect forced reformist elements to remain inactive until the Kuwait crises 
of 1990-91. Indeed the events of Grand Mosque paved the way for the 
neoconservatives to control the affairs of Saudi Arabia more strongly by 
propagating the Islamist cause (Nadwi, 2001,18). 
The Kuwait War 1990-1991 
The impact of Kuwait war 1990-1991 on Saudi internal security system 
was enormous. The sudden takeover of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces and the 
subsequent war for liberation by the US led coalition forces placed Saudi 
ruling elites in a difficult position on domestic front (Peteson, 2002, 21). 
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The prompt approval of King Fahd for the stationing of the US led 
coalition forces on Saudi soil and logistic support for the execution of 
operation Desert Storm in January 1991 created an uneasy situation in the 
country. Both, the reformist and the neo-traditionalist seized this moment 
as an opportunity to express and assert their view points (Bowen, 2008, 
168). 
The new-traditionalist belonging to the Salafi school of thought, strongly 
opposed the government decision to permit the stationing of the US led 
coalition forces on the "holy soil" of Saudi Arabia. They termed the US 
led coalition forces as "infidel". Even the senior members of the Ulama 
council, under grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, endorsed the 
view of the new-traditionalists by issuing a Fatwa (Long, 2002, 80). The 
reformists [liberals], who maintained low profile after the Grand Mosque 
event, reemerged during the Kuwait crisis. Soon, however,acrinoial war 
of words began between liberals and Islamists {New-traditionalists}, 
Liberals defended the King's decision to permit the stationing of the US 
led coalition forces on Saudi soil. Dr. Ghazi al-Qusaybi, a leading liberal, 
justified the presence of western troops and supported the King's action 
and decision. Islamists, on the other, opposed the presence of western 
forces on Saudi soil and, Nassir al-Umar, a leading Islamists, condemned 
the king's decision. He accused Qusaybi of being both a secularist and an 
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infidel. Qusaybi in a rejoinder rejected Nassir al-Umar's allegations 
systematically and launched a fierce assault on Salafis for showing 
discord [Fitna] at this moment of crisis. He advised and suggested them 
to remain stick to religion and stay out of politics (Dekmeijian, 2003, 
401). 
However, Salafis offensive meanwhile grew tremendously in Saudi 
Arabia during 1991-93. They demanded for the reorganization of Saudi 
society according to Islamic tenets which though would place checks on 
royal authority and strengthen the political position of the Ulama class. 
They also pressed the regime for reorientation of foreign and defense 
policies without the special relationship with the US (Zuhur, 2005,16). 
Clearly, this was a propitious time for the liberals to further their 
reformist agenda. About forty six [46] intellectuals belonging to the 
reformist faction in December 1990, signed a petition for codification of 
Islamic law (Peteson, 2002, 33). They, effect, sought fundamental 
reforms through codification of Islamic law establishment of consultative 
council, basic human rights, women's rights, equality before the law 
regardless of race, gender and social status, and an independent Islamic 
judiciary. Encouraged by the reemergence, of liberals about seventy 
Saudi women in order to express their disliking and defiance against the 
tradition drove their cars through Riyadh. This was a symbolic act by the 
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Saudi women and the aim was to provide support to the liberals demand 
for reform (Zuhur, 2008, 26). 
Caught between these countervailing pressures of liberals and neo-
traditionalists, Saudi government moved to take some measures to defuse 
the situation. It issued a Basic Law of Governance in 1992, and created 
Majlis al-Shura (consultative council) in 1993. The first session of Majlis 
was held in Dec. 1993, which discussed the various issues pertaining to 
the Salafi's challenge and the liberals demand for reform (Bowen, 2008, 
668). Later the Saudi government met the Salafi's challenge by providing 
financial and other incentives and in some cases by adopting selective 
detention of Islamists. The Liberals, however, continued to remain active 
at moderate level and avoided confrontational course (Quandt, 1981, 87). 
They advocated their view point for reform in political structure 
meticulously. They refrained from criticizing the regime and maintained 
the status of being as advisers. They continued to keep pressure on the 
government to adopt the policy of Saudization through modernization of 
the economy (Subhan, 2003,348). 
It is clear from the above discussion that stability in Saudi Arabia seems 
much more precarious. One may say that religion which has been used as 
an instrument of power by the ruling class for many decades is now 
becoming a force of divisive influence instead of cohesion. The impact of 
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development on the local population is creating a more difficult problem. 
The gaps between the different layers of the society are correspondingly 
much winder because of the increasing income disparity between rich and 
poor. It may be concluded that a growing desire is emerging for a fora in 
which to debate national issues, for the creation of some form of 
government accountability, and for restriction on the role and excesses of 
the members of ruling families (Bling, 1985,368). 
Event of World Trade Centre-11 September 2001 
The events of 11 September 2001 and the involvement of Saudi nationals 
in the attack on World Trade Centre (WTC) created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty in domestic political stability (Zuhur, 2005, 5). The kingdom 
was criticized by the US media as the source of terrorism on account of 
its religious orders and its education system that preached extremism and 
produces more ignorant young men and women. Some scholars 
contended that Islam and Saudi Arabia were intrinsic threats to the west. 
The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee blamed that 
Saudi schools were "hate-filled anti American breeding grounds". The 
critics of Saudi Arabia called for a wide-ranging and comprehensive 
reform of the Saudi polity (Cordesman, 2003, 131). The strategic 
relationship that was existed before the September 11 events had been 
threatened and the events marked a new low in Saudi-US relations 
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(Zuhur,2005 10-12). 
The White House in September 2002 released the US National Security 
strategy document generally referred to as "Bush doctrine". The new 
security policy or Bush doctrine document was, in fact, a political agenda 
of the neo-conservatives who hold influential positions in the Bush 
administration, American think tank and the media. In essence emphasis 
of the new security policy was heavily influenced by the neo-
conservative vision and strategy (Nehme, 1994, 923). It strongly 
emphasized for a shift from the traditional US national security policy of 
deterrence and containment to an aggressive unilateral approach based on 
global military supremacy and pre-emptive military strikes. The new 
security policy document outlined the active US role in promoting 
domestic, political, economic, religious and socio-cultural reform to root 
out all manifestations of Islamic extremism and violence and also anti-
Americanism and anti-westemize in West Asia and particularly in Saudi 
Arabia (Zuhur, 2005, 14). It advocated for immediate initiative - towards 
freedom, democracy and free markets in West Asia general and in Saudi 
Arabia particular (Fuller, 2003,45). 
In view of these developments and criticism about the style and way of 
the fiinctioning, the Saudi government decided to take step towards 
greater openness in the society (Nadwi, 2001, 18). It relaxed in control 
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over public discourse in the country. Crown Prince Abdullah initiated 
some well-publicized moves towards internal reform. He set up National 
Forum for Dialogue consisting of moderates belonging to the various 
cross section of the society. Representatives of the Ulama were also 
included into this Forum. National Forum for Dialogue provided a 
venue for the expression of social discontent and debate national issues 
for intellectuals and leading figures from various segments of the society 
(Long, 2002, 64). King Abdullah openly castigated the Ulama for 
encouraging hatred and violence. In a dramatic gesture that got 
considerable national publicity. King Abdullah initiated educational 
reform based on modem education system (Munro, 2000, 38). 
The most important step of the Saudi government after the event of 
September 11, 2001 was the expansion of Consultative Council (Majlis 
al-Shura). The strength of Majlis al-Shura was increased from 90 to 120 
members in 2002. Most of the members appointed was young and 
highly educated who supported the liberal's views and ideas (Bowen, 
2008, 638). Nevertheless, the establishment of Majlis al-Shura is an 
important internal change that has direct implications for Saudi internal 
security policy, it points to the fact that political transition in Saudi 
Arabia has started (Nehme, 1994, 932). It will be wrong to say that 
present political system in Saudi Arabia is authoritarian and tyrannical. 
312 
Chapter - VII 
It is somehow may be placed between liberals and traditionalists. Socio-
economic developments in Saudi Arabia suggest that the respective 
Saudi rulers have promoted developmental porgrammes in such way 
that a workable balance between traditionalists and modernists could be 
maintained for a long (Dawishq, 2003, 388). 
The changing socio-political environment of Saudi Arabia and the King 
Abdullah's genuine concern about reform encouraged the liberal 
elements to take lead in convincing the ruling class about the need of 
reform. In January 2003 about 104 intellectuals, former official, 
prominent businessmen and professors after extensive discussions and 
debate prepared and signed a document entitled "Strategic Vision for the 
present and the Future of the homeland". They submitted this document 
to then Crown Prince Abdullah for perusal and implementation of 
reform programmes outlined in the document. It was prepared and 
drafted with all care to avoid feeling of discontent (Munro, 2000, 41). It 
was rather moderate with an unequivocal pledge of allegiance to the 
royal family or ruling order. It called for a wide-ranging and 
comprehensive reform of the Saudi polity. The vision document 
contained three parts- political, economic and social sections. The first 
part outlined a number of political demands. It emphasized the 
establishment of constitutional institution to guarantee the basic of all 
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citizens—justice, equality, and political participation—regardless of 
their regional, tribal, and. confessional background, creation of elected 
national and provincial or regional consultative councils (Majlis al-
Shura), human rights for all citizens including freedom of speech, 
assembly election and participation, and allow the emergence of civil 
society by permitting the formation of professional, economic, social 
and cultural associations. Keeping in view of the sensitivity of the 
matter, the authors of the vision document explained the political reform 
within a fundamental maxim of Islamic political philosophy (Nadim, 
2003, 24). 
The economic section mentioned the issues as: equal distribution of oil 
wealth, diversification of the economy, cut back on arms purchases, 
allow foreign direct investment, and creation of employment 
opportunities. It also suggested measure against the continuing high 
level of corruption which has become a burning issue at all level of 
society? (Nadim, 2003,24). 
The third part addressed the social issues under different head entitled: 
The Dangers That Threaten National Unity. It dealt with social problems: 
inequality in social structure, question of identity, ending of 
discrimination, improvement of public services, gender relations and role 
of women, who are described as "half of the society" (Nadwi, 2001,21). 
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The text of the vision document explains that the drafting was done with 
utmost care. It is evident from the text that the reformists took every 
measure to avoid the religious discourse in demand. However, they 
considered Sharia as cardinal framework for all the reforms, thus calling 
democratic change within an Islamic discourse (Kawachi, 2003, 19). 
It is important to mention here that most of the signers of reformist group 
belong to both Liberal and Islamic segments of the Saudi ideological 
spectrum. It means there is growing consensus between Liberals and 
Islamists on issues pertaining to national security, political and economic 
reforms. The secular educational foundation and occupational profde of 
the signers proved helpftil for this historic rapprochement (Kawachi, 
2003, 24). 
In response to reformists demand, first time in the country's history, a 
national dialogue conference under the auspices of the then Crown Prince 
Abdullah was held in June 2003. About thirty Ulamas of different 
confessional groups—Salafi and non-Salafi, Sunnis, Sufis, Twelver, and 
Ismaili Shiites—of Saudi Arabia participated to discuss the various issues 
mentioned in the vision document. They endorsed the necessity of 
implementing reforms, freedom of speech and a better distribution of 
wealth. Soon Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia Prince Nayif announced 
the establishment of two separate human rights organisations, one 
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comprising government officials and the other consisting of citizens not 
involved in government administration. The then Crown Prince Abdullah 
in October 2003 announced partial municipal elections to placate the 
onslaught of reformists. These steps of Saudi government may be 
regarded as a part of strategy to make certain that domestic liberal dissent 
did not get out of hand. These developments in Saudi Arabia suggest that 
reformist's movement in Saudi Arabia enjoys wide support from 
different spectrum of the society. It may be stated that strategic vision 
charter is dissent against the official Wahhabi Doctrine. It acknowledges 
the confessional diversity and political transition of Saudi nation. The 
reformist charter may be described as "voice of freedom" of Saudi 
intellectuals, nationalists and socialists'* .^ It will not be wronged to say 
that reformist movement, if not managed effectively, could create 
problem to the internal security political stability of Saudi Arabia in 
future (Filluer, 2003, 44). 
It is important to note that women who were signatories to the two 
petitions those were submitted to the king asking for reforms and 
inclusion of women members in the Shura Council. This suggests dissent 
among women and growing awareness about their right that had been 
sidestepped for decades. Over the last few years, Saudi Arabia has 
permitted women into profession formerly forbidden to them. One may 
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agree that women's Participation in the developmental programmes and 
their active role in decision making bodies is the most important 
requirement of the changing times (Nadwi, 2001, 23). And Saudi Arabia 
is not an exception. Another aspect of the reformist movement which has 
significant bearing on internal dimension of the Saudi security is 
resurgence of Shia minority. They on April 29, 2003 presented a separate 
petition to the Crown Prince Abdullah. They demanded the 
acknowledgement of sectarian diversity, respect for citizen's human 
rights, dignity and, religious and intellectual freedom (Sau, 2004, 4235). 
Impact of Socio-Economic Issues 
Proper and balance socio-economic developments are always consider 
paramount in maintaining the political stability of the state. It ultimately 
contributes in strengthening the internal security of the country. Hence 
the indirect impact of socio-economic development on the internal 
dimensions of security is an inevitable fact. The implications of the low 
rate of growth are manifold (HoUen, 1981, 1066). At present Saudi 
Arabia faces some challenges which centers around three economic 
issues, (a) Restoring and maintaining of economic growth above that of 
the population, (b) job creation to check the growing unemployment rate 
which is 8.2% among Saudis, and (c) Maintaining the peace of economic 
reforms (Alkadiri, 2003, 554). 
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The backbone of Saudi Arabia's economy is oil whicii accounts for 90% 
of export earnings, 75% of state revenues and over 30% of GDP. Oil 
revenues in Saudi Arabia have played key role in the current transition 
from a traditional tribal and feudal economy into a modem industrial 
nation. Oil revenues increased in the 1970s and the beginning of oil boom 
led to a spending spree in Saudi Arabia. She launched its developmental 
programmes through economic planning process which started in 1970. 
Early plans focused on building economic and social infrastructure and 
concentrated on economic diversification (Bowen, 2008, 674). A brief 
survey of economic growth of Saudi Arabia suggests that before the price 
rise of oil its economy was predominantly rural and pre-industrial. 
Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) explains that in 1973 Saudi 
Arabia's GDP was less than $100 bn and per capita income stood at less 
than $2500. However, after oil boom Saudi Arabia's GDP and per capita 
income rose sharply. And according to Economic Intelligence Unit in 
2000 its GDP rose to $170 billion and per capita income touched around 
$10,000 (Looney, 2004,12). 
Despite Saudi Arabia's credible economic progress and modernization, 
many Saudi consider that their government and rulers have failed to 
fulfill the needs demands and wishes of their people. This feeling is 
increasingly strengthened with a belief that the fruits of economic 
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prosperity are not reaching to the needy section of the society. The size of 
economic pie has shrunk considerably due to non-essential priorities, 
financial mismanagement and continuing high level corruption (Richarad, 
2003, 171). The distinction between various social and economic groups, 
of the country, inspite of oil revolution have not changed, rather widened 
resulting income disparity. The rich and privileged section of the society 
prospers because of increased social mobility, education and economic 
opportunities. Contrary to this, many citizens find themselves living 
beyond their means due to low paid Job. These grievances have created 
strains or resentment in the society, and in future may cause friction 
between ruling class and to common citizens (Looney, 2004,12). 
The massive defense spending after the Gulf War and the cost, of paying 
off Kuwait war to the US ~$55 billion, have all reduced the economic 
opportunities in Saudi Arabia (Cordesman, 2003, 26). During the decade 
that followed the Gulf War-I, Saudi Arabia's defense expenditure 
averaged around $20 billion a year. Between 1993 and 2000 Saudi 
Arabia received arms deliveries worth $66 billion. Defense spending of 
Saudi Arabia rose from $23.66billion in 2000 to $27billion in 2001. In 
1997, Saudi Arabia ranked ninth in the world in military expenditures 
($21.19 billion). Despite massive spending on defense, Saudi Arabia has 
failed to meet the challenge of internal and regional disturbance and 
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continue to rely on the American deterrent. Higli defense expenditures 
have indirect impact on health care, education and social sectors of the 
economy and, thus are considered critical threat to welfare state 
(Nimblock, 2007, 36). 
The economic growth in Saudi Arabia is not sufficient to keep pace with 
rise in population. "Between" 1990-2000 Saudi Arabia registered a 
marginal increase in GDP by only 1.5% while population grew at an 
annual rate of2.7% during the same period. This results a sharp decline in 
per capita income from $15600 in 1981 to some $10,000 in 2001, and 
surprisingly the trend still continues. With present high growth rate of 
population, Saudi Arabia may face a critical threat to its scarce resources 
and services. It needs adequate fund for expenditure on such items as 
health care, education, water, electricity etc. Oil glut of the 1980s and 
1990s drastically reduced the oil revenues, creating deficit financing in 
Saudi Arabia. Development projects and social services sector felt the 
impact of reduced earnings. Saudi Arabia domestic public debt shows 
increasing trend which according to the Saudi-American Bank in 2001, 
was estimated $630billion. In 1998 Saudi Arabia created Supreme 
Economic Council to oversee the reforms initiated the sixth (1995-2000) 
and seventh plans (2001-2005). An examination of sector wise 
contribution to GDP shows the marginal role of Agriculture in the 
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economy which estimated as 6.2% of GDP in 2003. It means dependency 
level on imported food items will increase and agricultural production 
seems to have appeared a distant hope. And gun or butter argument is 
increasingly heard in private conversation across a wide spectrum of the 
population (Nimblock, 2007,36). 
The demographic profile of Saudi Arabia presents a severe challenge to 
the internal security. At present Saudi Arabia is facing employment 
problem due to high population growth rate—-2.7% annually. The 
unemployment rate among Saudis is 8.2%) reaching 32%) among younger 
workers. In 2001 the unemployment rate for the Saudi labour force alone 
reached to 15%). This issue may assume critical security threat to the 
present regime in the foreseeable future (Wilson, 2004, 64). 
There is intense pressure on the government that new employment 
opportunities should be for Saudi nationals and quota system must be 
introduced to achieve the goal. To this end greater emphasis has been 
given to the process of Saudization of the workforce, a useftil tool in the 
battle against unemployment. The current guidelines of Majlis Shura, 
too, emphasize the Saudization as a development strategy and suggest 
that 70% of the workforce must be Saudi by 2012. In July 2003, Saudi 
government announced its decision to reduce the number of expatriate 
workforce to 20%o of the total population in a decade. Man Power 
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Council" of Saudi Arabia in February 2003 issued guidelines that the 
number of foreign workers and their families must not exceed 20% of the 
Saudi population by 2013. Despite these efforts Saudization programme 
have met with little success as vacancies continued to exist as unfilled in 
recruitment pool. Needless to say, the education system has largely failed 
to prepare the country's youth for jobs. According to Saudi Arabia 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) report, number of workers at private firms 
stood at 3.1 m, of these, Saudi was 433 thousand representing 14'% of 
the total (Wilson, 2004, 68). 
The emergence of reformist movement in Saudi Arabia, seeking political 
liberalization, represents a significant development towards Saudi 
liberalism and social evolution. It appears that Saudi Arabia is 
confronting with a surge of issues that need attenfion. Long persistence of 
problem may culminate into well organized movement that could 
engender the political stability as well as security of the regime 
(Nimblock, 2006,141). 
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CONCLUSION 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made massive efforts to advance 
Socio-economic development in the past few decades. Oil income has 
allowed a modem physical infrastructure for the country to be 
implemented and a social welfare net to be created for nearly all the 
population. The result has been a dramatic improvement in living 
standards and quality of life for most Saudis. Saudi Arabia has dealt with 
many challenges in the past, having already coped with massive social 
and economic change. In 1973, before the beginning of the oil boom, 
Saudi Arabia was a nation of roughly 6.8 million people. It was largely 
ruler or nomadic and largely preindustrial in character. Although no 
precise figure are available, its population growth rate was probably 
under 2.7% and less than 30% of its population was under fourteen years 
of age. 
The kingdom occupies 80 percent of the Arabian Peninsula. Most of the 
country's boundaries coincide with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Oman, and the Republic of Yemen. Saudi Arabia, a desert country with 
an estimated area of 2,240,000 sq km, sprawls over 80 percent of the 
entire Arabian Peninsula, and less than 1 percent area is suitable for 
cultivation. The desert is the most prominent features of the Arabian 
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Peninsula, although vast, arid tracks dominate Saudi Arabia, the country 
also includes long stretches of arid coastline along the Arabian peninsula 
and the Red Sea and several major oases in the Eastern province. 
Accordingly, the Saudi environment is not uniform, and the differences 
between coastal and desert life have played their part in Arabian history. 
Those living on the water have had more contracts with other people and 
thus have developed more cosmopolitan outlooks than those living in the 
interior. 
Saudi Arabia is the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula. It shares the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts with the Persian Gulf states, Yemen 
Jordan, and Iraq. So there are cultural and historical overlaps with its 
neighbors'. Many of these countries rely on the authority of a single 
family whether the ruler calls himself a king, as in Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, or an Amir, as in the Gulf States. Tribal loyalties also play an 
important role in these countries, and large portions of their populations 
have only recently stopped living as nomads. 
The most profound agent of change for the economy of Saudi Arabia was 
the discovery of huge reserves of oil by a United States company in 1938. 
Initially, the newly established oil industry had only an indirect impact on 
this primitive economy. The establishment of the Arabian American oil 
company (Aramco, Predecessor of Saudi Aramco) and the oil towns 
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around the oil fields triggered major changes in the economy of the 
kingdom, especially in the Eastern provinces. Development of the oil 
fields required ancillary construction of modem ports, roads, housing, 
power plants, and water systems. In addition to the concentration of oil 
employees and the range of services of oil companies and employees 
needs opened new economic opportunities on a scale previously unseen 
to local merchants, contractors, and others. Aramco provided technical, 
financial, and logistical support to local entrepreneurs. The discovery of 
oil ended the kingdom's isolation and introduced new ways to organize 
the production and distribution of goods and services. 
In the Saudi fields, dissolved gas is associated under pressure with the 
crude oil in the reservoir. When the reservoir is penetrated by a 
production well then pressure causes the crude oil mixed with the 
associated gas to rise freely to the surface. In Al Ghawar field, for 
example 15 cubic meters of gas are extracted for every barrel of oil. As 
Saffaniyah field produces 26 cubic meters of gas for every crude oil 
barrel. In numerous gas oil separation plants (GOSPs), the associated gas 
is separated firom the crude oil. In addition, a number of fields containing 
only natural gas have been discovered. In the late 1970s the government 
esfimated total gas reserves, including associated gas, at 2.4 trillion cubic 
meters, or about 3 percent of known world gas deposits. 
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Although the oil and Natural gas industry's creation produced a profound 
impression on the kingdom's economy, economic structural change was 
well under way before oil was discovered. Abd al Aziz Al Saud quest to 
consolidate his family's control over the territories by establishing a 
modem state had begun to transform the traditional economy. One of the 
pivotal policies pursued by the king was sedentarization of the Bedouin, 
largely for political and security reasons. As part of the creation of the 
Ikhwan movement, Abd al Aziz encouraged the establishment of a series 
of agricultural communities, designed to relieve the Bedouin groups 
comprising this unified military force of providing for their livelihoods. 
For thousand of years, the economy of the Saudi Arabia was determined 
by autonomous clusters of people living near wells and oases. Most of the 
population was engaged in agricultural, including nomads who raised 
livestock by moving their animals to the limited forage produced by 
infrequent rains. However, the inability of pastoral nomads to provide for 
their communities solely on the basis of pastoral activities forced them to 
create multiple resource systems. Such systems took the form of 
protection services for merchant caravans and pilgrims, control over 
small oases, and to a lesser extent, direct cultivation. In the settled areas, 
local craftsmen produced a few items needed by those living near or 
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visiting the scattered sources of water. Production was limited to serve 
very small markets and existed essentially on a subsistence level. 
Saudi Arabia's rapid increase in population is causing its natural water 
resources to drop sharply. The World Resources Institute and the World 
Bank estimate that Saudi natural per capita water resources dropped from 
537 cubic meters in 1960 to 156 cubic meters in 1990 and project that 
they will drop to 49 cubic meters 2025. The government has raised water 
prices in recent years, but Saudi Arabia still wastes nearly 90% of its 
natural water on agriculture versus 6% for domestic needs and 2% for 
industry due to government subsidies. Agricultural used a total of 18.3 
billion cubic meters of water in 1999 with about 8 billion cubic meters 
coming from renewable and surface water sources and 0.1 billion cubic 
meters coming from sewage water. The remaining 88% of total 
consumption came from non-renewable groundwater sources. 
Saudi Arabia must depend on an extensive system to desalinization plants 
for its drinking water. The production of such desalinated water increased 
from only 4.4 million gallons per day in 1970 to 491.6 million gallons per 
day in 2000. Saudi water production accounted for 30.2% of all world 
production from such plants in 2000, and the kingdom's growing 
dependence on the plants has made them potentially lucrative military 
targets whose importance will increase with time. 
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The importance of the ratio of total population to oil and gas earning is an 
important as the ratio of total population to GDP/GNP because of the 
special character of the Saudi largely by its earning from oil and gas 
exports. It is easy to call for economic diversification and privatization, 
and the kingdom has made increasingly serious efforts along these lines. 
At the same time, though there are limits to what market forces and any 
economic reform program can hope to accomplish, particularly as long as 
the native labour force is not globally competitive in terms of education, 
skills, work ethic, productivity and cost. 
Saudi Arabia does have iron; gold, zinc and copper resources, and its 
seventh development plan calls for the development of eight projects in 
these areas, but its resource are relatively marginal interms of projected 
Saudi income needs and the world market. Saudi Arabia also has major 
bauxite, magnetite, and phosphates resources and its Seventh 
Development plan calls for one major project in each area including Al-
Jalamid Project at what Saudi Arabia claims is the largest phosphate 
deposit in the world. 
The cost-effectiveness of such mining at competitive returns on 
investment is uncertain however and long needed reforms in mining laws 
have still not been implemented. A new rail system is needed for the cost 
benefits resources, and Saudi estimates of the cost benefits of such 
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mining seem over optimistic. The kingdom has made progress by creating 
the Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden), a state owned 
autonomous joint stock company established in 1997, although it has as 
yet been more exploratory than productive. It continues to review a new 
mining code and created new railroad executive programmes in June 
2002. It will be well over a decade, however, before it is clear whether 
mining can supplement oil and gas production with any major 
macroeconomic benefits. 
The social and economic changes of Saudi Arabia shows just how 
dramatically of the Saudi Arabia economy and national budget were 
altered by the massive rise in the value of Saudi oil exports that followed 
the October war in 1973 and the oil embargo in 1974. The Iraq Iran war 
of 1980-1998, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war in 1990-91 
and, sudden swings in the world oil market since 1995 have also had 
major impacts on the kingdom. 
The situation improved from 1994 and the 1995-1997 periods saw 
deficits of five percent of GDP or less. In fact in 1995 many 
commentators were implying that the kingdom economic woes were over. 
Strong oil prices contributed to the country's economic improvement in 
1996 and 1997, but 2005 saw a return to the precipice of economic 
disaster. Agriculture is already heavily influenced by subsidies and 
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entitlements, and there is little room for added productive diversification. 
Only 2% of Saudi land is arable. Although some pasturage is available in 
56% of Saudi territory, most is desert and of very marginal value. Only 
6% of the Saudi GNP comes from agriculture. Much of these revenues 
come only at the cost of subsidies that distort the Saudi economy and 
increase the kingdom's water problem. Agriculture's share of GNP would 
be much lower of the agricultural sector had operated on competitive 
terms. 
There also are serious near to mid term limits on the potential growth of 
the industrial, trade and service sectors. The growth in Saudi 
manufactures and industry is closely tied to the petroleum sector and the 
value of downstream products. While Saudi estimates that the 
contribution of the petroleum sector market to the GDP dropped from 
56.1% in 1969 and 65.3% in 1974 to 35% to 36% from 1990 to 1999 
these numbers present a mirage of diversification. About 17% to 18% of 
the non-oil sector portion of the GDP actually consists of government 
services financed by oil revenues, and another 6.3% comes from highly 
subsidized agriculture. 
Although a precise estimate of the component part of Saudi GDP is 
impossible, about another 18% comes from services industries 
transportation and activities that are actually dependent on Petroleum 
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related revenues and investment. The manufacturing sector only 
contributes about 5% of the GDP and exhibited no real growth from 1985 
to 1999, with the amount of value added to GDP increasing from 8% in 
1990 to only 10% in 2000. The only major market related activity is 
construction which includes a significant amount of petroleum related 
activity. 
Saudi Arabia is still heavily dependent on petroleum exports, which is 
greater than some Saudi import (Table No. 3.2). The Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) reports that 'mineral products' (oil and gas) 
accounted for 88% of all Saudi exports in 1997 a figures that are typical 
for the late 1970s. These figures, however, understate that true role of oil 
and gas in the economy because they do not include another 2-5% in 
plastics exports and 4-9% in chemical products. As a result petroleum 
actually accounts for something approaching 95%) of all exports. 
Estimates by the Ministry of Planning indicate that crude oil accounted 
for 74.2%) of all exports in 2000, and petroleum products for 17.1% 
bringing the total to 91.3%o. 
All of these factors limit the kingdom's actual "oil wealth". Saudi Arabia 
is only "wealthy" in oil and gas terms to the extent its export revenues 
preserve a high ratio of oil and gas incomes per capita. While no precise 
statistics are available, this ratio seems to have dropped by more than 
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65% between the peak of oil boom in the early 1980s and the worst point 
in the "oil crash" of the value of both the GDP and petroleum production. 
There are data problems in the oil petroleum export earnings that, 
combined with the previous uncertainties in population data, make it 
impossible to provide an accurate picture of oil income per capita; 
however, it is all too clear that the population is rising significantly faster 
than oil revenues. 
The challenge of economic reforms; looks at the key economic dilemmas 
facing the Saudi Arabia state today, set within the context of the 
country's overall political economy. While the economic development of 
the country has proceeded quickly there remain key critical areas where 
some problems remain; the provision of adequate and economically 
productive employment of the population (both male and female), the 
achievement of a reasonable level of equity in the distribution of rewards 
from the economy, the creation of economic structure appropriate for the 
long term (non-oil) viability of the economy, and the creation of a social 
and physical infrastructure adequate for popular needs. Saudi Arabia's is 
a member of the World Trade Organization in 2005 makes urgent the 
resolution of these problems. The need to reform the economy and 
provide productive employment has an urgency which requires a radical 
approach. The reforms undertaken to date suffer from three problems. 
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The first is that they have been implemented slowly and partially. 
Economic reform will become more difficult the longer it is left. Rising 
unemployment and deteriorating social conditions, fed by one of the 
highest rates of population growth in the world (almost 4 percent during 
the 1980s) will intensify political unrest and social disruption in future. 
Second the context of the reforms is inadequate. The wider reforms which 
are needed are in many ways the most difficult, requiring a more far-
reaching social and political transformation than has so far been 
envisaged. Central to the needed reform is the issue of labour and 
employment. Saudi labour must be as productive and cost effective as 
migrant labour. While the problem of unemployment may gain temporary 
redress through the imposition of Saudi labour on unwilling employers 
and this will not create a productive economy for the long term. Saudi 
labour needs to be able to compete with expatriate/migrant manpower, 
such that employees see that economic gain of employing Saudis. The 
balance needs to be re-adjusted on both sides making Saudi labour more 
productive and less expensive to employers, and improving the working 
conditions of migrant labour (and/or imposing taxes on employers of 
migrant labour) thereby making it more expensive. 
Third, a massive redirecdon of government finances is needed so as to 
provide the resources for the Saudi state to re-structure the economy and 
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social structure. In addition to freeing up the regulations and bottlenecks 
which are currently discouraging investment, so as to ensure more 
employment for Saudis, greater equity, better social conditions and a 
viable economy for the long term. The state needs to divert itself of the 
ownership of most of the productive processes, so as both to save/raise 
money and to allow competitive forces to run companies and corporation 
more effectively. The resources (both financial and administrative) freed 
by these measures must be used to improve the country's physical and 
social infrastructure on the basis of improved educational and health 
services, and better welfare provision (such that the impact of making 
Saudis redundant from existing insecure positions can be softened)and 
the productive potential of the population can be released. 
A radical agenda of the kind proposed requires, a new social contract 
between the state and the population. A significant level of trust is 
needed, built on government transparency and a stronger commitment to 
socio-economic equity and greater popular accountability. A clear 
dividing line must be drawn between the state and the private sector, such 
that private sector gain is not dependent on government favor. 
Saudi Arabia socio-economic development must deal with massive 
ongoing social changes, growing demographic problems, and the need to 
fiindamentally restructure and diversify the Saudi economy. It must find 
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new solution to encourage foreign and domestic direct investment. It 
must create a far stronger private sector and one far less dependent on oil 
and gas exports, service industries and imports. It must develop and 
implement a long term energy structure to manage massive changes in the 
production and use of oil and gas and the scale and character of 
downstream operation. 
Saudi must replace its dependence on foreign labour with jobs for Saudis 
and Saudi labour and investment must become more productive and 
globally competitive. The kingdom's socio-economic development must 
absorb a near "explosion of young Saudis and expand its educational 
system infrastructure and job market accordingly. At the same time, it 
must adopt its traditional culture, religious customs, education and 
political structure to maintain its Saudi character and become a modem 
nation. 
The problem of such transitions pose should not be exaggerated. Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated its resilience and adaptability in the past, and it 
seems to be committed to doing so in the future. 
Saudi oil income interact with the certainty of massive population growth 
based on relatively conservative assumption about future Saudi 
population growth, which still shows that the kingdom is projected to 
have some of the fastest population growth in the Arab world, and indeed 
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the entire world. Even though the World Bank projections call for a 
significant future decrease in the Saudi population growth rate, they still 
project that Saudi Arabia will grow from a nation of 21.7 million people 
in 2000 to 46 million in 2030. 
In spite of its past accomplishment, Saudi Arabia faces other challenges 
that will be difficult to meet. Saudi Arabia must deal with the social and 
economic impacts of its explosive population growth at a time when 
much of its oil wealth has diminished in relative terms. 
Saudi Arabia must shape an energy strategy that will maintain its position 
as the world's preeminent oil exporter while developing its gas resources 
and diversifying its economy. 
Many of the kingdom's earnings from its petroleum products and 
downstream operations have been offset by the high investment cost for 
facilities and by the concealed cost of subsidized diversion of crude oil 
and gas to feedstock, Saudi Arabia also faces serious social challenges as 
a result of its rapid social and economic evolution. These challenges 
range from the need to modernize religious practices and the legal system 
to the "culture shock" resulting from placing a highly traditional society 
in continuing contact with a secular west. The most serious of the 
challenges, however, is to create a meaningful future from Saudi youth. 
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In spite of the massive increase in literacy and tlie number of structure 
educated, most of Saudi Arabia's young population is not yet properly 
educated to compete in the modem world economy, and nearly half of its 
labor forces are foreign. 
Recent increase in education spending have done for too little to change 
the character reliant on rate learning without instruction in problem 
solving and creative reasoning provided by low-quality teachers, and 
lacking in standards that ensure a proper level of teacher quality and 
student performance. As a result, Saudi youth will have very uncertain 
prospect of finding real, productive employment unless Saudi Arabia 
radically restructures its education system and economy. The kingdom 
must shifts from an inadequate and traditional education style to one 
capable to supporting a knowledge-based economy in Saudi youth is to 
be able to compare in global terms and support a diversified economy, 
and it cannot do this simply by replacing or supplementing foreign 
teachers with under qualified native Saudi teachers. 
The Saudi labor force is seriously distorted by disguised unemployment 
in a swollen state sector and the overdependence of foreign labor. 
Government employment has increased to the point where it consumes 
40% of Saudi Arabia's labour forces and more than half of its native 
labor force. 
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This combined with reliance on foreign labour, has left native Saudi 
youth without jobs and a work ethic, while declining per capita oil 
revenues mean the kingdom cannot hope to sustain its past pattern of 
disguised unemployment and subsidies. 
During the coming decades, Saudi Arabia not only must invest to create a 
large diverse private sector, but it must make massive new investments to 
maintain its status as a petroleum power. It must make equally massive 
investment in the national infrastructure. These investments almost 
certainly will cost in excess a one-third of a trillion dollars and this may 
be greater sum than the kingdoms can self finance even if it shifts from 
dependence on state investment to dependence on private financing. 
Saudi Arabia may be able to meet this mix of internal challenges, but the 
task will not be easy, restricting Saudi society and the economy present 
the most serious challenges of all, and change most come at a time when 
Islamic extension is a serious concern and Saudi Arabia's oil income is 
not sufficient to meet it social and economic needs. Saudi Arabia real 
needs are to match education and social reform with economic reform. 
The demand for greater transparency and pressure for political social amd 
economic reform in democratic fashion put the ruling class of Saudi 
Arabia in dilemma .The prevailing sentiments in Saudi Arabia indicate a 
clear majority support for democracy and overwhelming rejection of 
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autocratic rule. The reformist movement in Saudi Arabia may be 
discerned as the beginning of democratic awareness of the people— 
indeed an important development. The reformist movement is not an 
organized political activity at the moment. It should not be consider a 
weak movement in Saudi socio-political evolution. However, it could 
play constructive role in buoyant disposition of Saudi socio political 
evolution. It will not be wronged to say that the ruling class in Saudi 
Arabia is feeling congestion in the smooth functioning of the affairs. 
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